The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, Briefing 14, April 2005
 
Back to the main page on the 2005
NPT Review Conference.
Leading by the Wrong Example: New Nuclear Weapons Developments
in the United States
Background
Developing nuclear weapons capacity is back in vogue. Not only
in the non-NPT nuclear states (India, Pakistan and
Israel: see Briefing No.11) or
in ‘states of proliferation concern’ (North Korea and Iran:
see Briefings No. 6 & 15),
but in the most powerful and oldest nuclear state - the United
States. Over the last seven years, US nuclear policy has shifted
dramatically from one of steady, if grudging, compliance with arms
control and non-proliferation agreements to that of an aggressive
stance that threatens testing new weapons, and first use against
non-nuclear states. The four other Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) -
China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom
- are also reviewing their nuclear weapons infrastructure, albeit
to a much lesser degree (see Briefing No.10).
How the international community responds to these actions may well
influence the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the overall
non-proliferation regime.
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligates nuclear
weapon states (NWS) to negotiate towards the elimination of nuclear
weapons. However, by 1995, the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS)
had begun raising fundamental questions over whether the NWS intended
to follow through with their Article VI obligations. The Final Documents
of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences reiterated these concerns
with increasing clarity and alarm, as little progress was seen and
in some cases, such as the 1998 US Senate vote against CTBT ratification,
regression was evidenced.
This mixture of Article VI non-action in some cases and back-sliding
in others has only increased during the Bush administration. For
example, the 2001 US Nuclear Policy Statement describes the role
of nuclear weapons well into the future, not only as part of a nuclear
deterrent policy but as part of America’s war-fighting strategy.
While the Moscow Treaty aspires to reduce active, deployed nuclear
warhead numbers, its lack of transparency and reversibility leave
future intentions to chance and question, while maintaining thousands
of nuclear weapons in its core stocks. Perhaps most provocatively,
the Bush administration has pursued a host of more robust nuclear
policy objectives: new strategic nuclear delivery systems including
both missiles and bombers; a new Modern Pit Facility with the capacity
to manufacture between 250 and 900 nuclear components annually;
a decrease in the time necessary to prepare for nuclear testing;
consideration of nuclear-tipped missile defence interceptors; and
a series of new nuclear weapons for particular purposes.
Opening the Door
The United States has not developed a new nuclear weapon since
1988 but now there are clear signs in this direction. Through successive
yearly budgets submitted to a receptive US Congress, the Bush administration
has shown a desire to rethink many aspects of its nuclear policy.
The first move occurred in May 2003 when the Senate overturned the
1994 Spratt-Furse provision, which had barred research and development
that could lead to the production of low-yield nuclear weapons -
weapons with explosive yields less than the equivalent of five kilotons
of TNT (i.e. “mini-nukes”). Spratt-Furse had been intended to reinforce
a bright line between conventional and nuclear weapons to ensure
that the threshold for their use would not be lowered.
Enacting the Administration’s New Nuclear Weapon Initiatives
With Spratt-Furse removed, in 2003 the US administration requested
research funds for the Advanced Concepts Initiative (ACI) and the
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). The ACI programme was to
design new and modified warheads with specific characteristics:
lowered yields, certain radiation outputs, and other blast effects.
RNEP proposed to study modifying an existing weapon so that it would
penetrate some depth into the ground before detonating, increasing
its ability to destroy buried targets. The administration also requested
funds to reduce the maximum time between a presidential order to
conduct a nuclear test and the test itself to 18 months, shortening
the standard since 1996 of 24 to 36 months. Congress passed these
provisions and they became law by the end of 2003.
In 2004, the administration requested continued funding for the
ACI and RNEP programmes, along with others designed to reinvigorate
the US nuclear stockpile. However, in an unexpected move, Congress
ultimately decided to cut or significantly curtail funding for all
these initiatives, including the elimination of the ACI and RNEP
budgets.
The administration has made restoration of RNEP funding a top priority
for 2005, and through Congressional action, ACI has been replaced
by a new line item, the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). Although
the specifics are not clear, RRW is intended to research the design
modification of existing warheads to determine whether they can
be made more reliable. However, there are suspicions that new warhead
designs may be introduced in the process, potentially leading to
testing.
US Rationale for New Nuclear Weapons
The US administration has stated a concern that the current US
stockpile is not suited to post-Cold War threats, thereby undermining
their deterrent. According to this argument, underground facilities
built by North Korea, Iran, and potentially others may not be sufficiently
held at risk by the current nuclear arsenal; concurrently, small,
“rogue” states or terrorists may not believe that the United States
would use a massive nuclear weapon against a relatively smaller
and weaker foe.
Simultaneously, proponents of new nuclear weapon development have
begun to raise doubts concerning the safety, security, and reliability
of the existing stockpile and the Stockpile Stewardship program,
although the stockpile continues to be certified each year.
Put together, advocates argue that solutions lie in modified and
perhaps new warhead designs, and that the US government should be
preparing to test when there is a failure to certify the stockpile
or when a new or modified warhead design is so fundamentally different
that it would require testing before deployment.
New Nuclear Weapons and the NPT
While the NPT does not explicitly ban the development of new nuclear
weapons, such developments are inconsistent with progress on implementation
of Article VI. Final Documents from the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences
lay out paths toward fulfilment of Article VI obligations, and are
designed to lower the visibility and importance of nuclear weapons
in NWS strategic planning, while placing more and more stringent
restrictions on the nuclear weapons infrastructure. Specifically,
they include: ratification of CTBT; FMCT negotiation; negative security
assurances; and systematic, progressive efforts to reduce nuclear
weapons globally and an undertaking to accomplish total nuclear
disarmament.
In contrast, the Bush administration has sought new missions for
nuclear weapons, raising their visibility; pursued arms reductions
negotiations with less stringent requirements; vowed not to work
for ratification of the CTBT and has considered the legal possibility
of un-signing the treaty; refuses to negotiate a verifiable FMCT;
has withdrawn negative security assurances; and is researching new
nuclear weapons while advocating Stockpile Stewardship activities
that will maintain the nuclear stockpile for the foreseeable future
and may lead to new warhead designs that will necessitate a return
to testing.
It is highly unlikely that the US Congress will pass the relevant
legislation that deals with these issues before the Review Conference,
and so States Parties will not have the benefit of knowing whether
the 2004 cuts in new nuclear weapon funding will hold. In light
of this and the overall US nuclear posture, it is likely that while
the US will want to focus on issues such as the Additional Protocol
and the fuel cycle, its own provocative nuclear weapon policies
will significantly hamper its negotiating manoeuvrability and weaken
the overall non-proliferation regime.
What Washington says and does about nuclear weapons can have a
profound effect on other countries. If the United States places
more reliance on nuclear weapons, other nations will follow. The
power of US example should not be underestimated. Regrettably, with
respect to its Article VI commitments under the NPT, the United
States is currently leading by the wrong example.
Recommendations
We urge all NWS to:
1. Reaffirm their commitment to Article VI by forgoing any and
all new nuclear weapon development;
2. Reiterate that nuclear stockpile maintenance programmes are
only for the purpose of ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile
as part of an irreversible process of nuclear weapons reductions;
and
3. Commit to a timetable of negotiations towards fulfilling their
2000 disarmament commitments.
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