CANADA

NOTES FOR REMARKS BY
THE HONOURABLE CHRISTOPHER WESTDAL
AMBASSADOR FOR DISARMAMENT

TO THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
FOR THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NEW YORK, 9 APRIL 2002

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NOTES POUR UNE ALLOCUTION DE
L'HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER WESTDAL
AM BASSADEUR POUR LE DÉSARMEMENT

AU COMITÉ PRÉPARATOIRE DE
LA CONFÉRENCE DES PARTIES AU TRAITÉ
SUR LA NON-PROLIFÉRATION DES ARMES NUCLÉAIRES

NEW YORK, LE 9 AVRIL 2002

Congratulations on your election as our Chairman, Ambassador Salander, on your leadership in that role and on your determination to launch this new review cycle constructively, setting the stage for creative accountability . We will do all we can to help you succeed.

We are all gathered to begin to prepare for the 7^th Conference, in 2005, to review this bedrock treaty, to hold all States Parties to account for their fidelity to its historic provisions for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and to build on the momentum we achieved and the explicit commitments we registered two years ago. There is much at stake; this Treaty matters for everyone's security, individual and collective. We need to get this right.

The two years since we last met have seen clouds darken our outlook for success in the Thirteen Steps we planned to disarmament. The CTBT, rejected by one key state, is far from entry into force. At the Conference on Disarmament, for lack of consensus on a program of work, negotiations have begun about neither fissile materials nor negative security assurances. Further, we have not begun to deal there with either nuclear disarmament or the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Moreover, signals from some nuclear-weapon States regarding their nuclear arsenals occasion uncertainty and concern. As well, the ongoing development of nuclear weapons and missile programs in volatile regions including states not parties to this essential treaty is of grave concern. Iraq has not yet permitted the return of UNMOVIC inspectors - and the DPRK is not complying fully with IAEA safeguards requirements. And we have yet to achieve Treaty universality.

The news of the past two years, though, has not been all bad. We have been heartened by great improvement in relations between the USA and the Russian Federation, by their increasingly cooperative bilateral security dialogue, and by their planned reductions of nuclear arsenals. We want the strategic framework they develop to offer stability and confidence comparable to that which the ABM Treaty provided. To that end, we hope for reductions which are codified, irreversible, transparent and verifiable. In this context, Canada welcomed the commitment by the USA and the Russian Federation to each dispose of weapons-grade plutonium no longer required for defence purposes. As Chair of the G-8 this year, we are hard at work with our partners to carry this vital initiative forward. We have also been encouraged by action to stem the proliferation of ballistic missiles through the negotiation of an International Code of Conduct. We hope it can be completed by the end of this year. As well, though the CTBT has not entered into force, the global moratorium on testing holds and gathers vital credibility over time.

Against this mixed background, Canada sustains its conviction that global security prospects are best served by legally binding multilateralism. Above all, we must preserve and enhance the global norm against nuclear weapons enshrined in the NPT. Absolutely essential in this context is the reaffirmation of the Treaty commitment to disarmament. The NPT's inherent discrimination is acceptable only in a larger context of coherent commitment and credible progress toward disarmament. Without Article VI, the NPT would not exist. Without its fulfilment over time, the Treaty - in which non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually interdependent - will lose its seminal value.

From our vantage, Mr. Chairman, Negative Security Assurances, a key basis of the 1995 extension decision, remain essential. We hope and expect that this Preparatory Committee will witness their strong reaffirmation.

A key outcome of the past two Review Conferences was a strengthened process of review. Permanence with accountability, let us recall, was the basis of indefinite extension in 1995. In our view, transparency is the very foundation of accountability. We thus hope that all other States Parties have answered the call in our disarmament action plan's Step 12 for regular reports. To fulfill our commitment, we have submitted a comprehensive national report covering all articles of the Treaty. By reporting on each article, we have aimed to emphasize not only the importance of nuclear disarmament, but also the benefits of non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation.

While reporting is incumbent on us all, Mr. Chairman, it is not yet well defined. We think it is a field in which our efforts might be very productively focussed through this review cycle. We want to define the purpose, scope and format of reports and collectively develop an effective framework to deepen accountability. Preparing a national report, for the first time, we found the task complex; it would be eased by a consistent format. Later this week, Canada will table a Working Paper on Reporting, to initiate general discussion. We want to begin this process now, working towards a practical, positive outcome for our 2005 Review.

Mr. Chairman, Canada believes in partnerships with civil society serving shared nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament objectives. For this reason, as in the past, we have included Canadian NGO representatives as members of our delegation. We welcome the participation and involvement of NGOs in the work of the Preparatory Committee, and look forward to hearing their statements. We encourage members to send a clear signal that States Parties value the roles NGOs play and their contribution to our work, and to consider means further to enhance the participation of civil society in the preparatory process and at Review Conferences.

Mr. Chairman, compliance with the NPT - as with other non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament treaties - is of essential concern. We all need reliable assurance that each State Party is respecting the spirit and letter of each article of this Treaty. There has been some direct experience with non-compliance in the NPT context, which has been only partially addressed. A key step is to reinforce the IAEA's safeguards system, through universal adherence and full respect of obligations. Canada calls upon the 51 NPT States Parties that have not yet done so to sign comprehensive safeguards agreements, and calls on all States that have not yet done so to bring into force an Additional Protocol, as Canada has done in September 2000. These moves will strengthen the effectiveness of the safeguards system and the confidence it brings, and contribute to a more stable security environment, particularly in regions such as the Middle East.

The NPT offers concrete benefits to all States Parties. It enables the peaceful uses of nuclear science energy for a wide variety of important purposes, ranging from energy generation to medical care. Canada values these applications: we have a large domestic nuclear power program, providing 15% of our electricity requirements, with a significant export component. We are among the world's largest uranium exporters and we are a leading supplier of medical radio-isotopes. Canada is pleased to share its knowledge and expertise with many States Parties, including developing countries. It is therefore important for all States Parties to ensure that the conditions exist to allow these peaceful uses of nuclear energy to be sustained, without concerns that they will in any way contribute to proliferation.

Mr. Chairman, looking at the implications for the NPT arising from September 11^th and its aftermath, there are a number of areas where the review process can contribute. It is clearly essential to ensure that nuclear material, equipment and technology are kept out of the hands of terrorists. In this context, our collective work to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is urgent. We can contribute as well by strengthening the IAEA and ensuring that it has the resources it needs to achieve our non-proliferation objectives. We can strongly endorse its Plan of Action on protection against nuclear terrorism, we can fully implement the strengthened safeguards system, we can review our export controls and national legislation.

I close, Mr. Chairman. We are here to make accountability work. We need to promote the 13 Steps, develop new approaches and tools, such as reporting, and address and confront problems, such as non-compliance and threats of nuclear terrorism. In sum, Mr. Chairman, to keep the vital promises at the heart of this Treaty, we will do our outmost.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.