The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, Briefing 13, April 2005
 
Back to the main page on the 2005
NPT Review Conference.
Counter-proliferation in a Non-proliferation World
Background
Counter-proliferation—the taking of active steps to interdict
or counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their components,
or the tools used to manufacture them—covers everything
from anthrax vaccinations, to ballistic missile defences, to preventive
war. While the United States is the staunchest advocate and main
proponent of counterproliferation, other states have also embraced
the doctrine. For example, Defence Secretary Hoon recently stated
that one of the United Kingdom's goals for the 2005 NPT Review Conference
is to make the case for stronger and more effective counter-proliferation
measures.
The Clinton administration developed the 1993 Defense Counterproliferation
Initiative in response to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
the resultant ‘loose nukes’ fears of Russian weapons falling into
the hands of “irresponsible states or terrorist groups”. Secretary
of Defense Les Aspin announced the new policy, stating:
The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative in no way means
we will lessen our nonproliferation efforts. In fact, DoD's work
will strengthen prevention. What the Defense Counterproliferation
Initiative recognizes, however, is that proliferation may still
occur. Thus, we are adding protection as a major policy goal.
The Bush Administration agreed that counter-proliferation was complementary
to non-proliferation but after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the
US perspective turned sharply. In 2002 the Bush Administration moved
counter-proliferation to centre-stage, as set out in two new policy
documents. The National Security Strategy declared:
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads
of radicalism and technology. …In the new world we have entered,
the only path to peace and security is the path of action.
The Nuclear Posture Review asserted that:
- US nuclear weapons could be used against non-nuclear forces;
- current US nuclear arsenals were insufficient, particularly
in combating hard and deeply-buried targets; and
- missile defences were to become one leg of a new strategic triad.
Counter-proliferation now headed US efforts to combat WMD proliferation.
Non-proliferation still included traditional multilateral efforts,
but US policy actively promoted new methods to improve states’ capability
to prevent unauthorised WMD-related transfers and to criminalise
proliferation activities.
The relationship between counterproliferation and the NPT
Some specific US counter-proliferation policies, such as preventive
war doctrine and missile defence, have less to do with supporting
or enforcing the NPT and the international regimes and more to do
with the consolidation and extension of unilateral options and military
power.
However, the United States has taken some significant counter-proliferation
and non-proliferation initiatives to address the nuclear proliferation
threat in a post-9/11 world. They mainly deal with efforts to disrupt
and eliminate trafficking networks, cooperative threat reduction
or controls to limit the legal spread of proliferation enabling
technology. These goals are worthy and have contributed to some
major successes, including uncovering the A.Q.Khan trafficking network,
and the decision by Libya to renounce its WMD programmes. The key
counter-proliferation elements, which are more controversial, include:
Preventive War
The role of military force in pursuit of NPT objectives has been
moved to centre stage by recent pre-emptive and preventive war debates.
The term ‘pre-emptive war’ refers to the use of force in self-defence
against an imminent attack. But what the US National Security Strategy
calls preemptive war, is really ‘preventive war’ to “act against
such emerging threats before they are fully formed”. Preventive
war is indistinguishable from outright aggression and has no legal
justification.
The United States led a “coalition of the willing” and invaded
Iraq in what is the most aggressive example of counter-proliferation
doctrine to date, despite the widely held belief that a combination
of containment and international inspections had nullified the Iraqi
WMD threat. Yet the United States continues to assert the right
to all options when dealing with states thought to be acquiring
nuclear weapons programmes, including preventive war. While the
UN High Level Panel recently reaffirmed states’ rights to take pre-emptive
military action (against an imminent or proximate threat), it maintained
that UN Security Council (UNSC) authorisation is needed before a
state may act preventively (against a nonimminent or non-proximate
threat).
The Proliferation Security Initiative
Unveiled in 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is,
as the US Administration likes to say, an activity not an organisation.
It aims to enable interdiction of WMD materials in the air, on land,
or at sea, through a number of initiatives, including bilateral
boarding agreements. Seventeen states form the core of the PSI,
while another 60 states have indicated their support, although concerns
persist regarding the legality of some aspects of the initiative.
Without a truly multilateral framework, it remains to be seen how
effective another ad hoc, ‘coalition of the willing’ effort will
be in the long run. Early evidence suggests that the PSI has much
merit and growth potential. (http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/04PSI.htm).
UN Security Council Resolution 1540
Recently, the United States has pursued its counter-proliferation
objectives through the UNSC, citing Chapter VII of the UN Charter
as its legal basis. In particular, UNSC Resolution 1540, adopted
unanimously on 28 April 2004, is designed to strengthen the non-proliferation
regime, particularly with regard to non-state actors. It calls on
all states to establish domestic controls to prevent WMD proliferation,
including new legislation, enhanced export controls, new enforcement
procedures and international cooperation. It also establishes a
special UNSC committee to oversee the implementation of the resolution
and requests states to report on their progress. Only about one-third
of the membership has so far provided reports.
The effectiveness of counter-proliferation partly depends on accurate,
timely intelligence to detect illicit activity and potential threats.
The lesson from Iraq, however, was that the intelligence was poor
and few states agreed with the US assessment of the Iraqi threat.
Implications for the 2005 NPT Review Conference
A critical part of ensuring compliance with the NPT’s obligations
is enforcement. Compliance and enforcement were not addressed at
a general level in the 2000 Review Conference Final Document, although
the specific challenges of North Korea and Iraq were discussed.
US-led counter-proliferation initiatives have attempted to fill
this void. All of these initiatives need much hard work to make
them more effective and more congruent with international law. Some
appear selective in their application and overly reliant on military
force.
But with further compliance challenges coming to the fore in the
last five years, it seems likely that counter-proliferation initiatives,
such as the PSI, will feature in the 2005 Review Conference. In
exchange for PSI recognition, however, States Parties might attempt
to place restrictions on its activities or call for its universalisation,
as recommended by the UN High Level Panel.
Two other issues that the Review Conference may chose to explore
are first, the linkage between movement on nuclear disarmament commitments
under the NPT and broadening support for the PSI, and second, the
extent to which certain aspects of the counter-proliferation portfolio
(such as preventive war) actually encourages nuclear proliferation.
The PSI and other counter-proliferation initiatives should not be
seen as a separate activity in a losing war against weapons proliferation,
but as tools in the wider context of non-proliferation and
nuclear disarmament.
Recommendations
We urge:
1. All States Parties to:
- reaffirm the primacy of the NPT as the key ingredient in the
international nuclear non-proliferation framework;
- strengthen the NPT by granting it institutional support to enhance
accountability and fortify compliance monitoring; and
- review, in good faith, the counter-proliferation toolbox and
endorse and further develop those tools that strengthen compliance.
2. The United States to:
- pursue good faith efforts to formalise current counter-proliferation
efforts through appropriate UN processes;
- build confidence in intelligence and threat assessments with
allies (i.e. within NATO), and where possible, within the necessary
authorising agency of legitimate force (i.e. the UNSC); and
- build on recent positive indications of intent to move away
from confrontational diplomacy and unilateral action towards constructive
engagement and multilateral, law-based solutions, as exemplified
by the NPT.
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