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2002 NPT Preparatory Committee
(PrepCom)
EGYPT Statement By Head of the Delegation Before New York. 9 April 2002
It gives me pleasure to extend to you and to your friendly country my sincere congratulations upon your election as chairman of the first session of the Preparatory Committee of the 200S Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I am fully confident that you will lead the work of this session most ably and effectively in view of your rich experience in multilateral diplomatic work. Mr. Chairman, At the outset I would like to state Egypt's view of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general. In our opinion, the nuclear non-proliferation regime is an interim and provisional step. A step that would necessarily lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a transparent and clear manner. This in turn should lead to a world free of these lethal weapons under effective end strict supervision. It is also our opinion that this desired objective could not be achieved without the renunciation of ambiguous policies and the obsolete doctrines and strategies that are based on the concept of nuclear deterrence. In addition, the formulation of new doctrines based on the updating of the concept of nuclear deterrence must cease. More than thirty years have elapsed since the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 5 March 1970. The Treaty was indefinitely extended in 1995. The final Document of the 2000 Review Conference was adopted by consensus. Nevertheless, the world today is still far from the realization of the principles and objectives of the Treaty. Despite some limited progress achieved among the nuclear weapon States on the unilateral and bilateral levels towards the reduction of their nuclear arsenals, the world continues to be plagued by enormous arsenals of these destructive weapons, stockpiled by the five nuclear-weapon states. Regrettably, this fact has contributed to the race by three other States to acquire a nuclear capability. Those three states saw the non-implementation by the nuclear-weapon Sates of their commitments for nuclear disarmament as a convenient pretext, indeed an appropriate incentive, to proceed to acquire nuclear military capabilities. This raises a fundamental question about the effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the achievement of its major objectives and about the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon states for this state of affairs. On the basis of the above, Egypt believes that the comprehensive safeguards regime of the IAEA, provided for in the NPT, constitutes the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. The absolute priority accorded to the achievement of the universality of the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards emanates from this fact. The 2000 Review Conference declared that universality as one of the main objectives that support the efforts of the international community for the strengthening and enhancement of the non-proliferation regime. This fact was unanimously accepted. Therefore, we maintain that additional measures can not be accorded a higher priority at the expense of the main objective namely, the achievement of the universality of the comprehensive safeguards of the Agency. In principle we support such additional measures as the additional protocol to the Safeguards Agreement and the integrated safeguards regime. However, we believe they will be lacking in effectiveness and credibility unless the universality of the comprehensive safeguards is achieved end unless strenuous efforts are made to deal with the grave imbalance created by the continued refusal of a few states to abide by the principles which have become an integral part of the international non- proliferation regime. Mr. Chairman, The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference contains a number of practical steps for the implementation of Article Vl of the Treaty and of paragraphs 3 and 4C of the 199S Decision on the Principles and Objectives of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament. These are known as the Thirteen Steps. In this regard, the five nuclear-weapon Stat" are called upon to fully implement those steps, including by presenting regular reports on the implementation of Article Vl, to the Preparatory Meetings and to the next Review Conference with a view to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We would like to stress here that any laxity in the implementation of those steps will place the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons before a clear threat and challenge. It will also put into question the usefulness of the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Currently Egypt coordinates the work of the New Agenda Coalition. Within the framework of the Coalition, Egypt will continue its efforts to ensure the implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their firm commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The Sates member of the Coalition have played an effective role since its establishment in 1998. The members of the Coalition will continue their efforts in this field most actively in order to rid the world oft he enormous nuclear arsenals oft he five nuclear-weapon States and for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with the aforementioned commitment. In this regard, I would like to point out that the Coalition has already prepared a working paper for this session containing the points and ideas that we will pursue with our Coalition partners. Mr. Chairman, The Final Document of the 2000 Review conference reaffirmed that the Middle East Resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference constitutes an integral part of the results of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended in 199S. It also reaffirmed that the Resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved. The same Document explicitly emphasized the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Thus it is incumbent upon the States party to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to take all the steps necessary to urge Israel to adhere to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under the lAEA safeguards. This is all the more urgent since all states of the Middle East have accede to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel, which continues to place obstacles before the efforts made to render the region free from nuclear weapons. Egypt has presented its report on the steps taken by it for the promotion of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East and for the achievement of the purposes and objectives of the 199S Resolution on the Middle East. The report describes the various steps and efforts made by Egypt on the national, regional and international levels. This attests to the seriousness of the Egyptian endeavor to render the region free of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. As called for in the Final Document of the last Review Conference, we would like to know the steps taken by the five nuclear-weapon States, particularly the three Depository States, for the implementation of that Resolution. Those States were the co-sponsors of the IN Middle East Resolution. In the same context, we would also like to know the efforts made by those States for the establishment ore nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East from the reports they are required to submit in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Conference. In this regard, Egypt reiterates the need to consider the proposal it had tabled to the 2000 Review Conference. The proposal was also included in Egypt's working paper on the steps taken for the promotion of the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. The importance of that proposal lies in the fact that it aims to establish a machinery to follow-up and monitor the progress made towards the implementation of the 199S Middle East Resolution and the recommendations thereon adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. Mr. Chairman, It is with deep concern that we have followed the recent negative developments in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. These developments make clear the need for further and more serious efforts to be made to overcome those obstacles. They also make us insist on the need for the international community to continue to uphold the priorities it had established in this field. Thus gradual erosion in the credibility and effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime will be averted. In this way, we will also avert a loss of the importance of those priorities and the momentum necessary to implement them. Therefore, the delegation of Egypt strongly calls for the inclusion of the following four main questions in the work of the first session of the Prep. Comm:
Mr. Chairman, In conclusion, I would like to assure you of my delegation's full cooperation with you to ensure the success of the work of this session. At a later stage of the work of the Committee my delegation will pronounce itself on all the other questions under consideration at a later stage of the work of the Committee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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