NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
2004 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting
New York, 26 April - 7 May 2004
Progress at the IAEA
By Dave Andrews
Since its foundation in 1957, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) has always had the dual, possibly contradictory, role
of safeguarding against the spread of nuclear weapons whilst at the
same time promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Articles
III and IV of the NPT reinforced this dual role.
The Agency has always had considerable difficulty in gaining
acceptance of intrusive verification. Following the discovery of
Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme after the first Gulf
War, it was recognised that the traditional system of comprehensive
safeguards agreements (CSAs) under INFCIRC/153 was failing
adequately to verify compliance with the NPT, especially in regard
to undeclared activity.
A programme to enhance the safeguards process was therefore put
in place and culminated in the adoption of a model Additional
Protocol in May 1997.[1] The
Additional Protocol gives the Agency wider inspection abilities
whilst also requiring States to provide much more detailed
information about their nuclear programmes and nuclear related
activities. To date, however, out of the 189 States party to the
NPT only 82 have signed Additional Protocols and less than half
this number (39) have entered into force.[2]
There is no doubt that the IAEA finds this slow rate of adoption
of additional Protocols disappointing. In an interview with Arms
Control Today, Mohammed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA,
suggested that one of the reasons for the slow uptake was the lack
of progress by the NWS in pursuing their nuclear disarmament
obligations under Article VI of the NPT. "I heard that argument
made here in the [IAEA] by a number of large and small non-nuclear
weapons states: Why should we rush to an additional protocol if the
weapon states are not energetically pursuing [the} Article VI
process?"[3]
However, whilst NPT signatories are not required to adopt an
Additional Protocol, it is widely recognised that their universal
introduction would significantly enhance non-proliferation
objectives and international security. The importance of wider
acceptance of the Additional Protocol has been amply illustrated by
developments in relation to Libya and Iran over the last twelve
months. Both countries have been found to be in 'non compliance'
with their longstanding traditional safeguards agreements and
whilst the Libyan situation seems to have been resolved
successfully[4] that with regard
to Iran is more problematical.[5]
Disclosures by Libya have also indicated the existence of a
widespread nuclear blackmarket, stretching from Asia to Europe and
centred on AQ Khan's Research Laboratories (KRL) in Pakistan. This
has involved the supply of uranium enrichment technology to Libya,
Iran, North Korea and possibly others, though the full picture is
yet to emerge.[6]
One of the major constraints that the IAEA has faced in the past
was a zero real growth in its budget at a time when the number of
countries, facilities and amounts of nuclear material it was being
asked to safeguard were increasing considerably. It was clear that
the budgetary crisis was in danger of seriously weakening the
effectiveness of the international safeguards regime. Fortunately,
this year, the Board of Governors agreed, for the first time in 15
years, to an increase in the budget with further phased increases
until 2007.[7] The safeguards
budget now stands at a little over $100m, a welcome increase of
some $12m from 2003. However, this is still insufficient to allow
the Agency, for example, to undertake all the environmental
monitoring and purchase of satellite imagery that it would like to
do, nor enable it to add certain other capabilities that would
improve its effectiveness, independence and credibility. It will
still have to rely on extra-budgetary resources and Member States
Support Programmes.[8]
In recognition that " the margin of security under the current
non-proliferation regime is becoming too slim for comfort"[9] Dr ElBaradei has made a number of
important statements and suggestions to make the NPT more
'sustainable.'[10] These
include:
- limiting the processing of weapon-usable material in civilian
nuclear programmes;
- multinational control of the production of new material through
reprocessing and enrichment;
- multinational approaches to the management and disposal of
spent fuel and radioactive waste;
- and progress on a Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty to cap and
make public all inventories of fissile material still
available.
Whilst there may be questions about whether some of these
proposals go far enough there can be no doubt that they are a step
in the right direction and worthy of serious consideration by the
international community. Only through genuine progress towards
nuclear disarmament that involves all states - NWS, NNWS, and those
currently outside the NPT - will international security be
significantly improved.
Footnotes
[1] 'The IAEA's
Additional Protocol', Rich Hooper, Disarmament Forum, UNIDIR, http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art209.pdf
[2] 'Strengthened
Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols', IAEA, 29 March
2004, http://www.iaea.or.at/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html
[3] 'Curbing Nuclear
Proliferation', Arms Control Today, 2 November 2003, Transcript of
Interviews, http://www.iaea.or.at/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2003/act112003.html
[4] 'Implementation of
the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya: Resolution adopted by the Board on 10 March 2004',
GOV/2004/18,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-18.pdf
[5] More information on
Iran and the IAEA can be found on the BASIC website.
[6] 'A.Q. Khan was just
the "tip of an iceberg," says U.N.', Louis Charbonneau, Reuters, 6
February 2004, http://www.enn.com/news/2004-02-06/s_12842.asp
[7] 'States Okay
Landmark IAEA Budget for 2004-05', Daily Wrap, IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC47/DailyWrap/budget.html
[8] 'Atoms for Peace: A
perspective from the IAEA', David Waller, Deputy Director General,
IAEA, 8 December 2003,
http://www.iaea.or.at/NewsCenter/Statements/DDGs/2003/waller08122003.html
[9] 'Towards a Safer
World', Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, Op-Ed,
Economist, 16 October 2003,
http://www.iaea.or.at/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebTE20031016.html
[10] Ibid., and also,
for example, 'Statement To the Fifty-Eighth Regular Session of the
United Nations General Assembly', Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA
Director General,
http://www.iaea.or.at/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n023.html
Dave Andrews is a consultant to BASIC on nuclear
proliferation issues.
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