The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, Briefing 4, March 2005
 
Back to the main page on the
2005 NPT Review Conference.
Test Moratorium and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Background
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which opened for
signature in 1996, is designed to prohibit all nuclear weapon test
explosions. India and Pakistan conducted the only nuclear test
explosions since then. The CTBT is intended to fulfil both a
non-proliferation and a disarmament role, by:
Constraining the development and qualitative improvement of
nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of
nuclear weapons.
http://www.ctbto.org
The CTBT has achieved near universal adherence, having been
signed by 175 States Parties and ratified by 120. However, Article
XIV of the Treaty requires ratification by 44 named states before
the Treaty can enter into force.
Of these 44 states, three - India, Pakistan, and North Korea -
have not signed the Treaty. A further eight states - China,
Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the United States and
Vietnam - have signed but not ratified the Treaty. Some of these
countries also have nuclear weapons programmes and may be intending
to keep open the option of conducting nuclear weapon tests in the
future.
http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=nd98norris
The NPT and the CTBT
An end to nuclear testing has been a key non-proliferation and
disarmament goal dating back to the NPT negotiations in the 1960s.
The objective of a test ban is set out in the preamble to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which refers to the need "to
achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear
weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end".
For many states, the attitudes of the Nuclear Weapon States
(NWS) to the CTBT has become a litmus test of their commitment to
Article VI, as a halt to testing would curb qualitative
improvements in nuclear arsenals and be a critical step towards
preventing the re-emergence of a nuclear arms race.
http://www.acronym.org.uk/ctbt
The CTBT has the potential to be a make or break issue for the
2005 NPT Review Conference. The 1990 NPT Review Conference
dissolved in acrimony over the issue of nuclear disarmament, in
particular the refusal of the NWS to commit to negotiate a CTBT.
The 1980 Review Conference was similarly unable to agree a final
declaration due to disagreements between the NWS and members of the
Non-Aligned Movement over nuclear disarmament, including the need
for a moratorium on nuclear testing pending negotiation of a
CTBT.
At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, as part of the package of
decisions that allowed the Treaty to be extended indefinitely
without a vote, NPT states parties agreed to a series of Principles
and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, in
which the parties agreed a programme of action for the "full
realization and effective implementation of article VI". First on
the list was:
The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the
negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively
verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than
1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban
Treaty, the nuclearweapon States should exercise utmost
restraint.
Similarly, in the Final Declaration of the 2000 NPT Review
Conference, the parties agreed on "practical steps" to implement
Article VI, including:
1. The importance and urgency of signatures and
ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in
accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early
entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
2. A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any
other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that
Treaty.
Future Prospects: Towards a Resumption of Nuclear Testing?
Since the 2000 NPT Review Conference, however, progress towards
entry into force of the CTBT has stalled and the prospect of a
resumption of nuclear testing has increased.
The Bush Administration has made clear its opposition to the
CTBT and is currently proposing to cut its funding for the CTBT
Organisation by 25%. Although the Administration is currently
continuing with the 13 year-old US nuclear test moratorium, the
2002 US Nuclear Posture Review stated that this "may not be
possible for the indefinite future".
http://www.armscontrol.org/subject/ctbt/
The current US Administration wishes to retain the option to
test future additions to its arsenal with 'low yield' or 'earth
penetrating' nuclear weapons. But developing new and purportedly
more useable nuclear weapons undercuts broader progress on US
nuclear non-proliferation objectives.
Other US opponents to the CTBT cite the potential need to resume
yield testing in order to rebuild the nuclear stockpile at some
future date and problems with monitoring compliance with the
Treaty. However, detailed technical analyses have confirmed that
stockpile stewardship is possible without testing and that Treaty
compliance can be effectively verified.
Regrettably, the Bush Administration appears to be considering
ways to overcome the technical and legal obstacles to further
testing, by, for example, reducing the time needed to resume tests
at the Nevada Test Site. Consideration has also been given to
repudiating former President Clinton's signature of the CTBT.
http://www.psr.org/home.cfm?id=nuclear_weapons
If the US resumes nuclear testing, other countries may follow
suit. China is also modernising its nuclear arsenal and has not
ratified the CTBT. India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran and North Korea,
also have refused to ratify the Treaty. North Korea in particular,
has made several threats to test a nuclear weapon in recent
years.
Whether the US resumes testing or not, its opposition to the
CTBT is highly damaging as it contributes to blocking progress on
entry into force of the Treaty. It also encourages others,
including several states of proliferation concern, to do likewise.
This impasse is a major obstacle to progress at the 2005 NPT Review
Conference.
An Alternative Future: Urgent Action on Entry into Force?
Conversely, a US decision to ratify the CTBT and lead the effort
to bring the treaty into force would be an effective way of
strengthening the NPT. Others, including China, have indicated that
they would bring the Treaty into force once the US has ratified it.
In September 2004, the Foreign Ministers of 30 countries signed a
statement stating that:
The entry into force of the [CTB] Treaty, within the broader
framework of multilateral arms control and non-proliferation
efforts, is more urgent today than ever before.
And as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has noted, the
longer:
Entry into force is delayed, the more likely that nuclear
testing will resume. Were this to happen, it would be a major
setback in non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament efforts. In
the era in which we live, we cannot afford such a setback.
Bringing the Treaty into force would allow for the full
implementation of the verification system. This would add a
challenge inspection protocol to the existing worldwide remote
monitoring network that would permit onsite inspections of
suspicious events.
Recommendations
We urge:
1. All states that have so far failed to sign and ratify the
CTBT to do so without delay and to refrain from any activities
harmful to the Treaty.
2. The NWS to do everything possible to strengthen the
moratorium, including stronger statements of no intention to resume
nuclear testing and stronger support for the International
Monitoring System.
3. NPT States Parties to commit themselves to:
- continue to support the nuclear test moratorium, even if some
states resume nuclear testing; and
- maintain and strengthen existing national technical
capabilities for verifying treaty compliance.
4. CTBT States Parties to consider further measures to:
- strengthen the Treaty pending entry into force, including
provisional application of the Treaty under Article 25 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties;
- improve the international monitoring network - for example, by
incorporating private or government seismic stations as fulltime
participants in the detection system and by funding the development
of the on-site inspection regime so that it could be implemented
voluntarily even before the treaty enters into force; and
- strengthen the sensitivity of the CTBT to detect covert, treaty
violations - for example, by negotiating improved bilateral and
multilateral transparency measures, such as the introduction of
on-site sensors at former test sites.
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