PERMANENT OBSERVER MISSION
OF SWITZERLAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS
2005 Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
First Session of the Preparatory Committee
(8-19 April 2002, New York)
STATEMENT
by Mr. Christian Faessler, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the
Conference on Disarmament
(General debate)
New York, 9 April 2002
Mr. Chairman,
May I first say, on behalf of the Swiss delegation, how pleased we
are to see you chairing this First Session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2002 Review Conference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The long experience and the substantial
engagement of your country – and of yourself personally – in the
field of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament will
undoubtedly be important assets for the success of our work, which
remains more important than ever given the uncertain outlook of the
present situation. I would also like to take this opportunity to assure
you of the full support and co-operation of my delegation in the
fulfillment of your functions.
Mr. Chairman,
Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are two issues crucial to
international security. As long as there is disparity in the world
nuclear order, and until all danger of further proliferation—horizontal
or vertical—has been removed, the international community must spare
no effort to achieve these objectives.
For this purpose, the NPT remains the main tool. The decisions taken
at the Review Conferences in 1995 and in 2000 provide us the foundation
for strengthening the role of this instrument.
Mr. Chairman,
In accordance with the final document of the last review conference,
the purpose of our session is, among others, to "consider
developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty."
Among these developments, we note in particular a new issue brought
to mind, that of nuclear non-proliferation as result of international
terrorism, including the use of radiological and nuclear materials for
terrorist purposes. In the view of my country, there is no doubt that
the best means to guard against the risks of nuclear nonproliferation
are negotiations and the adoption of multilateral legally binding and
universal instruments rather than political engagements and unilateral
measures. However, this does not exclude, if necessary, new approaches
and arrangements which are more flexible and focused.
Since the end of the last Review Conference there has been positive
as well as negative developments. I would like to begin by noting a
number of positive developments:
1. Efforts towards nuclear disarmament and arms control have
continued, albeit at a modest pace. The United States and the Russian
Federation have made certain reductions, particularly in the framework
of the strategic arms reduction treaty, START I. We are pleased that a
new agreement on additional and substantial reductions between these
two countries seems to be close to realization.
2. At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over sixty
countries have already signed the Additional Protocol to the
Safeguards Agreements. Thus, the ability of the Agency to get a
better picture of non-declared nuclear activities has been reinforced.
Moreover, due to the events of September 11, discussions have started
at the Agency on the prevention of nuclear terrorism.
3. In the fight against terrorism, we note in particular the
international efforts to strengthen the multilateral Convention on the
protection of nuclear material as well as other initiatives aiming at
preventing unauthorized persons and groups from having access to such
materials.
However, this picture is overshadowed by some far less welcome developments
in terms of international stability and security:
1. The objective of complete disarmament, stipulated in Article VI,
remains a very remote objective. There are still considerable stocks
of military nuclear material, the existence of which is difficult to
justify today in terms of national security.
2. The military significance of nuclear weapons remains unchanged.
Nuclear deterrence continues to be part of defence doctrine, and new
arguments for maintaining and even the eventual use of nuclear
arsenals have been put forward.
3. The system of existing traditional nuclear arms control and
disarmament treaties is under question. Some of these treaties could
fail to enter into force because of the lack of ratification, another
one has been denounced.
4. The efforts of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in
the area of nuclear disarmament remain bogged down. The Conference has
still not been able to reach agreement on a programme of work yet and
thus begin negotiations on a convention banning the production of
fissile material and on nuclear disarmament, which was part of the
action programme recommended by the 1995 NPT Conference. My country
welcomes the efforts of the current president, the Ambassador Reimaa
of Finland, to identify constructive solutions.
5. The problem of the NPT's lack of universality persists.
This problem is particularly acute in South-East Asia and in the
Middle East, where regional instability carries the risk of nuclear
proliferation.
6. Doubts also persist as to whether Iraq and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea are fully in compliance with the Treaty. In
the past, these two States have not fully complied with the
obligations undertaken in accordance with their safeguards agreements
with the IAEA.
Mr. Chairman,
This assessment leads us to the following conclusions:
1. We find an imbalance between the lack of progress made in
realising the objective of Article VI and the implementation of other
aspects of the Treaty, in particular Articles 11 and III. For this
reason, Switzerland continues to defend the point of view that the
decision to extend the Treaty taken in 1995 must not mean an
indefinite extension of the status quo, particularly as regards
the prerogatives of the nuclear-weapon States. The question remains
more than ever of how to reestablish a balance between the
implementation of the non-proliferation provisions of the treaty as a
whole, and of the specific obligations of the nuclear weapon states in
the field of arms control and disarmament.
2. This imbalance also jeopardizes the two compromises which
have made it possible to conclude, and later to extend, the NPT. The
fact is that the NPT is based on a reciprocal commitment: a
renunciation of nuclear weapons, on the part of the vast majority of
States, which nevertheless retain the right to use nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, in return for a commitment, on the part of States
in possession of nuclear weapons, to pursue negotiations with a view
to nuclear disarmament. In 1995, a second compromise was added
to this initial reciprocal commitment: the extension of the NPT for an
unspecified period in return for the adoption of the "Principles
and Objectives", the establishment of a strengthened review
process, and a resolution on the Middle East. These 1995 decisions are
part of a package which can not be undone.
Mr. Chairman,
Our session should allow open and concrete discussions on all the
questions related to the implementation of the Treaty and of the
documents and decisions adopted at the Review Conferences. By doing
that, it should, in the view of the Swiss delegation, already take into
consideration the recommendations to be adopted at the last session of
the Preparatory Committee.
The starting point of our work should be a reaffirmation of the
basic compromises I have just referred to, i.e. link between
nuclear proliferation and the specific obligations of the nuclear
weapons States in the field of nuclear disarmament. It should also
reaffirm the link between the extension of the Treaty and the
implementation of the documents of 1995. Finally, we should examine
in particular the ways and means the 13 concrete steps contained in the
final document of 2000 could be supplemented and deepened.
With respect to procedural questions, the Swiss delegation is
flexible as to the organisation of our work, taking into account the
importance of using the time and the resources at our disposal in the
most efficient and rational way. My country has complete confidence in
the ability of our Chairman to prepare a factual summary report which
will provide a solid base for our future work and hence advance our
common cause.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.