NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
2004 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting
New York, 26 April - 7 May 2004
Time to put Article I under the Spotlight
BASIC Briefing for the 2004 Preparatory
Committee for the 2005 Review Conference
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
See also: Text of the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement
Introduction
Earlier this year, US Ambassador to the Conference on
Disarmament Jackie Sanders, told delegates that:
While the nuclear weapon states have the primary
responsibility to pursue measures related to nuclear disarmament,
all parties can contribute meaningfully toward that goal by helping
to fashion an international environment that is conducive to a
reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and to their eventual
elimination," and that "non-nuclear states share a responsibility
for creating an international climate to enable nuclear-armed
states to reduce their stockpiles.[1]
In our briefing paper for the 2003 Non-Proliferation Treaty
Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, BASIC
suggested that verified compliance with NPT obligations was the way
forward if the international non-proliferation regime were to
remain meaningful and effective. That is, of course, verified
compliance by all 189 States Parties under all applicable articles
of the Treaty.[2]
Events since the Geneva PrepCom have strengthened the arguments
for placing greater demands on States Parties for complying with
their non-proliferation obligations. Unfortunately, there has been
less progress on nuclear disarmament obligations, despite
protestations to the contrary by Ambassador Saunders.
Surely nobody could disagree with her when she says that,
"Events of the past few years have introduced a new and
destabilizing unpredictability into world affairs".[3] But this reality cannot be used to
legitimize the continued possession and threatened use of nuclear
weapons or to avoid confronting the 'declared' nuclear weapons
states with their failure to move determinedly towards nuclear
disarmament and disavow the flawed logic of 'nuclear deterrence'.
Indeed, as BASIC and Physicians for Social Responsibility argued at
the Geneva PrepCom, nuclear weapons are more likely to undermine,
not reinforce, national and international security.[4]
Ambassador Saunders is right to emphasise the shared
responsibility for creating the climate to enable progress to be
made. Unfortunately, good intentions will remain unfulfilled unless
nuclear weapon programmes are terminated and policy developments
are halted and reversed, as other delegates said during the debate.
For example, Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen called progress on
disarmament and non proliferation "mutually reinforcing".[5]
After nearly 35 years of reinterpreting Article VI obligations,
and with the 2005 Review Conference just a year away, substantive
movement by the five nuclear powers is an absolute requirement. A
restatement of progress on reducing nuclear arsenals will not
suffice.
Nuclear collaboration under the 'special relationship'
umbrella
President Bush is preparing to sign a bilateral agreement with
minimal fanfare and limited oversight, unless the US Congress
decides otherwise. There is a double irony here, in that the
agreement in question will not curb nuclear proliferation, it will
actively promote it.
In May 1994, President Clinton transmitted to Congress the
amended 1958 agreement between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic
Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.[6] In his letter to Congress in 1994, President
Clinton states:
In light of our previous close cooperation and the fact
that the United Kingdom has committed its nuclear forces to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I have concluded that it is in
our interests to continue to assist them in maintaining a credible
nuclear force.[7]
This amendment to the 1958 Agreement extends to the end of
December 2004, by which time it must be renewed in London as well
as in Washington, or fall. While highly motivated to prevent the
spread of nuclear materials which might find their way into weapons
programs across most of the world, the United States permits the
United Kingdom access to scientific information, technology and
materials "to continue to maintain viable nuclear forces" in this
near open-ended agreement.[8]
According to successive administrations since its original
signing in 1958, the Mutual Defence Agreement was legitimised by an
amendment to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act and "meets all statutory
requirements".[9]
While this active and extensive assistance to the UK, which
enables that country to maintain its Trident nuclear weapons system
may be deemed legal by domestic law, questions remain about its
compliance with Article 1 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Article I states that:
"Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes
not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly..."
Although the US and the UK claim that the Mutual Defence
Agreement is an "existing security arrangement" that does not
breach Article I, a number of non-nuclear-weapon states have
questioned whether nuclear cooperation of this nature is in full
compliance with the NPT and whether it is appropriate in view of
current security concerns about the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.
The NPT was written to prevent those states already in
possession of nuclear weapons, at the time of its signing in 1968,
from transferring that knowledge and capability to other
states.
To this day, the legality question remains unresolved but there
can be no doubt that the Mutual Defence Agreement subverts the
spirit and objectives of the NPT. In turn, the continued obduracy
of the two nuclear weapon states has not gone unnoticed in the
world at large and, at best, it has contributed to the stagnation
at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. At worst, this
determination to remain a nuclear power indefinitely is rightly
deemed hypocritical and used by aspirant nuclear weapon states to
justify their own pursuit of greatness via unofficial membership of
the nuclear club.
NATO Nuclear Sharing
More than 100 nations including South Africa, Egypt and the
entire Non-Aligned Movement, have consistently expressed concern
that members of NATO, especially Belgium, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and Turkey, as well as the United States, are
themselves nuclear proliferators, acting against the intent and
possibly the letter of the NPT.
