The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, Briefing 7, March 2005
 
Back to the main page on the 2005
NPT Review Conference.
The Importance of a Fissile Material Treaty
Background
The importance of ending the production of fissile materials for
nuclear weapons was recognised by the 1946 Baruch Plan. Various
proposals were mooted but it was only in the early 1990s that a
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) was placed on the international
agenda.
In September 1993, the Clinton Administration proposed an international
agreement to “ban the production of these materials forever”. Three
months later, in December 1993, the UN General Assembly passed,
without opposition, Resolution 48/75L which called for negotiations
on:
A non-discriminatory, multinational and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
To implement it, Ambassador Shannon of Canada was asked to carry
out consultations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.
In March 1995, a consensus was reached that the CD was the appropriate
forum to discuss the treaty and that an ad hoc committee should
be established with a mandate based on Resolution 48/75L.
The subsequent 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference firmly
placed a FMCT into its ‘Programme of Action for Nuclear Disarmament’.
However, it was only in August 1998 that the CD agreed to adopt
the Shannon Report as a basis for negotiations and the ad hoc committee
was finally set up. The committee did not meet as the major differences
over scope and verification, which had dogged the earlier consultations,
continued to prevent any progress.
Post 2000 Review Conference Activities
As part of its ‘Plan of Action’ the 2000 Review Conference called
for the CD to commence negotiations on a FMCT immediately, to conclude
within five years. The primary goal was to have the Nuclear Weapon
States (NWS) and the three countries outside the NPT regime (India,
Israel and Pakistan) as parties.
Unfortunately, the deadlock has continued and it has been impossible
to even start negotiations, with key NWS again putting forward different
priorities and linkages. Until August 2003, for example, China refused
to discuss a FMCT unless negotiations also began on the prevention
of an arms race in outer space (PAROS).
When China relented, the Bush Administration announced a major
review and progress halted for almost a year. The US review concluded
in July 2004 that, whilst still supporting a FMCT, it believed that
effective verification was not achievable. This stance effectively
returns the issue to the pre-Shannon conclusions and led to the
United States being the only country to vote against the November
2004 UN General Assembly resolution calling for immediate commencement
of negotiations.
Reasons for the Deadlock
The main controversy in the CD discussions has been the fundamental
differences between the parties over the scope of a treaty, the
inventories to be included, the definition of what constitutes fissile
material and the kinds of verification and safeguards measures needed.
The US Administration and most other NWS emphasise non-proliferation
objectives for an FMCT and, therefore, that a ban should only be
applied to future production. These NWS argue that they have ceased
military production, while India and Pakistan, in particular, both
have active programmes for fissile material production for weapons.
It is not clear if Israel is still producing material for weapons
purposes.
The NWS consider that without India, Pakistan and Israel, the cost
of extended verification and safeguard measures is too high. For
their part, the approach of these latter states is largely influenced
by their own perceptions of regional security in South Asia and
the Middle East respectively. However, the unilateral US announcement
that verification is not achievable goes much further than the previous
NWS position.
Meanwhile others, including the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), emphasise
the FMCT as a disarmament measure that should be non-discriminatory,
as called for in Resolution 48/75L. This means that it should cover
existing stocks of fissile material as well as future production.
Further difficulties have arisen over the definition of ‘fissile
materials’. Should this just cover so-called ‘direct use’ material
or also other fissile material? Likewise, what activities constitute
‘production of fissile materials’? Is it just reprocessing and enrichment
or should downstream activities or even civil reactors and spent
fuel stores be included?
Benefits of a FMCT
Pursuing a FMCT has advantages for all parties. For the NWS it
would signify their commitment to nuclear disarmament. Since India,
Israel and Pakistan are members of the CD, their participation in
FMCT discussions draws these three states currently outside the
NPT into the non-proliferation arena. By helping to prevent further
proliferation of nuclear weapons, an FMCT would increase the security
of NWS and Non- Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) alike.
A treaty banning the production of fissile materials is therefore
needed to:
- restart negotiations on further nuclear arms control and disarmament
measures;
- control the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries;
- encourage the control of fissile materials from which nuclear
weapons or nuclear explosives can be fabricated;
- increase the proportion of weapon-usable fissile materials under
international safeguards;
- improve the effectiveness of nuclear export policies;
- reduce the discrimination inherent in the present NPT regime
by narrowing the gap between the mutual obligations of NWS and
NNWS; and
- reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism through the illegal diversion
of fissile materials.
A verified ban would, furthermore, be fundamental to any comprehensive
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The measures and
requirements for verification and control would be little different
to those necessary to enable complete nuclear disarmament. Indeed,
any progress on nuclear disarmament would make little sense in the
absence of a ban on the further production of fissile material.
Future Prospects
Whilst there is still general agreement about the validity of negotiating
a FMCT, the prospects for progress over the terms and scope of such
a treaty in the immediate future look bleak. None of the major players
seem willing to make the necessary compromises to break the deadlock.
There is also no doubt that inactivity has damaged the standing
and integrity of the CD to the extent that some are beginning to
question its suitability as a forum for such negotiations. In particular,
the need for consensus allows countries to block progress, for example
by linking issues together. A different process may need to be established.
However, there are measures that could be taken outside of the
CD that could perhaps improve the chances of progress within it
– as set out below.
Recommendations
1. All States Parties are urged to:
- reiterate their commitment to the expeditious negotiation of
a FMCT;
- recognise that an “all or nothing” approach risks losing the
very major benefits a FMCT could bring;
- not allow differing positions on verification to block the start
of negotiations;
- use their good offices to persuade others to drop linkages and
preconditions;
- take appropriate confidence building measures to foster a climate
in which safeguarding of all fissile material is regarded as the
norm;
- introduce a moratorium on fissile material production;
- ensure that fissile materials are physically secure;
- increase the transparency of their nuclear production histories,
management and accountancy practices; and
- start discussions with the IAEA about verification procedures.
2. The US administration is urged to reconsider its policy towards
the FMCT and consider more creative approaches to the problem of
verification. For example, it could support the creation of an international
technical advisory panel to assist with verification of the treaty.
3. The United States and Russia should build on the bilateral steps
they have already taken and place more of their fissile material
under international safeguards.
4. NNWS are urged to build confidence by reinterpreting their ‘inalienable
right’ to all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.
For further information see ‘The FMCT Handbook:
A Guide to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty’ available at: http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/books/fmcthandbook.htm
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