The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, Briefing 11, March 2005
 
Back to the main page on the 2005
NPT Review Conference.
Towards a Universal Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
Background
The NPT has more States Parties than any other arms control or
disarmament treaty. However three countries of ‘nuclear proliferation
concern’ remain outside the Treaty - India, Pakistan
and Israel.
Since Article IX of the NPT defines Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)
as having manufactured and tested a nuclear device prior to 1 January
1967, it is not possible for India, Pakistan or Israel to join the
NPT as NWS without an amendment to the Treaty. This would not be
palatable to many Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), which have renounced
nuclear weapons on the understanding that there will never be more
than five NWS (who are obliged to dismantle them).
At the 1995 NPT Review Conference “universality”, and particularly
Israel’s nuclear weapons programme, was a major area of contention.
As part of the package of agreements that enabled the Treaty to
be extended indefinitely without a vote, States Parties agreed that
future Review Conferences should:
Address specifically what might be done to strengthen the
implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.
[All countries that had not already done so were urged to] accede
to the Treaty at the earliest date.
In addition, a Resolution on the Middle East was agreed, calling
for “the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East
zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and
their delivery systems”.
Between 1995 and 2000, significant progress was made towards universality
with Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, the
United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu acceding to the Treaty.
The 2000 NPT Review Conference called for “India, Israel and Pakistan
to accede to the Treaty as NNWS promptly and without condition”.
States Parties also agreed to “make determined efforts” to achieve
universality. Since 2000, little effort has been made to encourage
India, Pakistan or Israel to accede as NNWS. The United States,
in particular, appears to be moving towards greater accommodation
of the nuclear weapons’ programmes of these states.
Towards a Nuclear Weapon-Free Middle East?
Israel’s official policy is that it “will not be the first country
to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East”. It pursues a policy
of opacity neither confirming nor denying possession of nuclear
weapons. Whilst Israel has not openly defied the non-proliferation
regime by conducting a nuclear test or declaring itself to be a
nuclear power, it is believed to possess between 75 and 200 nuclear
weapons.
US tolerance of Israel's nuclear weapon programme is a significant
obstacle to preventing proliferation in the Middle East, as many
countries in the region perceive a double standard, contrasting
US accommodation of Israel with its stance towards Iran, Iraq and
Syria.
Arab states want Israel to give up its nuclear capability as part
of comprehensive peace talks. Israel, however, insists that the
peace process must be completed before it considers relinquishing
its nuclear capability. IAEA Director-General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei
suggests that the two should be pursued “together in tandem” and
that all parties should pursue:
A dialogue on regional security as part of the peace process.
One goal of this dialogue would be to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapons-free
zone.
Turning back the clock in South Asia
In 1998, India and Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests.
UN Security Council Resolution (1172) condemned the tests, and called
on India and Pakistan to become parties to the NPT and to the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) “without delay and without conditions”.
India and Pakistan argue that their nuclear capabilities are essential
for regional security and “strategic stability”. However, in summer
2002, the two countries came close to nuclear war as tensions escalated
over Kashmir. Although they pulled back from the brink, far from
enhancing security, the presence of nuclear weapons exacerbated
this crisis.
India's stated position is that it supports “global and complete
nuclear disarmament, within a timebound framework” as proposed by
Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi in 1998. Although India has a no-first-use
policy, it has adopted a nuclear doctrine similar to NATO’s strategy
of “minimum deterrence”, including a triad of nuclear forces.
Pakistan advocates measures of “restraint” such as de-alerting
and non-deployment of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles and anti-ballistic
missile systems. In 2004, Pakistan scientist A.Q. Khan was found
to be at the centre of a proliferation network, supplying Libya,
Iran, and North Korea.
Universality and Compliance
India and Pakistan reject calls to join the NPT as NNWS, criticising
the NPT as a “discriminatory” regime, imposing different obligations
on NNWS and NWS. They also point to the failure of the NWS to fulfil
their side of the NPT bargain by implementing disarmament commitments
under Article VI.
Israel also highlights compliance. In the Knesset's first debate
on nuclear weapons on 2 February 2000, Minister Chaim Ramon said
that the NPT “does not provide a fitting solution for our region
as proved in the case of Iran and proved in the case of Iraq”.
The goal of the NPT is the elimination of nuclear weapons. Dr ElBaradei
argues that ultimately, as with international norms against slavery
or genocide the renunciation of nuclear weapons should be "universal
and permanent".
Prospects for Progress
There are three main proposals for breaking the impasse:
1. Recognise India, Pakistan and Israel as NWS?
They could be treated ‘as if’ they were NWS and allowed some form
of recognition in return for taking on similar nonproliferation
and disarmament obligations to the NWS. An additional protocol to
the NPT obliging India, Pakistan and Israel to behave ‘as if’ they
were NWS might enable progress to be made on reducing the risks
of horizontal proliferation and nuclear weapon use and improving
safety, security, and command and control. However, given the disarmament
record of the NWS, placing them on the same footing may make little
difference, and is likely to be resisted by the majority of NNWS.
http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No7-Lodgaard%20Final.pdf
2. Constrain further development of India, Pakistan and Israel's
nuclear weapons programmes?
Achieving entry into force of the CTBT and a verifiable FMCT would
help to constrain further development of their nuclear weapons programmes.
Neither India nor Pakistan has signed the CTBT. Israel has signed,
but not ratified.
3. Include India, Pakistan and Israel in parallel high-level
consultations?
In 1999, Malaysia proposed regular high-level consultation meetings
with the remaining hold-outs, to be convened by the chair of the
respective NPT Preparatory Committee or Review Conference.
Dr ElBaradei has also suggested that India, Pakistan, Israel and
North Korea should be:
Encouraged to contribute their insights and concerns [to the
coming Review Conference. He proposes that the Conference starts
the process of agreeing] benchmarks for non-proliferation and
disarmament, [including] a concrete roadmap for verified, irreversible
nuclear disarmament, complete with a timetable, [involving not
only the NWS] but also India, Pakistan and Israel.
Recommendations
We urge that:
1. The establishment of a Middle East NuclearWeapon Free Zone is
considered as part of the Middle East peace process and is supported
at the NPT Review Conference.
2. The United States offer Israel a credible security guarantee
in exchange for a Middle East NWFZ.
3. India and Pakistan:
- freeze their nuclear weapons programmes at current levels;
- build confidence and enhance security with each other and with
China with the aim of reducing and eliminating their nuclear capabilities;
and
- publicly and unequivocally uphold all of the non-proliferation
provisions of the NPT.
4. NPT States Parties agree a mechanism for regular consulting
and constructively engaging with the three remaining non-members
of the NPT as de facto NWS. However, de jure recognition
of India, Israel and Pakistan as NWS would damage, perhaps fatally,
the NPT and must continue to be resisted.
5. The NWS make greater efforts to implement their Article VI disarmament
obligations and, by example, encourage India, Pakistan and Israel
to eliminate their nuclear weapons.
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