The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, Briefing 8, March 2005
 
Back to the main page on the 2005
NPT Review Conference.
NATO: Nuclear Sharing or Proliferation?
“A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration
of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention
continue to require widespread participation by European Allies
involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime
basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control
and consultation arrangements.”
NATO's Strategic Concept
Background
Nuclear weapons have played a key role in NATO’s military strategy
since its inception in 1949. NATO’s current Strategic Concept (1999)
states that the:
Fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is
political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind
of war.
NATO nuclear forces include strategic weapons provided by the United
States, France, and the United Kingdom, along with US ‘sub-strategic’
or ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Within NATO these
substrategic weapons are seen as symbolic of the transatlantic link
between the United States and its European allies.
Five Non Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS) parties to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) – Belgium, Germany, Italy, The
Netherlands and Turkey – participate in nuclear sharing
arrangements with the United States. These countries host US B61
‘gravity’ bombs that, in the event of nuclear war, could be delivered
by aircraft and pilots belonging to the host nation. Previously
Greece also participated in nuclear sharing, but in 2003 US nuclear
weapons were reportedly withdrawn from the country. The United
Kingdom also hosts US nuclear weapons, USAF aircraft and pilots.
http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd04norris
Does NATO nuclear sharing breach the NPT?
NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements were at the centre of negotiations
between the United States and Russia on Articles I and II of the
NPT in the mid-1960s. Article I of the NPT states that:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not
to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive
devices directly, or indirectly.
Article II imposes a complementary obligation on NNWS not to “receive
the transfer” of nuclear weapons.
NATO nuclear sharing appears to breach these obligations as it
is intended to allow the transfer of US nuclear weapons to non-nuclear
Allies to deliver in time of war. NATO asserts that nuclear sharing
is compatible with the NPT, based on a US interpretation that it
does “not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over
them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which
time the treaty would no longer be controlling”.
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2000nuclearsharing5.htm#Annex%201
In the past ten years, this interpretation has become increasingly
controversial. At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, Mexico asked in
Main Committee 1 for clarification on whether nuclear sharing breached
Articles I and II. Mexico's concerns were taken up by the Non-Aligned
Movement. As a result several proposals for language questioning
the US interpretation were put forward for inclusion in the Committee's
final report, including:
The Conference notes that among States parties there are various
interpretations of the implementation of certain aspects of articles
I and II which need clarification, especially regarding the obligations
of nuclear weapon States parties...when acting in cooperation
with groups of nuclear-weapon States parties under regional arrangements...
In 1998, Egypt proposed a way to close the loophole on nuclear
sharing by suggesting that:
The PrepCom recommend that the 2000 Review Conference state
in clear and unambiguous terms that Articles I and II of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons allow for no exceptions
and that the NPT is binding on States Parties at all times.
At the 1999 PrepCom, a statement on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition
(NAC) stated that,
“all the articles of the NPT are binding on all States Parties
and at all times and in all circumstances”.
NATO also asserts that nuclear sharing is in compliance with the
NPT because it pre-dates the NPT. However, not all sharing was not
challenged in the 1960s, it is being questioned today. Is it really
desirable for the NPT to be non-binding during wartime? It is time
for this ambiguous loophole to be closed.
Developments since the 2000 Review Conference
The 1995 NPT Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament contain a number of commitments relevant to NATO,
such as the establishment of additional Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones
(NWFZs), and the need for strengthened security assurances for NNWS.
Similarly, the 2000 NPT Final Document includes:
- the need for further unilateral reductions in nuclear arsenals;
- increased transparency;
- further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons;
- measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons
systems; and
- a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.
This call for a “diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security
policies” followed concerns about NATO’s Strategic Concept, which
describes nuclear weapons as the “supreme guarantee” of Allied security.
In June 2004, NATO published two fact sheets, which it claims demonstrate
the “radical” and “far reaching” steps the Alliance has taken to
adapt its nuclear policy, by reducing the number of nuclear weapons
in Europe since the end of the Cold War.
http://www.nato.int/issues/nuclear/index.html
However, recent figures published by the US-based National Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) indicate that the number of US nuclear warheads
based in Europe has remained static at about 480 since the 1994
US Nuclear Posture Review. Since 2000, therefore, there has
been no positive change to Alliance nuclear posture.
Far from reducing the role of nuclear weapons, the United States
is now pursuing development of weapons such as ‘bunker busters’
and ‘mininukes’, and enhancing the role of nuclear weapons in counter-proliferation
and preventive war strategies. NATO may come under pressure to adopt
similar policies.
Prospects for Progress
NATO does not publish details on the number of nuclear weapons
remaining in Europe, despite the member states’ commitment to transparency
in the 2000 NPT Final Document. The continued presence of US nuclear
weapons has, in part, also resulted in Russia declining to discuss
their ‘tactical’ nuclear weapon holdings and dismantlement.
NATO claims that it is in “full compliance” with the NSAs issued
by the United States, the United Kingdom and France on the eve of
the 1995 NPT Review Conference. However, NATO’s refusal to rule
out first use of nuclear weapons is a major obstacle to further
steps to strengthen NSAs. It also effectively gives a green light
to NATO military planners to prepare for the option of using nuclear
weapons first. NATO’s policies have also proved a serious obstacle
to any possibility of a NWFZ in Central Europe.
NATO could play an important role in strengthening the NPT by supporting:
- ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT);
- efforts to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT);
and
- the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament
at the Conference on Disarmament.
However, since the 2004 Istanbul summit, NATO communiqués have
been silent on the subject of non-proliferation and disarmament.
Recommendations
We urge that:
1. The remaining US nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Europe.
These weapons are militarily obsolete and impede improved transatlantic
relations.
2. NATO seeks to negotiate a treaty with Russia on the verifiable
elimination of sub-strategic nuclear weapons and on warhead accounting.
3. NATO conducts a review of its Strategic Concept to include a
diminished role for nuclear weapons, including a commitment to no
first use of nuclear weapons.
4. The NPT Review Conference agrees a statement that the Treaty
is binding at all times and in all circumstances.
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