For two weeks, the UN photocopiers at the Palais des Nations overlooking Lake Geneva disgorged reams of paper for the distribution of speeches and position papers on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.  But just how important were the deliberations of the 188 member states of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? Who showed any interest in their outcome on Friday afternoon, May 9? And what impact are they likely to have in the real world?

To the delegations who actively participated on behalf of their national governments and to the ranks of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) granted limited access to the proceedings, such meetings (known as PrepComs, which take place in the intervening years between the five-yearly NPT Review Conferences) are viewed as a mixture of formalised sparring, an opportunity to get views and opinions on the record and a rather ineffectual talking shop.

The NPT was generally accepted in 1970 as the best means available for both preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and achieving nuclear disarmament.  33 years later neither objective has been achieved, despite notable successes along the way. Worryingly, faith in the eventual full implementation of the NPT’s historic agreement is on the wane while some nations are clearly making alternative plans and arrangements.

Meanwhile, the three nuclear weapons states remaining defiantly outside the treaty (Israel, India and Pakistan) have recently been joined by its first defector – the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea. Not yet with a confirmed nuclear weapon capability, many analysts believe North Korea is well down the path trodden by the three ‘outsiders’ and the five ‘declared’ nuclear powers (US, Russia, UK, France and China). The ‘declared’ nuclear weapons states continue to demonstrate their unwillingness to divest themselves of the very capability they hypocritically deny to other states. It is this unwillingness on the part of nuclear weapon states to seriously address their own disarmament commitments, combined with the new post-September 11 counter-proliferation strategies of the United States, that is contributing to both ‘nuclear ‘breakout’ and the treaty’s declining legitimacy.

The Chairman’s 10 page factual summary of the two-week paper chase around the conference halls of the Palais, was a diplomatic triumph of compromise phrases and subliminal messages. Nevertheless, there was a round of ritualised, but polite rebuttals for it being both too bland for some and too critical for others. 

The most significant paragraph of Ambassador Laszlo Molnar’s factual summary came very near the beginning when he reaffirmed that each article of the NPT is “binding on all member states at all times and in all circumstances” and the imperative that all member states be held accountable with respect to their strict compliance with all their obligations. The other side of this obligation coin is suggested further down the opening page as he reminds member states that they had expressed their readiness to reinforce the efficiency of the NPT by coming down more heavily on reported cases of non-compliance.

Progress could be achieved by a willingness to adopt greater transparency and for individual member states to report back to these conferences on their non-proliferation and disarmament activity. Such accountability could be supplemented by more intrusive inspection and verification agreements. Should neither of the above achieve their declared objectives, clear cases of non-compliance will need to be addressed systematically and robustly. In theory, this applies to cases of both horizontal proliferation (e.g. North Korea) and vertical proliferation (e.g. the United States).

Not surprisingly, there was a good deal of comment over the two weeks about discussions and proposals in the United States for developing new roles for a new generation of nuclear weapons. Such accusations were robustly countered with the US getting its retaliation in first by aggressively accusing Iran of developing a nuclear weapons program and demanding a full and open declaration of its intentions. Such overt antagonism is almost unheard of at PrepComs and generally regarded as undiplomatic. Iran responded by stating that its nuclear program was entirely peaceful and was supported by others in its condemnation of US double standards in not addressing how a nuclear-armed Israel could be induced to join the NPT.

Washington’s verbal attack on Iran will be followed up within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). US officials are pressing the IAEA to declare Iran in breach of its NPT obligations. If such a declaration is agreed, a complaint could be brought before the UN General Assembly, as happened with North Korea. The military option may be under active consideration by the United States, as indicated by Assistant Secretary of State John S. Wolf in his statement, “There must be serious consequences for those who violate their NPT commitments.”

Ambassador Molnar’s summary concluded with the standard comment about the value of the involvement and contribution of civil society to the NPT review process in the guise of NGO participation. While welcome, it is questionable whether the restricted presence of a few specialised NGOs is truly representative of wider civil society. It is unquestionably the case, however, that unless the general publics and elected representatives in the nuclear weapons states become more informed and vociferous on this issue, then there is little chance of turning these ‘talking shops’ into genuine disarmament conferences.