International Atomic Energy Agency
Statement at the General Debate
NPT Preparatory Committee Session: 8 April 2002

by

Tariq Rauf
Head
Verification and Security Policy Coordination
Office of External Relations and Policy Co-ordination
Offices reporting to the Director General

Nearly two years ago, the States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) agreed by consensus to a historic Final Document outlining ambitious practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament; a strengthened safeguards system; and fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy within a framework of confidence and cooperation. The NPT is based on three pillars - nuclear nonproliferation; peaceful nuclear cooperation; and nuclear disarmament—and the premise that progress in any one pillar strengthens the integrity of the whole.

The activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are also based on three pillars: nuclear verification and security; nuclear safety; and nuclear technology. The IAEA continues to play an important role within the operating framework of its three pillars as a catalyst for sustainable development and as a cornerstone for nuclear safety and nuclear nonproliferation. The Agency's programme of activities focuses on building and maintaining a global nuclear safety regime; verifying commitments to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensuring the security of nuclear material and facilities; and bringing about the development and transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies.

The purpose of this Preparatory Committee session is to begin to lay the groundwork for the review in 2005 of the implementation of the Treaty; and to consider a preliminary assessment of the achievements since 2000. The basis for this review is the provisions of the Treaty itself and the package of decisions adopted in 1995 and the final document agreed in 2000. In this context, the Agency's report today focuses on the activities of the IAEA relevant to the implementation of the Treaty.

The Agency's Director General has emphasized that verification activities cannot be considered in isolation from multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts, and as he recently stated: "The universalization, consolidation and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, including concrete steps to reduce the number of and dependence on nuclear weapons, are more than ever important for the continuing sustainability and credibility of the regime". Also, as the UN Secretary-General has stated: "Disarmament and non-proliferation remain unfinished business" and "the past year yet again saw lack of progress in multilateral disarmament efforts".

Since the first NPT Review Conference in 1970, States Party have continued to emphasize their conviction that IAEA safeguards play a key role in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This is because States Party to the Treaty rely on Agency safeguards for assurance of compliance by other Parties with their non-proliferation obligations and for demonstration of their own compliance.

Several references in the 2000 Final Document have direct relevance to IAEA safeguards. States Party rightly recognized that Agency safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty, and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament and to nuclear cooperation. They reaffirmed the fundamental importance of full compliance with the Treaty and the relevant safeguards agreements.

The 2000 Final Document reaffirmed that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with its Statute and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with States' obligations under Article III.1 of the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The 2000 NPT Conference expressed its conviction that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard. It urged the IAEA to continue implementing strengthened safeguards measures as broadly as possible and called upon all States Party to give their full and continuing support to the Agency's safeguards system.

The Agency has continued to function as the competent authority to verify and give assurance about compliance with States' safeguards obligations under Article III.1 of the Treaty. Furthermore, the Agency has continued to provide assurance that no nuclear material that has been declared and placed under safeguards has been diverted for any explosive purposes or for purposes unknown.

The IAEA once again urges the 51 States Parties that have still to conclude and bring into force the required safeguards agreements to do so without further delay; and recommends that every effort be made to accomplish this objective prior to the opening of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Under NPT safeguards agreements, the Agency has the right and the obligation to ensure that all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities of the State is subject to safeguards, and that safeguards are in fact applied to such material. The Agency's obligation is thus not limited to nuclear material actually declared by a State; it also extends to that which is required to be declared. It is only in respect of States which have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol in force that the Agency will be able to provide assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but also concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Additional Protocol is therefore a very important tool for effective verification by the Agency of compliance with non-proliferation obligations provided for in the NPT. It is a continuing disappointment that overall progress in signing and bringing Additional Protocols into force remains slow. Since 2000, thirteen States have concluded Additional Protocols and 14 have brought additional protocols into force bringing the total to 61 States with Additional Protocols concluded and 25 with additional protocols in force. Among these, one nuclear-weapon State brought its additional protocol into force at the end of March.

Of those Treaty Parties which have yet to bring into force Additional Protocols, 53 have nuclear facilities under safeguards but only 29 have signed such a protocol. The IAEA urges all States Parties that have not yet done so to conclude Additional Protocols and bring them into force at the earliest possible date to enable the Agency to provide the comprehensive assurance requested under Article III of the Treaty. In order to facilitate this effort, the Agency has organized several regional seminars on strengthened safeguards - in Almaty, Lima, Minsk, and Tokyo, among other places - and is organizing another such seminar in South Africa on 24-27 June for all African States. As part of the Agency's programme to improve protection against nuclear terrorism assistance will be provided to States to help them to establish the necessary legislation and regulation for adopting the Additional Protocol.

