The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference:
Breakthrough or Bust in '05?
A BASIC/ORG project, Briefing 1, February
2005
 
Back to the main page on the
2005 NPT Review Conference.
Strengthening the NPT Regime
Background
The Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) will meet in May 2005 at a time when the Treaty itself faces
stark challenges. With one nation having already announced
withdrawal, the possibility that another may follow, changes in
nuclear doctrine by some Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and the goal
of universality no nearer to being achieved, it is clear that the
Treaty is vulnerable and in need of strengthening.
The NPT entered into force in 1970. More countries have now
ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament
agreement. It represents the only binding commitment in a
multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the NWS. It is a
highly successful regime measured by the small number of NWS that
exist and by the number of states that turned away from programmes
or actual possession of nuclear weapons.
All but four countries in the world - India, Israel, Pakistan
and North Korea, which withdrew recently - are formally committed
to the NPT. Yet after nearly thirty-five years it still has no
institutional support and is only able to take decisions at
five-year intervals during the Review Conferences.
The Chemical Weapons Convention established the Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to ensure effective
implementation of the Convention. It has an annual conference of
its 167 States Parties, an executive council and a Secretariat.
Similarly, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has recently
introduced twice yearly Meetings of Experts from its 151 States
Parties to "discuss, and promote common understanding and effective
action on" specific topics related to better implementation of the
BWC. While the meetings were introduced as a result of a failure to
agree a verification protocol for the BWC, they are nonetheless
seen as valuable and allow limited involvement of international
NGOs.
The NPT has no secretariat, no annual meeting at which decisions
can be taken, nor an executive. This seriously constrains the
ability to respond effectively to issues crucial to the Treaty
itself, such as the announcement by the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) that it intended to withdraw from the
Treaty. If the Treaty is to continue these issues must be addressed
and the regime strengthened.
Strengthening the NPT in 1995 and 2000
The NPT Review Conference in 1995, in confirming the indefinite
extension of the NPT, agreed to strengthen the review process by
introducing Preparatory Committees (PrepComs) between the Review
Conferences with a remit to:
Consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote
the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality,
and to make recommendations thereon to the Review
Conference.
http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/1995dec1.htm
The Review Conference in 2000 upheld this concept of 'permanence
with accountability' and took it further in the final document by
including it in the 'Plan of Action' (or 13 practical steps towards
global nuclear disarmament). Point 12 called for:
Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened
review process, by all States Parties on the implementation of
Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles
and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament', and
recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice 8 July 1996.
http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/finaldoc.html
Developments since the 2000 Review Conference
Canada has been consistent at each of the PrepComs in making
proposals to strengthen the Treaty, in particular addressing the
institutional deficit of the regime. Canada's paper to the PrepCom
in 2004 included efforts to, "bring the NPT in line with comparable
international accords by providing it with a governance capacity to
protect adequately the interests of its members in the face of real
world threats". The paper proposed:
- replacing the existing PrepComs with annual Conferences of
States Parties that would consider and decide on any issues covered
by the Treaty;
- the creation of a five-person standing bureau, selected at the
RevCon with a mandate for five years; and
- continuing secretarial support for the Treaty by the UN
Department of Disarmament Affairs.
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/statements.html
This reconfigured process would take the same time and resources
as currently but would be a much more productive use of them. The
bureau would be able to call an emergency meeting of the States
Parties, for example on notification of withdrawal or violations of
the Treaty and would work closely with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).
Increasing confidence in the ability to implement the
Treaty
Strengthening the NPT could also be achieved through increased
transparency and accountability. Regular reporting, as required by
the Final Document of 2000, would achieve clarity on actual
progress towards implementation of the goals of the Treaty.
Increasing the access of civil society to documentation, to
cluster sessions and to the delegates themselves would further
enhance accountability and help revive a treaty that is perceived
by some to be outliving its usefulness. Dr ElBaradei, the Director
General of the IAEA expressed the same hope that:
"At next year's NPT Review Conference, parties to the Treaty
will consider urgently needed measures and agree on a specific
course of action that will help re-engineer the nuclear
non-proliferation regime and revive the stalling nuclear arms
control and disarmament process."
Measures to strengthen the treaty have been suggested by the
IAEA and include: photo:
- tighter controls over the export of nuclear material and
technology;
- safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force for all
States Parties before the 2005 Review Conference;
- negotiation of a Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty; and
- strengthening of Article 10(a) to prevent other nations from
leaving the Treaty.
Moving beyond the current Treaty?
Accepting that the NPT has until now been arguably the most
successful of all multilateral disarmament treaties, it must also
be accepted that the 'status quo' cannot be sustained. Ways to
augment the Treaty have been proposed by different bodies. At the
2004 NPT PrepCom, Malaysia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement,
expressed the Movement's continued belief in:
The need for negotiations on a phased program for the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework
of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention.
This call has been made on many occasions, particularly by
representatives of civil society involved in non-proliferation and
nuclear disarmament work.
The Director General of the IAEA has also signposted a way
forward, suggesting that a:
"Concrete programme for verified, irreversible nuclear
disarmament, complete with a timetable … could be achieved
in the context of a protocol to the present NPT … [which]
should be regarded as a 'peremptory norm' of international law - in
short, it should be enduring and permanent."
Others have suggested that the way to ensure the elimination of
all nuclear weapons would be to create a completely new treaty that
would outlaw nuclear weapons completely. This would probably
attract the immediate support of many but not all nations, and
would probably follow a similar course to the Ottawa Treaty on
Landmines.
Recommendations
We urge all States Parties to:
1. Consider supporting the Canadian and IAEA proposals to
overcome the institutional deficit of the Treaty.
2. Comply with the requirement to submit a report as set out in
Point 12 of the 'Plan of Action' agreed at the 2000 Review
Conference.
3. Consider ways to increase civil society participation in the
NPT process.
4. Implement safeguards agreements and additional protocols, or
plan to do so, before the 2005 Review Conference.
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