The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, Briefing 12, March 2005
 
Back to the main page on the 2005
NPT Review Conference.
The Need for a Strengthened IAEA Safeguards System
Background
Established in 1957 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
had its genesis in US President Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ policy.
The Agency has thus always had the dual, even contradictory, role
of promoting the peaceful use of ‘atomic energy’ whilst simultaneously
trying to ensure, via safeguards, that this use was not put to military
purpose. Articles IV and III, respectively, of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) reinforced this dual role and Non Nuclear Weapon States
(NNWS) were obliged to accept comprehensive safeguards agreements
(CSAs) with the IAEA.
However, with the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons
programme and difficulties in verifying North Korea’s safeguards
declaration, it was recognised that the traditional CSAs were failing
adequately to verify compliance with the NPT, especially in regard
to detecting undeclared nuclear activities.
To strengthen the safeguards system, the Agency launched the ‘93+2
Program’ in December 1993. In addition to new measures under existing
CSAs, this also expanded the IAEA’s legal mandate by the adoption
in May 1997 of a model Additional Protocol (AP), designed to allow
more intrusive inspections and give greater assurance about the
absence of clandestine activities.
Recent Developments
Many States see the IAEA framework as a ‘bargain’ between the provision
of technical aid and nuclear technology and their acceptance of
safeguards. They therefore apply pressure to maintain the rough
balance between the IAEA’s efforts in each sphere. From the mid
1980s the Agency’s safeguards budget had zero real growth despite
an ever- increasing range of countries, facilities and nuclear materials
coming under its remit.
Whilst modest budget increases have been agreed for 2004-2007,
resource constraints mean that the IAEA still has to look for cost
effectiveness in applying safeguards. It is thus developing the
concept of ‘integrated safeguards’, formally adopted in March 2002.
Essentially this ‘customises’ verification for individual states
that have both a CSA and AP, and where the absence of diversion
of nuclear materials for military purposes and of undeclared nuclear
activities can be credibly assured. Once introduced the integrated
approach enables the level of safeguards activities to be reduced.
Currently only a handful of States have integrated safeguards systems,
while some 39 States have yet to introduce the mandatory CSA under
the NPT. Moreover, only 65 of the 188 States have brought APs into
force. This is a disappointing rate of uptake, especially as the
IAEA’s original goal was to conclude such protocols with all Member
States before the 2000 Review Conference.
To bolster the NPT regime, the Agency has also promoted the idea
of international and regional management of the processing of plutonium
and highly enriched uranium and of spent fuel and nuclear waste.
This issue will be discussed in a later briefing.
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs)
The main method used in traditional CSA safeguards is material
accountancy, whereby the nuclear materials fed into a State’s nuclear
plants are checked against those that are produced. This is essentially
an audit system that seeks to establish the quantities of nuclear
material present within defined areas and whether there are any
changes in these quantities over time. It can only detect the diversion
of material after it has occurred, not prevent it,
and is restricted to declared facilities only.
This is supplemented by containment and surveillance measures (e.g.
use of seals and cameras) and on-site inspections. Such inspections
are limited to designated areas in declared facilities, as agreed
by the State concerned. Whilst it is possible for the IAEA to make
‘special inspections’ of other areas this facility has been invoked
only once, in 1993 in North Korea, which refused to cooperate.
Additional Protocol (AP)
The AP changes the IAEA’s safeguards system from the accountancy
based CSA to a more qualitative approach “aimed at gathering a comprehensive
picture of a State’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities”, including
nuclear-related imports and exports. States have to provide much
more detailed information and the number and type of facilities
the IAEA can inspect and monitor is considerably increased. Short
notice inspection of all declared and, if necessary, undeclared
facilities, is guaranteed. The IAEA can use environmental sampling
during inspection and makes much greater use of open source and
intelligence related information.
The AP thus allows the IAEA to look for clandestine nuclear facilities
by giving it the authority to visit any facility – declared or not
– to “investigate questions about, or inconsistencies in a State’s
nuclear declaration”.
Weaknesses of the Safeguards Regime
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Implementation has tended to be bureaucratic, cautious and
focused on formal rules and guidelines specifically designed
not to be too intrusive or disruptive.
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There are limits on the number and frequency of inspections,
which can only take place at agreed key points in declared facilities.
States can reject inspectors, delay their designation and entry
visas and insist that they are accompanied.
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The concentration on material audit has inevitably meant that
most inspections occur in states with large nuclear infrastructures.
Over 70 percent of IAEA safeguards effort has taken place in
Canada, Germany and Japan, which are arguably of less proliferation
concern.
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Safeguards are meant to detect the diversion of a ‘significant
quantity’ (SQ) of nuclear material which is defined as 8kg of
plutonium and 25kg of highly enriched uranium, based on advice
from the 1960 -70s. On today’s standards these figures are far
too high and a state could manufacture nuclear weapons with
much less material.
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Detection of possible diversion is also meant to be timely,
but in practice the Agency rarely meets its timeliness criteria,
i.e. one month for unirradiated plutonium and highly enriched
uranium and three months for irradiated direct-use material.
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The use of material accountancy is particularly problematic
in facilities handling bulk quantities of nuclear materials,
such as enrichment, reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants.
Losses of nuclear material inherent in these processes and measurement
uncertainties mean that even with the best available and foreseeable
safeguards technology it is not possible to get the accuracy
necessary to ensure that diversion would be detected. Reprocessing
plants, for example, typically handle tonnes of plutonium per
year, yet just 3–4kg of this material is needed to make a nuclearweapon.
States are allowed to accumulate weapon–usable material and develop
civil nuclear technologies and infrastructures that can be used
for nuclear weapons purposes. They can then withdraw from the NPT
at 90 days notice whilst retaining the facilities and materials
acquired under it. The Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) are not obliged
to accept safeguards, although they voluntarily place some of their
facilities and nuclear material under them.
The IAEA has no power to compel a state to take or refrain from
any action and there are no explicit enforcement mechanisms within
the NPT. Universal and sustained application of the AP and integrated
safeguards would address many of these problem areas. Even without
a new agreement to limit the processing of weapon-usable material
in civil nuclear programmes, the safeguards regime can provide credible
assurances of the absence of undeclared materials and activities.
Such guarantees would be relative and can never be absolute, especially
where a nation deliberately sets out to deceive the Agency.
However, there is no doubt that the safeguards regime enhances
non-proliferation objectives and international security. But the
authority of the IAEA needs to be enlarged and backed by the enforcement
responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in
verifying compliance with the NPT.
Recommendations
- State Parties that have not yet done so need to sign and implement
CSAs and conclude and bring into force APs as a matter of urgency.
- It should be the norm that any country seeking nuclear technology
for peaceful purposes must fully implement CSAs and conclude an
AP.
- The NWS need to increase the scope of their voluntary safeguards
offers and allow greater IAEA access to their nuclear facilities
and materials.
- Member States should agree a substantial further increase in
the IAEA’s regular budget, particularly for safeguards work.
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