NPT 2003 PrepCom Report

Dr Fiona Simpson

21 May 2003

Between the 28 April and 9 May 2003, the United Nations in Geneva played host to the Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  In a year that has seen the withdrawal of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from the NPT, the war in Iraq and growing concern regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions, it was clear from the outset that there was much to be discussed.  In the event, the proceedings of this year’s committee were, generally speaking, considered an improvement over those in New York last year, and the PrepCom itself was characterised by, if not progress, then movement. The improvement – particularly the level of interaction and debate between delegations – should not, however, hide the increasing disillusionment among many States parties with the perceived lack of commitment by the Nuclear Weapons-States (NWS) to the obligations undertaken at the NPT Review Conferences of 1995 and 2000; the precedent set by the war in Iraq; and the possibility of the continuing abrogation of NPT responsibilities by some Non-Nuclear Weapons-States (NNWS).

The Structure of the Debate
In the opening debate, many states expressed their desire that this PrepCom facilitate greater engagement and discussion than those in the past.  Speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), the Honourable Marian Hobbs (New Zealand Minister of Disarmament) stated, “at this session we will be seeking a more intensive debate.”  Similarly, the opening statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement of States (NAM) expressed the desire to “emphasize the need for a substantive interaction beyond the formal exchange of views between States parties at these meetings.”  The PrepCom Chair, Ambassador Laszlό Mόlnár of Hungary, duly decided to encourage such debate and interaction by giving delegations the opportunity to ask questions directly of other delegations and to respond to questions from others.  This resulted in what many felt to be several worthwhile and fruitful interactive sessions.  Such a format was naturally constrained by the need of delegations to check with their capitals before responding to many of the questions asked of them.  As a consequence, it was accepted that questions raised did not have to be answered either immediately or else not at all, but could be responded to in future meetings. 

The occurrence of such discussions did not, however, culminate in any unexpected agreements or serious modification of key positions.  Nonetheless, some issues – most particularly those surrounding the matter of tactical nuclear weapons, which last year had tended to provoke only silence and ceiling-study, this year stirred a dialogue.  While such dialogue cannot be conflated with agreement or even substantive progress towards agreement, it was generally considered an improvement and was duly welcomed.

The Axis of Evil:  Year Two
The events in Iraq cast a shadow over proceedings in Geneva, although they were only infrequently mentioned.  The occasional direct references to the war in Iraq notwithstanding, the emergence of a pre-emptive counter-proliferation doctrine evoked concern on the part of many delegations, who were at pains to clarify their belief that such a doctrine flouted the goals of the non-proliferation regime.  Many, too, sought reassurance regarding the negative security assurances provided by NWS to NNWS, and considered that recent actions in Iraq had both exemplified and exacerbated the erosion of this norm.

The withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT – the first in the Treaty’s thirty-three year history – prompted more vocal anxiety.  Given the recent nature of the DPRK’s revelations and the precedent set by the withdrawal from the NPT, the discussion of this issue appeared somewhat muted.  The situation remains uncertain and this was reflected in the words of many delegations, the majority of whom were content to express their regret at the DPRK’s decision and their desire for a peaceful solution to the problem.  Notably, US Assistant Secretary of State John S. Wolf went further, declaring the withdrawal “cynical” and “dangerous”.  However, he too spoke of the need for “a peaceful solution, through negotiation, to the DPRK issue.”  Other delegations expressed their desire that the United States offer the DPRK a Non-Aggression Pact in return for the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programme.

As it turned out, the greater portion of the US delegation’s hostility and much of the concern of others was reserved for Iran and its increasingly ambiguous nuclear programme and its failure to sign up to and implement the IAEA safeguards in the Additional Protocol.  It was this issue that, more than any other, dominated the discussions and debates. The opening statement by the United States contained the bold declaration that “Iran provides perhaps the most fundamental challenge ever faced by the NPT.”  The statement declared, furthermore, that Iran was “going down the same path of denial and deception that handicapped international inspections in North Korea and Iraq.”  The US assertion that prompted the greatest speculation was that which claimed, “there must be serious consequences for those who violate their NPT commitments.”  The use of the phrase “serious consequences” harkened back to the language of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which stated that Iraq would be subject to serious consequences in the event of continuing non-compliance.  Iran, for its part, hotly denied that it held nuclear ambitions, and said in its own opening statement that it considered “the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against our very basic principles.”  This did little to reassure the 40 or so delegations that expressed concern regarding the Iranian nuclear programme.

