The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, Briefing 5, March 2005
 
Back to the main page on the
2005 NPT Review Conference.
The US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement: Contributing to vertical
proliferation?
As Admiral William Crowe, a former US Ambassador to London under
President Clinton said about the 'special relationship' in a BBC
interview in February 2001:
I have always described the relationship like an iceberg, in
that there is a small tip of it sticking out, but beneath the water
there is quite a bit of everyday business that goes on between our
two governments in a fashion that's unprecedented in the
world.
UK-US nuclear weapons collaboration is almost entirely
submerged. Lorna Arnold, in her book 'Britain and the
H-Bomb', provides a historical account of the initial benefits
to Britain's nuclear weapons research and development following the
signing of the 1958 Agreement For Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic
Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes. The US government agreed to the
Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA), on the understanding that the UK
would continue to invest in nuclear weapons-related scientific
research and development work as an ongoing contribution to the
special relationship on defence collaboration-or risk having such
access denied in the future.
What does the MDA permit?
The MDA permits the transfer of:
- nuclear warhead components, fissile material (plutonium and
highly enriched uranium) and tritium;
- delivery systems (missiles); and
- submarine design specifications, nuclear propulsion plants and
HEU to fuel them, which amount to aid in the building of the
platforms.
Thus, all three aspects of a deployable nuclear weapon -
warhead, delivery system and platform - are put together,
collaboratively, under the auspices of the MDA. In fact, it would
be much easier to say what is not permitted under the MDA: the
transfer of a complete nuclear warhead.
The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) website describes this
collaboration as follows:
Based around a series of Joint Working Groups, each
concentrating on a specific area of physics, engineering and
material science, Aldermaston's specialists have for more than
forty years been able to exchange and develop ideas with their
counterparts from the American Laboratories to the benefit of the
nuclear weapons programme on both sides of the Atlantic.
AWE admits to the importance of the MDA when they say it has
been a "cornerstone of life for our British nuclear weapon
community ever since". Somewhat ironically, the NPT is usually
referred to as 'the cornerstone of arms control and reduction
treaties', but the two edifices are at opposite ends of the
non-proliferation architecture.
The 2004 Renewal of the MDA
Despite reaffirming their disarmament commitments at the 2000
NPT Review Conference, the US and UK governments soon afterwards
embarked on secret discussions to renew the MDA for a further 10
years. BASIC, with the assistance of interested MPs, gathered
information about the MDA, encouraged parliamentary debate and
sought executive accountability. For further details, see BASIC's
special report, US-UK nuclear weapons collaboration under the
Mutual Defence Agreement: Shining a torch on the darker recesses of
the 'special relationship' (http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Press/040616.htm),
and a copy of the text of the MDA (http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/1958MDA.htm).
The fundamental purpose of the NPT is set out in the Preamble:
"The prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons". In
reality, this is exactly what the MDA provides - an open-ended
arrangement for two named states to 'disseminate' information,
technology and materials in their pursuit of more sophisticated
nuclear weaponry.
The MDA actively promotes nuclear proliferation both directly
and indirectly by poor example. Our efforts to bring this issue to
the attention of Parliament and Congress met resistance or were
ignored. The question of the provisions of MDA undermining the
spirit, or even the letter of the NPT attracted a good deal of
interest during the 2004 PrepCom. We anticipate it being raised
again at the Review Conference.
In conjunction with the Acronym Institute for Disarmament
Diplomacy and public interest lawyers, Peacerights, we sought legal
opinion on the MDA renewal. Rabinder Singh QC and Professor
Christine Chinkin of Matrix Chambers, considered the histories and
objectives of the two treaties and their legal relationship and
noted several ways in which their aims and purposes are
incompatible. They concluded that: "In our view, it is strongly
arguable that the renewal of the MDA is in breach of the NPT".
Their full opinion can be downloaded from our website (http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Press/040726.htm).
Nonetheless, the UK Government ratified the MDA on 20 July 2004,
without any select committee scrutiny or parliamentary debate, just
before the summer parliamentary recess two days later. A Defence
Minister later stated that "the Government are satisfied that the
extension of the Mutual Defence Agreement for a further 10 years is
compatible with the UK's obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty".
The United States seemingly ratified the MDA, as it is passed
the required 60 sitting days for it to lie before Congress on 18
November 2004, without any debate or congressional hearing having
being called.
The MDA entered into force on 9 December 2004 following written
notification by both Governments, an 'Exchange of Notes',
confirming that it had complied with all national statutory and
constitutional requirements.
Future Prospects
With the 2004 renewal of the MDA prospects for progress by
Britain and the United States on the nuclear disarmament component
of the NPT do not look promising. Both countries have, made
strenuous efforts to close the nuclear technology sharing
loopholes, partly provided by agreements permitted by Article IV of
the NPT. Yet, they refuse to ackowledge that the loopholes provided
by the MDA undermine the NPT and contribute to the belief that both
are 'discriminatory'. In summary, the US and the UK have not met
their 2000 obligations to:
- set out a plan or timetable to further reduce and eliminate
their nuclear arsenals;
- establish a diminished role for nuclear weapons in their
national security policy; and
- provide non-nuclear weapon states with legally binding
assurances that they will not be targeted by US and UK nuclear
missiles.
In fact, both countries are actively discussing modernising or
replacing existing nuclear delivery systems. Article VI, the
nuclear disarmament component of the NPT, remains a blind spot in
the two governments' field of vision. They must come to see that
most Member States are unwilling to accept that activities
conducted under the MDA are justifiable in purely legal terms when
the clear perception is that the UK and the US have 'ring-fenced'
their nuclear programmes as not up for debate. US-UK nuclear
collaboration under 'the special relationship' must be seen for
what it is - a contribution to vertical nuclear proliferation.
Recommendations
We urge interested parties to:
1. Read the text of the MDA, BASIC's special report on the 2004
renewal and the Matrix Chambers legal opinion.
2. Ask the Governments of the United States and the United
Kingdom to explain how their obligations under the NPT are
compatible with their practices under the MDA.
3. Seek assurances that the MDA will not be used to enable
collaborative scientific endeavour to design and manufacture new
nuclear warheads.
4. Affirm that international NPT obligations take precedence
over bilateral MDA arrangements.
We also urge the US and UK Governments, in the interests of
transparency and as confidence building measures, to:
5. Publish details of all transfers (nuclear goods and services)
made under the MDA in annual reports to Congress and the House of
Commons, respectively.
6. Use the MDA to develop broader bilateral and international
cooperation on the verification of nuclear reductions and the
elimination of nuclear weapons, building on the existing work that
has been undertaken at British and US national laboratories.
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