Permanent Mission of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

Statement by H.E. Mr. Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian,
Ambassador and Permanent representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations,

Before the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, 9 April 2002, New York

In the Name of God The Compassionate The Merciful

Mr. Chairman, Let me congratulate you on your election as the chairman of this important meeting. I am sure that with your vast diplomatic skill in disarmament and your personal contribution to the NPT negotiations process, this first session of the Preparatory Committee would achieve its best results.

Today it is apparent more than before that nuclear non-proliferation is an indispensable and integral ingredient of a broad international peace and security architecture. Nuclear weapons with its great destructive capacity are major threats to our civilization and have the capability to bring the earth into the heart of the darkness. The emergence of the phenomenon of non-state actors in the international scene have particularly opened the eyes more than before to a quite range of dangerous possibilities. Nuclear weapons once created to assume the role of reinforcing security are today transformed to means of intimidation and terror. Furthermore the September 11th tragic incident manifested that interrogational security is indivisible and that the wide accessibility to technology has therefore the potential to put us similarly in instability and insecurity. We are all travelers of one boat and regardless of the military strength, large or small, face similar threats and dangers.

Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty despite its shortcomings is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. The historic decision of the States Parties to the Treaty to extend it indefinitely was clearly made on the assumption that the absence of such a foundation would lead to nuclear chaos and accordingly to a complete disruption of international peace and security. Since 1995, we all have reaffirmed on the necessity of the implementation of all provisions of the treaty alongside with the recommendations of the declaration of principle and objectives adopted in 1995 and 2000 which serve as the road map defining the specific measures required for implementation of the Treaty. In this context, this four years Review process which we are now at its beginning, is an important tool in our hand to remain seized of the implementation of the principles enshrined in the 2000 declaration and make our recommendations to foster the implementation of the treaty.

Unfortunately Mr. Chairman, the developments since 2000 NPT Conference have not been positive in terms of laying a better ground for the implementation of particularly the thirteen specific measures defined within the 2000 NPT declaration, but at the same time some developments have created very serious setbacks for the efforts to decrease the role of nuclear weapons.

Persistence of some non-parties to still remain outside and the rejection of the CTBT by one of the Nuclear Weapon State, are highly alarming.

No progress has been achieved to implement the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The ongoing incidents should have already shown that Israeli policy of expansionism, aggression and mass killings of innocent civilian people recognizes no limit. The occupation of already recognized Palestinian territories are brutally pursued and civilians even children and women are arrested, intimidated and murdered. Israel in the same spirit and in defiance of international community in its call for the establishment of the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, has opted to pursue its programs to produce and develop nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This policy has endangered the regional and global security and therefore it should be the task of this conference to continue to address this basic challenge to the Treaty.

The negative developments specially related to the NPT implementation are numerous and therefore source of quite concerns. The progress towards implementation of the START-2 is stalled and has also blocked any practical step for the commencement of START 3 agreement. The absence of such efforts to reduce nuclear weapons at the global level has furthermore produced negative impacts on the security of states at the regional level and accelerated arms race which at occasions has created a very unstable environment endangering peace and security. We very much hope that on-going efforts to foster new agreements for further reductions of nuclear weapons would return the process back to its right track.

The withdrawal of the Unites States from the 1972 ABM treaty as the cornerstone of the global strategic stability would unfortunately lead to the abrogation of this historic treaty with serious consequences for the international peace and security. It is noted with sorrow that some circles are working intensively to urge the Nuclear Weapon States to establish as an alternative an extensive new missile defense system which contain measures that lead to new phase of nuclear arms race in contravention with the obligations within the NPT to move towards total elimination of nuclear weapons. This option is quite damaging and should be defeated by all means.

But Mr. Chairman, the new nuclear posture review submitted by the US Defense Department to the Congress is the most real setback within the nuclear non-proliferation context requiring our careful consideration. This doctrine indicates the emergence of a new doctrine in the United States on the use of nuclear weapons through development of new generation of nuclear weapons and improving the existing ones to be used against nuclear as well as non-nuclear-weapon States. It drastically changes the long-standing traditional role for of the nuclear weapons as means to deter the adversary and transforms such weapons as operational weapons in the battlefield and regional armed conflicts. This policy is in quite contravention to the letter and spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The new doctrine if approved, would furthermore lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons by defining the new circumstances such as when conventional arms could not effectively destroy the targets, which therefore expands the scope to use such weapons.

This doctrine furthermore is a clear violation of the United States multilateral obligations under the NPT and contradicts previous assurances officially undertaken by the United States at the highest level. The United States in response to the legitimate requests from the Non-Nuclear Weapon States to renounce the threat or use of nuclear weapons against States Parties to the NPT, proposed ,on March 7 1968, that such assurances be submitted to those States through a tripartite proposal by the US, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to the effect that the security assurances take the form of a UN Security Resolution, supported by declarations of the three powers. The resolution, noting the security concerns of states wishing to subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would recognize that nuclear aggression, or the threat of nuclear aggression, would create a situation requiring immediate action by the Security Council, especially its permanent members.

Following submission of the Treaty itself to the UN General Assembly, the tripartite resolution was submitted to the Security Council and in a formal declaration, the United States asserted its intention to seek immediate Security Council actions. In addition, US Secretary of State on 12 June 1978, made a particular statement on the issue, which formally elaborates the declaration of the then US president that "the United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear weapon state, or associated with nuclear weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack."

The Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted on 11 May 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, which extended the Treaty indefinitely, also took note of Security Council Resolution 984 on the issue as well as "the declaration of the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances" and stipulated that "further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.'

The new proposed US doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons is in clear violation of the commitments which were made and reaffirmed to help the indefinite extension of the NPT. Under Article VI of the NPT, the "cessation of nuclear arms race" and "nuclear disarmament" constitute the undertaking of "each of the Parties to the Treaty", and it is self evident that the nuclear-weapon States have a crucial role to play in this process. The 2000 NPT Review Conference called for "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI." It called upon them to consider "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination."

In addition to the NPT context, the demand of the international community for fostering the prohibitions against the threat or use of nuclear weapons nuclear has been reflected in numerous documents of the UN General Assembly and other fore The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice has articulated also on the illegality of threat or use of nuclear weapons as well as the legal obligation to continue the endeavors for nuclear disarmament in good faith.

The new US doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons not only shifts back towards a new era of nuclear arms race, but also expands the role of nuclear weapons to conventional conflicts and even non-belligerent non-nuclear-weapon States. By devising such a policy, the US would require to test the new nuclear weapon systems which would be in clear violation of its legal obligations stemming from its signatures of the CTBT and its unilateral moratorium to conduct further nuclear tests.

Mr. Chairman there has been a growing trend to undermine multilateral efforts aimed at addressing global menaces ranging from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction to environmental degradation. This trend presents a cause for grave concern, which requires an urgent and resolute universal consideration and response.

Non-Proliferation Treaty has laid out the fundamentals and essentials for the international community to pursue in good faith the measures to eliminate the dangers of nuclear weapons through their total elimination. Every step to increase the role of nuclear weapons, revise military doctrines and strategies to more operationalize nuclear weapons and finally reverse the process of nuclear weapons reductions would all undermine the objectives of the APT and are contrary to the spirit and letter of this Treaty.

We should stand united to preserve the integrity of this Treaty and this conference has a particular responsibility to act to this direction. Thank you.