The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, Briefing 10, March 2005
 
Back to the main page on the 2005
NPT Review Conference.
A Promise Not Realised:
Nuclear Disarmament by the Nuclear Weapon States
Background
The five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) – China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom and the United States – are committed under Article
VI of the NPT to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament”.
As part of a package of decisions that allowed the NPT to be extended
indefinitely without a vote at the 1995 Review Conference, States
Parties agreed to a series of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Non- Proliferation and Disarmament. The NWS agreed to the “determined
pursuit” of “systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear
weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons”.
They also agreed that future Review Conferences should:
Evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including
the implementation of undertakings of the States Parties under
the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through
which, further progress should be sought in the future.
In the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document States
Parties agreed to 13 “practical steps for the systematic and progressive
efforts to implement Article VI”, including an “unequivocal undertaking”
by the NWS to “accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear
arsenals”.
China
China claims to be contributing to nuclear disarmament through
its long-standing policy of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons but
it currently appears to be neither ready nor willing to enter the
disarmament process itself. There have been no new initiatives to
implement the 2000 Final Document and China has been pursuing modernisation
of its nuclear forces to improving their accuracy and mobility.
Although China has submitted several working papers at recent NPT
meetings, it is the least transparent of the NWS. It has provided
little or no information about its nuclear weapons programme or
steps it has taken to implement the 2000 Final Document. Instead,
China has focused mainly on multilateral steps and the responsibilities
of other parties to the Treaty. In a working paper to the 2004 PrepCom,
it argues that:
States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals shoulder special
responsibilities for nuclear disarmament and should take the lead
to drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals, set their reduction
promise in a legal form and destroy all the nuclear weapons reduced
from their arsenals.
France
France regards nuclear deterrence as a “pillar” of its defence
policy. In June 2001, far from endorsing any unequivocal commitment
to eliminate France's nuclear weapons, President Jacques Chirac
reaffirmed that nuclear deterrence is and will continue to be the
“ultimate guarantee” of French security.
France claims to have “halved the number of nuclear delivery vehicles
in its force”. However, much of these reductions have taken place
as a result of removing from service older weapon systems, such
as the Pluton, Hades and S3D ground launched missiles, and ending
the Mirage IV's nuclear mission.
Although France cites a list of “significant decisions...regarding
implementation of Article VI”, including ratification of the CTBT
and the closure of its nuclear test sites in the Pacific, all these
decisions were taken in the 1990s and it gives no examples of steps
taken to implement the 2000 Final Document.
France is currently pursuing an extensive modernisation programme.
It is deploying four new Triomphant-class nuclear submarines,
armed with TN75 nuclear warheads and is developing a new submarine-launched
missile, the M51, which will carry up to six nuclear warheads and
will have a greater range and accuracy than the current M45 missile.
In addition France is currently modernising its air-sol moyenne
portée (ASMP), medium range air-launched missile for deployment
on new Rafale aircraft.
Russia
In a press statement in February 2004, President Vladimir Putin
committed Russia to a nuclear deterrent force “for some decades
ahead”. During questions he announced that Russia has carried out
tests of “new hypersound-speed, high-precision new weapons systems
that can hit targets at intercontinental distance and can adjust
their altitude and course as they travel”. Later that year, Russia's
Minister for Defence, Sergey Ivanov, stated at a London conference:
Russia regards nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence as the
basis for global stability ... [and] ... Russian leaders regard the
maintenance of fighting ability and readiness of strategic nuclear
forces as their top priority task.
While Russia is committed to reducing its strategic nuclear forces
to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012 under the 2003 Moscow Treaty,
it continues to retain an unknown number of sub-strategic or ‘tactical’
nuclear warheads. It has shown little progress on transparency or
reductions since the 2000 Final Document.
United Kingdom
Although the UK government states that it “continues to support
the disarmament measures listed in the 2000 Final Document”, it
has made little progress to implement them. With the exception of
further verification work on the reduction and elimination of nuclear
weapons, it has taken no new initiatives since the Strategic Defence
Review of 1998.
The UK government cites removal of aging weapons such as Polaris,
WE177 free-fall bombs and (US) Lance missile and artillery roles.
However, it does not acknowledge that the current Trident system
represents a significant enhancement in the UK's nuclear capability.
Although Trident currently deploys the same number of warheads as
its predecessor Polaris, it has a longer range, greater accuracy,
and the warheads can be independently targeted, enabling Trident
to reach a greater range of targets. Trident is also deployed in
a sub-strategic role.
Rather than pursuing nuclear disarmament, the UK has announced
that a decision on whether to replace Trident is likely to be taken
after the next General Election. In 2004, the 1958 UK-US Mutual
Defence Agreement was extended for a further 10 years, which will
enable continued cooperation on Trident and development of any future
UK nuclear weapon system.
United States
In recent months the US administration has been backtracking from
its administration Article VI obligations and the 1995 and 2000
agreements. US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen
Rademaker asserted in February 2005 that Article VI:
- does not refer specifically to the nuclear weapons states nor
requires the conclusion of ‘agreements’ relating to disarmament;
- establishes no timetable or deadline for accomplishing these
objectives; and
- contains no suggestion that nuclear disarmament is to be achieved
before general and complete disarmament is achieved.
Rademaker claims that “it is indisputable” that the United States
has “more than fulfilled our obligations”, and highlights the Moscow
Treaty which requires reductions in US-Russian strategic nuclear
warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012.
Unfortunately, these reductions, while welcome, are neither irreversible
nor verifiable – a step backwards from the earlier START treaties.
The primary impact of the Moscow Treaty is to reduce the number
of deployed warheads by downloading (into a ‘nuclear hedge’) rather
than destroying them.
Little Progress since 2000
Since 2000 NWS have indicated that Article VI is important but
not crucial to the NPT. While they see the need for a change in
focus for the NPT in line with post-9/11 threat perceptions, the
majority of States Parties continue to regard Article VI as the
heart of the Treaty.
Rather than reducing the prominence of nuclear weapons in their
security doctrines, several NWS have undertaken new weapons research
programmes and introduced new targeting doctrines. All the NWS are
embarking on modernisation programmes and remain committed to retaining
nuclear weapons, indefinitely.
Recommendations
1. It is vital that the 2005 NPT Review Conference:
- undertakes a review of implementation of the 2000 NPT Final
Document;
- reaffirms the disarmament commitments agreed in 2000; and
- makes progress on establishing criteria for monitoring compliance
under Article VI.
2. The NWS must:
- accelerate implementation of their “unequivocal commitment”
to nuclear disarmament; and
- provide full and transparent reporting, both on their implementation
of the 2000 agreements and on future progress towards disarmament.
3. Russia and the United States must build on the Moscow Treaty
by taking additional reciprocal measures, such as:
- abandoning the nuclear hedge (in effect, changing the Moscow
Treaty from a downloading to a disarmament treaty);
- dismantling weapons in a transparent way;
- undertaking not to develop new nuclear weapons; and
- removing ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons from their stockpiles.
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