These concerns arise because, under NATO nuclear sharing
arrangements, European non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) could be
given wartime access to US nuclear free-fall bombs stored in
Europe. Pilots from these NNWS states are already trained to fly
nuclear missions and their aircraft are equipped to allow them to
do so.
NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements seem anachronistic in
today's world. It is hard to imagine a President of the United
States ever agreeing to hand a nuclear weapon over to a Belgian or
other European fighter pilot. Despite this, NATO's Strategic
Concept describes these weapons as "vital to the security of
Europe" and states that NATO nuclear posture "require[s] widespread
participation by European Allies involved in collective defence
planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on
their territory and in command, control and consultation
arrangements."[10]
Articles I and II of the NPT prohibit the "transfer" of nuclear
weapons. The United States argues that NATO nuclear sharing
arrangements are in compliance with the NPT on the basis of a
unilateral interpretation that the NPT "deals only with what is
prohibited, not with what is permitted" and that at time of war the
NPT "would no longer be controlling."[11] Given current concerns about proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, this permissive interpretation of the
NPT is no longer appropriate.
As the United States carries out its current global posture
realignment, NPT States Parties should press for the removal of all
US nuclear weapons from Europe. NPT states parties should make
efforts to close the NATO nuclear sharing loophole by recommending
that the 2005 NPT Review Conference state in clear and unambiguous
terms that Articles I and II of the NPT allow for no exceptions and
that the Treaty is binding on State Parties in times of peace and
in times of war alike.
Conclusions
From the very start, the United States and the United Kingdom
chose to exclude their nuclear collaboration from scrutiny and
placed it outside, and above, their obligations under the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The supremacy of international norms over national
interpretations was highlighted in Chairman Ambassador Molnar's
summary of the 2003 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) PrepCom in
Geneva when he reaffirmed that each article of the NPT is "binding
on all member states at all times and in all circumstances" and
that it is imperative that all member states be held accountable
with respect to their strict compliance with all their
obligations.
The British Government has recently indicated that any decision
to replace its four Trident submarines with another nuclear
delivery system will have to be made in the next parliament, after
a general election in 2005. No mention was made of what the UK
needed to do to comply with its own obligations under Article
VI.
The United States Administration is currently engaged in a
vigorous campaign to curb horizontal nuclear proliferation
worldwide, actively supported by the Blair Government, rightly so
in the opinion of many commentators. But should the United States,
at the same time, be actively promoting vertical nuclear
proliferation at home and in selected countries abroad just as the
signatory nations to the Non-Proliferation Treaty are making plans
to meet for the PrepCom in New York this month?
Recommendations
At the 2003 NPT PrepCom British Ambassador David Broucher stated
that, "The UK continues to support the disarmament measures listed
as part of the 2000 Final Document and the 1995 Review Conference
decisions."[12] If this is the
case, delegates to the 2004 PrepCom should call for clarification
on:
- Why is the UK seeking to extend the 1958 nuclear cooperation
agreement with the United States and in what way is cooperation
under this agreement compatible under Article I of the NPT?
- Why has the UK announced that decisions will need to be taken
in the next few years on replacing the Trident nuclear submarine
system and how would this be compatible with their commitment to
nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT?
On 10 March 2004, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe General
Jones indicated that the US will "significantly reduce its nuclear
weapons in Europe". Delegates to the 2004 NPT PrepCom should:
- Call for the complete removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe
and an end to NATO nuclear sharing.
- Clarify that Articles I and II of the NPT allow for no
exceptions and that the Treaty is binding on State Parties in times
of peace and in times of war alike.
Footnotes
[1] 'U.S. Advocates
"Incremental" Nuclear Disarmament' by David Ruppe, Global Security
Newswire, March 30, 2004 (http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004_3_30.html#C1A74474).
[2] 'NPT in Crisis? Verified
compliance is the key to moving forward'. BASIC briefing April 2003
(http://basicint.org/pubs/nptpc03.pdf).
[3] Op.cit. 'U.S. Advocates
"Incremental" Nuclear Disarmament'.
[4] The Evolving Nuclear
Strategy of the United States and the United Kingdom and its
implications for the NPT', NGO Presentation at the 2003 PrepCom
April 29, 2003 ( http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/NPT/2003prepcom/Evolve.htm).
[5] Op.cit. 'U.S. Advocates
"Incremental" Nuclear Disarmament'.
[6] Message from the President
of the United States to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, The White
House, May 23, 1994.
[7] ibid
[8] ibid
[9] ibid
[10] 'The Alliance's Strategic
Concept', NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65, 24 April, 1999 (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm).
[11] Questions on the Draft
Non-Proliferation Treaty Asked by US Allies Together with Answers
Given by the United States (1967).
[12] 'Statement by Ambassador
David Broucher', April 29, 2004; Reaching Critical Will website (http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org).
Nigel Chamberlain and Nicola Butler
BASIC
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