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Clarification
to NGO Presentation regarding NATO Nuclear Policy
As
stated on 1 May 2003, we wish to issue a clarification to the NGO
Presentation, ‘The Evolving Nuclear Strategy of the US and UK and its
Implications for the NPT’, on behalf of the British American Security
Information Council (BASIC). Our
statement suggested that NATO nuclear doctrine may have been amended to
bring it more into line with US nuclear doctrine and, as a result,
declared that NATO now reserves the right to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear states.
Despite
past promises of open publication, most of NATO’s strategy papers are
classified, making it difficult for NGO’s to fully assess what policy
changes have occurred. On the basis of what is known, our statement is
misleading. However, a number of concerns remain and it is by no means
certain that such a change in NATO nuclear policy will not take place in
the near future.
We
appreciate the Canadian delegation’s swift action in drawing our
attention to this and for their intervention in Cluster One, which
reaffirmed that the 1999 Strategic Concept remains the base for NATO’s
nuclear policy. We also appreciate Canada’s clarification that NATO’s
nuclear weapons use policy continues to be guided by the 1995 Negative
Security Assurances given by NATO’s three nuclear weapons states.
Our
analysis indicates that NATO’s nuclear posture has been under review.
The United States’ Nuclear Posture Review stated that, “A plan is
already underway to conduct a NATO review of US and allied dual capable
aircraft in Europe and to present recommendations to Ministers in summer
of 2002. Dual capable aircraft and employed weapons are important to the
continued viability of NATO’s nuclear deterrent strategy and any changes
need to be discussed within the alliance.”[1]
The
Final Communiqué from the NATO Ministerial meeting of the Defence
Planning Committee/Nuclear Planning Group of June 2002 stated, "we
provide guidance to further adapt NATO's dual-capable aircraft posture”
and "we continue to place great value on the nuclear forces based in
Europe and committed to NATO, which provide essential political and
military linkage between the European and the North American members of
the Alliance."[2]
US
nuclear strategy has changed since 1999. While the policies of the United
States, as well as nuclear weapons states and NATO were previously
ambiguous with regard to nuclear weapons use policy, US Presidential
directives and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
now clearly allow for the use of nuclear forces in response to
the use of chemical
or biological weapons.[3] Historically, NATO nuclear doctrine and policy has been
amended following changes in US nuclear doctrine and policy.[4]
We
note that NATO failed to reiterate previous communiqué language
supporting the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference following the
Prague Summit. We also note that NATO adopted a global policy of
anti-terrorism operations and a series of initiatives to strengthen
counter-proliferation and defence against WMD.
Many of these documents are currently classified and we would
welcome assurances that they do not include new roles for nuclear weapons,
particularly in use against chemical or biological weapons.
Additionally,
we are concerned that NATO member states not possessing nuclear weapons
may be compromised by the evolving nuclear strategies of the US and UK, as
outlined in our NGO Presentation. This is particularly worrying given that
nuclear first use remains an option in NATO nuclear policy and that
security assurances attached to the NPT are not legally binding. For
example, would the actual use of the UK’s Trident system, which is
committed to NATO, require an affirmative decision by all member states?
NATO
currently includes 16 nominally non-nuclear states (soon to be expanded to
23) that are nevertheless part of the nuclear Alliance. We urge that all
member states of NATO reject any direct proposals or indirect efforts to
amend the Alliance’s nuclear policy in any way that makes use of nuclear
weapons more conceivable. Indeed, in compliance with NPT obligations, NATO
allies should undertake nuclear disarmament measures and end NATO reliance
on any nuclear posture.
Martin Butcher (Physicians for Social Responsibility PSR)
Nigel Chamberlain, Kathryn Crandall & Fiona Simpson (BASIC)
7
May 2003
We
would like to thank other NATO analysts for their assistance with this
statement and note that BASIC and PSR plan to work with others to more
thoroughly address these and related NATO nuclear policy questions.
[1]
U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, Dec. 31,
2001, p. 44 [excerpts] URL (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm)
version current on May 6, 2003.
[2]
NATO Press Release, 6 June 2002.
[3]
The Classified version of The Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction, National Security Presidential Directive 17, was leaked
to the Washington Times. See, Kralev, N. “Bush Approves
Nuclear Response,” Washington Times, Jan. 31, 2003.
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