Other Debates
The closed sessions of this year’s PrepCom were divided into three clusters.  The first focussed on disarmament, the second on regional issues, and the third on peaceful nuclear programmes.  As usual, the prospects for a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) were discussed, and the paralysis in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) – the only negotiating body for such a treaty – was widely lamented.  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) received little attention outside of the usual remonstrations for the remaining 13 States – whose signature and ratification are required in order for the Treaty to come into force – to sign and implement it and the US statement that it did not intend to pursue ratification.  As part of the interaction and debate that was occasionally stimulated this year, the UK reiterated its negative security assurances (NSA) and US stated that its NSA had not changed.  This was in response to several questions and widespread concerns that were raised, both directly and obliquely about this issue and about the possibility of future US nuclear weapons tests.

Chair’s Factual Summary
The process of formulating the Chair’s factual summary was very different this year. It consisted of the amalgamation of the submissions of various delegations, and was an approach that was generally welcomed.  However, it did run the risk that disagreements arising from the language of the text would result in its rejection by some States parties.  The number of and variety among the contributions created unavoidable difficulties in creating a cohesive text, despite the fact that a substantial portion of it was very similar to that of the previous year.  Moreover, the attempt to be all things to all delegates dictated that much of the language put forward by some was weakened in order that it not incur the displeasure of others.  In the event, significant – and predictable – problems arose regarding the language on Iran and on the Middle East generally, the delayed start on the final day rumoured to be indicative of just how deeply such disagreements ran.  Nonetheless, the gamble paid off, although several States parties took the opportunity to put on record their continued concern with parts of the text.

The United States, in particular, chose to articulate several objections to parts of the summary, and reiterated at the outset that the summary was neither an agreed or binding text, but simply the Chair’s view of events.  While agreeing with the emphasis given to the issue of compliance, the US delegation unsurprisingly felt that the summary should have devoted greater attention to Iran’s nuclear programme, although the naming of Iran in the summary itself was welcomed.  The summary stated that Iran’s nuclear facilities raised “the most serious questions” about that State’s nuclear intentions and ambitions.  With respect to this, it was further maintained that Article IV benefits (of assistance with peaceful nuclear technology) were not “a guaranteed entitlement.”

In addition, the US delegation considered that the summary could have said significantly more about the DPRK, and it was once more asserted that the denuclearisation of the DPRK and the reapplication of IAEA safeguards were the only acceptable objective.  In a blow to all those who continue to hold the 13 Steps (agreed in 2000) as the means by which to measure progress towards disarmament, the US delegation reaffirmed its position that the US does not support all 13 Steps and that it is a mistake to see them as the only measure of the fulfilment of Article VI.  The US delegation further reaffirmed its lack of support for the CTBT, and its lack of intention to proceed with ratification of that treaty.

In response, Iran stated that it took its NPT commitments seriously.  Addressing the widely held concerns of its failure to implement the IAEA’s Agreed Protocol, Iran asserted its intention to work closely with the IAEA.  However, it also claimed that this would be “easier said than done,” since the experiences of the previous two decades had “dictated a mentality of distrust.”  It accused the United States of being unwilling to view the Iranian nuclear programme objectively and separately from other problems in their bilateral relations.  Iran went further still, claiming that the American focus on its nuclear programme was part of a general tactic to divert attention from the United States’s own failure to comply with its NPT commitments and from its own double standards, especially in relation to Israel.   The Iranian delegation took particular exception to the US accusations made in advance of the IAEA report on its programme, due in June.  By creating a “quasi-crisis”, the Iranian Director General for International Affairs, Mr. Amir Zamaninia, declared that the United States “stands to judge before the court date” – an action that he claimed interfered with the IAEA process. 

Besides the United States, the other P-5 powers felt obliged to vocalize their concerns regarding parts of the summary.  Russia pronounced itself to be not entirely satisfied with the text, particularly the last sentence of paragraph 26, which stated, “some States parties took note of the IAEA’s readiness to resume its verification activities in Iraq.”  The Russian delegation claimed that a preferable sentence would have been one that read, “some States parties welcomed the IAEA’s readiness to assume inspections in Iraq” and a further reaffirmation that the IAEA is the only body authorised to verify the intentions of a nuclear programme.  Russia further claimed that the tendency to dissociate tactical from strategic nuclear weapons was too simplistic, and was also careful to point out the need for a “responsible attitude towards the implementation of the 13 Steps.” 