The IAEA Director General has stated that it is the aim of the Agency to achieve the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, in order to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This optimum combination is known as "integrated safeguards". Integrated safeguards activities, when implemented fully will usher in a smart, information driven, non-discriminatory system that is designed to draw conclusions regarding compliance by a State with its non-proliferation obligations

Effective implementation of safeguards is also dependent on the availability of the necessary financial resources. The Agency currently safeguards over 900 facilities in 70 countries on a regular safeguards budget of approximately US $80 million per year. It is clear that if the Agency is to continue to provide credible verification assurances, and strengthen its safeguards system, the verification mission must be matched by the required resources.

The Agency continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) of nuclear material subject to safeguards in accordance with its NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency. At the request of the UN Security Council, however, the Agency since November 1994 has been monitoring the "freeze" of DPRK's graphite moderated reactor and related facilities in accordance with the "Agreed Framework" between the United States and the DPRK, and has also maintained a continuous inspector presence at the Nyongbyong site. Although DPRK's safeguards agreement with the Agency remains binding and in force, the DPRK continues to link this verification to progress in the implementation of the light-water reactor project as provided for in the US-DPRK "Agreed Framework". As the Agency has mentioned earlier, the work required to verify that all nuclear materials subject to safeguards in the DPRK have been declared and placed under safeguards could take 3-4 years, with full co-operation on the part of the DPRK.

The Director General has reiterated that the Agency continues to stand ready to resume its Security Council mandated verification activities in Iraq at short notice. The IAEA's objective should it return to Iraq, is clear: but to provide assurances through verification measures that the situation with regard to nuclear activities in Iraq has not changed since the Agency verification ceased in December 1998, and, provided that the status quo ante could be re-established, it could be possible to move to the implementation of the Agency's ongoing monitoring and verification plan.

Following the tragic events of last September, the General Conference of the IAEA, in its resolution GC(45)/RES/14 B of 21 September 2001, requested the Agency to review thoroughly its activities and programmes with a view to strengthening the Agency's work relevant to improving protection against acts of terrorism involving nuclear material and other radioactive materials. Last month, the Board approved in principle the Agency's plan of action which covers eight areas: 1) physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities; 2) detection of malicious activities (such as illicit trafficking) involving nuclear and other radioactive materials; 3) strengthening of State systems for nuclear material accountancy and control; 4) security of radioactive sources, 5) the assessment of safety and security related vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities; 6) response to malicious acts or threats thereof; 7) the adherence to international agreements and guidelines, and 8) enhancement of programme co-ordination and information management for nuclear security related matters.

The Agency's Director General continues to emphasize that the activities proposed are not a substitute for national measures, nor can they diminish the primary responsibility of the State on all matters of security; rather they are designed to supplement and reinforce national efforts in areas where international co-operation is indispensable to the strengthening of nuclear security. The cost of the proposed plan of action would be about 12 million dollars annually for the programs outlined above. The Board of Governors has approved the Director General's proposal. The initial funding for this plan of action will be through voluntary funding. Since terrorism knows no borders, the implementation of the action plan for nuclear security will bring benefits for all States - regardless of the existence or size of their nuclear programmes - by contributing to improved protection of nuclear material and other radioactive material, better border controls, and enhanced mechanisms for responding to radiological emergencies. Those benefits should be an encouragement for all to contribute.

The Agency's activities in the field of nuclear safety are organized in three broad programmes: nuclear installation safety, nuclear safety coordination; and radiation and waste safety. The 2000 Final Document inter alia underlined the importance of enhanced nuclear safety, spent fuel and radioactive waste management, and safe transportation of radioactive materials and commended the Agency's activities and plans in these areas.

Over the past year particularly, national and international efforts to enhance global nuclear safety testified to the increasing importance of safety in nuclear activities that is vital to the credibility of nuclear technologies. It is now widely recognized that nuclear safety, which has implications that transcend national boundaries, is a primary national responsibility and equally a legitimate international concern. The development and adoption of international legally binding norms under the auspices of the Agency have significantly contributed to the enhancement of nuclear safety worldwide. To date, conventions have been developed covering the safety of power reactors, radioactive waste and spent fuel management, early notification and assistance in case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency, and the physical protection of nuclear material. Many States are not yet party to these conventions, certain key areas of nuclear activity are still not subject to conventions, and some of the conventions that exist are not comprehensive in their coverage. Further efforts are needed to make these conventions universal and comprehensive and to establish legally binding norms in areas not currently covered by conventions, such as, for instance the safety of research reactors. An effective worldwide safety regime can best be established through the application of one global system rather than a set of disparate regional systems.

One area of continuing concern is the safety of research reactors. In the past year, the Agency initiated a range of measures towards the establishment of a comprehensive, internationally accepted safety regime for research reactors that includes inter alia, an assessment survey to acquire comprehensive information on safety status worldwide and the preparation of a Code of Conduct on the safety of research reactors.

