The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, Briefing 6, March 2005
 
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2005 NPT Review Conference.
Challenging the NPT: North Korea's nuclear weapons
programme
Background
North Korea's nuclear weapons programme is one of the most
serious threats to the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) regime. For over ten years, North Korea has been in
continuous non-compliance with its Treaty obligations, and has
prevented the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from
verifying the exclusively peaceful use of its nuclear
programme.
Under a 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States, North
Korea accepted a 'freeze' on its nuclear weapons programme,
including a halt to the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to
extract plutonium. In exchange, North Korea was to receive heavy
fuel oil for heating and electricity production and two new
nuclear-power reactors that would be less suitable for producing
weapon-grade plutonium. The IAEA would inspect North Korea's
nuclear facilities to ensure that the agreement was not being
violated.
In addition:
- political and economic relations between the US and North Korea
were to be normalised;
- both countries would work for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
(NWFZ) on the Korean peninsula; and
- the US agreed to provide formal assurances that it would not
threaten to use, or actually use, nuclear weapons against North
Korea.
Both sides failed to live up to their obligations. In 2001 the
Bush Administration undertook a reassessment of President Clinton's
policy towards North Korea due to on going concerns about its
nuclear activities and the viability of the Agreed Framework.
An overtly nuclear-armed North Korea could result in the
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries and, quite
possibly, a devastating regional conflict. It is therefore
imperative that the current confrontation be expediently resolved
through diplomacy and verification to enable North Korea to rejoin
the NPT.
The current crisis
In January 2002, President Bush labelled North Korea part of an
'Axis of Evil' along with Iran and Iraq. In October 2002 the US
asserted that North Korea had violated the 1994 Agreed Framework
and accused it of pursuing a new nuclear weapons programme based on
the enrichment of uranium to weapon-grade standard. This led to a
serious breakdown in US-North Korea relations.
In December 2002, IAEA officials were expelled from the country.
In January 2003 North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT,
a move that many consider to be of questionable legality. North
Korea now claims to be increasing its "nuclear deterrent" and has
repeatedly hinted that it may conduct a nuclear weapon test.
The situation has been exacerbated by the Bush Administration's
insistence that it will not engage in bilateral talks with the Kim
Jong Il regime and by a lack of flexibility in the US negotiating
stance.
Six Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear programme
A process of six party talks was established in 2003, involving
North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the US, with the
objective of finding a diplomatic solution to the North Korea
nuclear crisis. These governments have invested heavily in the
dialogue process as the primary means of addressing concerns about
North Korea's nuclear weapons programme. To date, progress has been
slow with many obstacles presented by the entrenched positions in
Pyongyang and Washington.
Despite the lack of concrete progress, the six party talks have
established a diplomatic forum for discussion of the North Korea
nuclear problem. While no agreement has been reached, the
presentation and limited discussion of proposals is a positive
step. In June 2004, the US put forward its most detailed proposal
to date, suggesting that:
- the US would provide a 'provisional' guarantee not to invade
North Korea or seek regime change;
- the US would begin bilateral discussions with North Korea on
the potential lifting of economic sanctions, removal from the State
Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism and provision of
energy aid in the longer-term;
- Russia, China, Japan and South Korea would deliver tens of
thousands of tons of heavy fuel oil;
- in exchange North Korea would commit to dismantling its
plutonium and highly enriched uranium nuclear weapons programmes by
shutting down all its nuclear facilities within three months;
- North Korea would fully declare all elements of its plutonium-
and uranium-based nuclear programmes and open up its nuclear
facilities for inspection; and
- North Korea would also disable any nuclear weapons in its
possession; and prepare any nuclear materials, as well as relevant
components, for removal from the country.
North Korea, however, continues to call for the US to "drop its
hostile policy" and argues that it should receive an immediate
"reward" in exchange for a freeze of its nuclear facilities.
Two negative trends continue to cast doubt over the feasibility
of a negotiated solution. Many leading officials in the Bush
Administration, and many Republicans, continue to argue for a
policy of containment and isolation, with the aim of provoking the
collapse of the North Korean regime. They are very critical of the
1994 Agreed Framework, viewing it as 'blackmail pay-off' to a rogue
regime and a reward for unacceptable behaviour. They do not believe
that North Korea will ever relinquish its nuclear capabilities.
In addition, North Korea has proved very reluctant to engage in
dialogue and it is not at all clear whether the regime wants to
reach a negotiated settlement. Pyongyang has set a number of
improbable conditions for a nuclear 'freeze' and its continued
participation in the six-party talks process is uncertain.
Future Prospects
If North Korea refuses to engage in the six party talks process
the US is likely to seek other means of applying pressure on North
Korea, possibly even use of force. Recent policy statements
indicate that the US is not prepared to allow North Korea's current
ambiguous status as a nuclear weapon state to be sustained.
A negotiated solution, however challenging, is the only
long-term means of resolving the current confrontation. The other
two options most often discussed, military action or containment
and further isolation, offer no pragmatic route to a lasting
resolution.
Military action is strongly opposed by US allies in the region
since targeted air strikes against North Korea's nuclear facilities
risks retaliatory strikes against South Korea and Japan and the
potential for a regional, possibly nuclear, conflict.
Increased isolation with a view to the eventual collapse of the
North Korean regime requires the Cupertino of regional states that
is unlikely since South Korea, Russia and China continue to value
regime stability in Pyongyang. US efforts to further isolate North
Korea have proved ineffective but have allowed Pyongyang more time
to develop its nuclear weapon capability and long-range ballistic
missile programmes.
Recommendations
We urge NPT States Parties to:
1. Support the continuation of high-level dialogue through the
sixparty talks process, possibly supplemented by bilateral
discussions between the US and North Korea.
2. Insist on a comprehensive settlement of this issue through a
combination of diplomacy and verification with the objective of
bringing North Korea into full compliance under IAEA
inspection.
3. Advocate negotiation of a provisional agreement of limited
scope and duration in the near-term as a necessary first step
towards a broad, long-term negotiated settlement.
4. Encourage the resumption of North-South Korea dialogue to
ease border tensions. This may include negotiating a new basis for
a US military presence on the Korean peninsula perhaps modelled on
NATO's 'Partnership for Peace'.
5. Consider options to strengthen the capacity of the Treaty to
address problems such as notification of intent to withdraw from
the Treaty or violation of Treaty obligations (see Briefing 1).
6. Support the proposals put forward by IAEA Director-General Dr
ElBaradei, including the call for the United Nations Security
Council to act swiftly and decisively in the case of any notice of
withdrawal from the Treaty.
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