China, which had been disappointingly quiet throughout, came to life to lament the “stagnation in the arms control sphere as a whole” and claimed that the three pillars of the NPT (disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use) needed to be promoted along with the 13 Steps.  China further commented that it considered the summary to be “basically balanced but not completely satisfactory”, chiefly with respect to the language on the DPRK and FMCT.  While the DPRK’s nuclear-free status was desirable, it was also necessary to address that State’s legitimate security concerns.  China urged both sides to exercise flexibility in dealing with this issue.   Despite these reservations, however, China stated that it would not seek to amend the text.

France, in its own remarks on the factual summary, echoed the beliefs of others that the non-proliferation regime faced “real challenges”, but believed, too, that the NPT had emerged from the Second PrepCom strengthened.  France thanked the chair for the transparency involved in the drafting of the summary, although it claimed that the reassertion of negative security assurances by the NWS was not adequately reflected in the summary.  It also expressed its regret that the IAEA was not given a higher profile in the summary and, as the US delegation had said earlier, maintained that the references to Iran were not a genuine indication of the grave concern expressed about that State’s nuclear programme. 

For its part, the United Kingdom expressed an overall reservation that the text of the summary did not reflect the balance of the debate.  In particular, paragraph 17 and 18 – which addressed the negotiations for an FMCT and the production of fissile material generally – made no mention of the fact that four of the five NWS had already declared moratoria on the further production on fissile material.  The UK was also disappointed that reassertions of negative security assurances were not highlighted and, while it considered the text on the DPRK to have been well handled, it considered the language on Iran “weak.”  Like France and the United States, the UK delegation considered this part of the summary not to have adequately reflected the nature of the discussion.

Other delegations used the opportunity to reiterate their commitment to all the goals of the NPT.  New Zealand, speaking briefly on behalf of the NAC, commented that the Coalition was mindful of the fact that the summary did not pretend to express a consensus or even a majority of the views of the delegations.  The NAC reiterated its determination to redouble it efforts to secure the implementation of both Article VI and all of the 13 Steps.  NAC member Egypt shortly thereafter repeated this commitment to a full implementation of the 13 Steps, and identified the continuing need to implement the agreements of 1995, and the need for Israel to join the NPT and submit its own facilities to IAEA inspections. 

Germany noted the need for what it deemed a “focused approach” with regard to compliance and achieving a new momentum in the disarmament process.  Brazil noted the general satisfaction with the results of the PrepCom itself, although it, too, stated that it would have liked to have seen some issues reflected more fully or in a different light – specifically, the need for more movement on nuclear disarmament and the threats faced by the NPT both from within and from without.  Speaking on behalf of the NPT members of NAM, Malaysia looked forward to working towards the Third PrepCom and claimed that NAM welcomed both the increase in the level of interaction during the Second PrepCom and the increase in reporting regarding the implementation of the 13 Steps.

Conclusion
Although the increase in the level of interaction alluded to by Malaysia on behalf of NAM was a noteworthy improvement, there was no mistaking the general understanding and concern that the withdrawal of the DPRK, the invasion of Iraq and the increasing attention paid to Iran presented profound challenges, both to the NPT and the regime of which, as it was so frequently maintained, it is a cornerstone.  Thirty-three years after the implementation of the NPT, interaction and debate – even in that absence of substantial progress, agreement or flexibility – were considered a favourable development.  While an increase in the level of engagement is certainly to be welcomed, the pleasure and surprise with which they were greeted is perhaps indicative of how low expectations were going into the Second PrepCom.  The proceedings closed, for the second year in a row, with a song by Vice-Chair Ambassador Henrik Salander who, having done the same as Chair last year, is in very real danger of establishing a tradition. 

Revised Lyrics to “My Way” (sung by Henrik Salander from the point of view of the Chair):

And now, the end is near
and we all face the final curtain.
We got a summary,
exactly how I am not certain.
I tried each loaded word,
each careful phrase along the byway,
and more, much more than this, I did it my way.

Complaints, I had a few,
regarding facts that I had mentioned.
But first the draft report
had been pushed through without exemption.
To think I did all this
and, may I say, not in a shy way,
oh no, oh no not me, I did it my way.

Yes there were times, I'm sure you know,
when I bit off more than I could chew.
But through it all, when there was doubt,
I ate it up and spit it out!
I faced it all,
and I stood tall,
I did it my way!

I tried each loaded word
each careful phrase along the byway,
and more, much more than this,
I did it my way.

(Reprinted with permission)

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