A specific safety issue that has been the focus of the Agency's work is the safety and security of radioactive sources - a matter that surely will be considered at this meeting. In the past year, the Agency's Action Plan has been revised and expanded to accomplish inter alia promoting self-assessment of States' protection arrangements, the provision of more guidance and assistance on locating "orphan sources", responding to emergencies, and the development and implementation of a universal system of labeling of radiation sources to raise awareness of the dangers associated with their potential hazards.

The 2000 Final Document commended the Agency's efforts in the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. There continues to exist a gap in perception between technical waste experts and the public at large with respect to the issue of the safe management of radioactive waste. In view of this, the Agency has continued to implement its related technical projects, and is developing a step-by-step programme of work aimed at addressing the broader social dimensions of this issue. An important new development in 2001 has been the entry into force of the Joint Convention of the Safety of Spent Fuel and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

The transport of radioactive materials was an important issue at the 2000 NPT Conference. At the 2001 General Conference of the Agency, a resolution called for several actions including efforts to examine and further improve measures and international regulations relevant to the international maritime transport of radioactive materials and spent fuel, and urged States to adopt national regulatory documents governing the transport of radioactive material that are in conformity with the Agency's Transport Regulations. For next year, the IAEA is planning a conference in Vienna on the safe transport of radioactive material.

The Agency's activities in nuclear technology range from the generation of electricity in nuclear power plants, to the eradication of pests through the use of isotopic techniques in nutrition and water development programmes and food irradiation.

Nuclear power continues to be an important part of the energy mix in many countries. There are 440 nuclear power plants currently in operation, corresponding to a total capacity of 353 GW(e), more than 10,000 reactor-years of cumulative operating experience and about 16% of global electricity generation. Given low fuel costs and improved capacity factors, well-run amortized nuclear power plants are often the least-cost generation option. There is thus growing interest in lifetime extensions.

The world's leading fusion scientists and engineers have completed a detailed, fully integrated engineering design for a 500 MW(e) International Tokamak Experimental Reactor (ITER), which will demonstrate the scientific and technological feasibility of fusion energy. The Agency has supported activities related to the ITER project since its inception and the ITER Parties (the European Union, Japan and the Russian Federation) have asked for the Agency's continued support during the next phase leading to the construction of the ITER.

The 2000 Final Document called for an expanded use of the Agency's technical cooperation programme. For more than 30 years, the Agency's technical co-operation activities have helped develop infrastructure related to the application of nuclear technology and nuclear techniques in its recipient Member States. Today, the effective use of these capabilities and of nuclear application have great potential in addressing those countries most urgent requirements, ranging from nuclear safety and security to the most basic human needs. A few examples may be mentioned in this context.

Despite various drastic efforts over the past 100 years to eradicate the tsetse fly, most of the time it has recovered. The tsetse, about the size of a housefly, infests 37 sub-Saharan African countries - 32 of them among the 42 most Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) in the world. The Agency is playing a major role in supporting the Pan-African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign (PATTEC), because of the role that the Sterile Insect Technique (SIT) will play as an essential component of a package of technologies that will be used. The SIT is the most environment friendly pest control method. The new world screwworm and the Mediterranean fruit fly were successfully eradicated using the SIT in some parts of the world. The SIT has been responsible for reduction in pesticide use and its negative impacts on food and the environment, to preserve biological diversity and contribute to the introduction of profitable and sustainable agricultural systems in developing countries.

An estimated 70% of all stunted children live in Asia, where 21% of infants are born undernourished. In addition, iron and iodine deficiencies continue to be major public health issues in the region. Isotope techniques are very effective mechanisms for evaluating nutritional status of individuals and populations, and measuring nutrient requirements and bioavailability of vitamins and minerals. The Agency has been supporting these activities through several of its programmes. In addition, the Agency has initiated steps to establish a partnership with the Asian Development Bank to overcome malnutrition in the region.

These are just a few examples of IAEA activities aimed at the transfer of relevant nuclear technologies for a broad range of peaceful nuclear applications. Most of these activities, in 96 recipient countries, are financed through the $54 million Technical Cooperation Fund. Most applications the areas of health (21%), food and agriculture (17%) and nuclear safety (20%). The Agency attaches great importance to the fact that its activities fit well in the overall development goals of the country concerned.

The Agency depends on voluntary contributions to the Technical Co-operation Fund (TCF) and extrabudgetary resources to finance the TC programme. As the annual target for the TCF is approved in the form of a resolution adopted by consensus by the IAEA General Conference, Member States are considered to have entered into a commitment to take action in good faith in conformity with the resolution which they have supported. In this regard, it is gratifying that in recent years the number of countries contributing to the TCF has been increasing. In 2001, 78 countries, the highest number ever, made pledges, and TCF payments for 2001 have reached 79.98% of the target, just under the minimum Rate of Attainment of 80% set by the General Conference in Resolution GC(44)/RES/8 of 22 September 2000. This year, however, it will require a special effort on the part of all IAEA Member States to achieve the goal of 85% Rate of Attainment set for 2002 by the aforementioned resolution.

Thank you.