Mr. Chairman,

I am happy to see you presiding over First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Pleas. accept the warmest congratulations of my delegation on your unanimous election as the Chairman of the First PrepCom. We are confident that, with your long experience and great expertise in thee field of disarmament, you will be aisle to handle the challenging task that lies before you and that you will be able to guide this PrepCom Session to a successful conclusion.

Mr. Chairman,

This PrepCom Session is taking place at a time of uncertainties. The prevailing international political climate and security environment are not very conducive to arms control and disarmament.

Drastic changes that have taken place since the successful 2000 NPT Review Conference are far from encouraging.

Despite such an evolving International security environment, we still hope that we can have a fruitful and productive First PrepCom, provided that all State Parties, particularly the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) carry forward their firm commitment to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and show their maximum flexibility. To title end' we should do our utmost, under your able leadership, to lay down useful groundwork for the succeeding PrepCom Sessions and the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Mr. Chairman,

We should maintain and carry forward the strengthened review process of the NPT, laid down by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference calls for regular reports within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process by all States Parties on the implementation of Article Vl and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmaments.

Accordingly, all States Parties, particularly NWS, should submit their reports to the PrepCom Sessions and the 2005 Review Conference on the implementation of Article Vl of the Treaty and the 13 steps of nuclear disarmament, bid down In the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

Mr. Chairman,

My Delegation attaches great importance to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon, the NPT regime and its strengthened review process.

The NPT has the largest number of States Parties among arms control and disarmament agreements. It deals with today's foremost arms control and disarmament problems of nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation.

Universality of the membership of the NPT is of paramount importance. The States Parties should do their utmost to achieve the universal membership of the NPT.

However, merely ostracizing or alienating the hold-out states will not be very helpful. Nor will it bring us closer to the achievement of our goal. The States Parties, particularly NWS, should instead enter into a security dialogue with the hold-out states.

Mr. Chairman,

The 13 practical steps, set out in paragraph 15 of the provisions on the implementation of Article Vl and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference constitute a vital plan of action for nuclear disarmament. Commendable as a plan of action may be, its value depends on its practical implementation. Up till now, progress in the implementation of the 13 practical steps has been very little and far from encouraging.

Mr. Chairman,

It is true that some progress has been made in unilateral reductions and bilateral reductions of nuclear weapons. We welcome these steps.

Mr. Chairman,

We attach great importance to the Advisory Opinion on 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons.

It was the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

However, the record shows that this is still not the case and that most of the 13 practical stops, set out In the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, are yet to be implemented.

There are, indeed, several other areas where lack of progress is evident in terms of the fulfilment of the commitments contained in Principles and Objectives of 1995 and in the Final Document of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Mr Chairman,

We consider that another Important question on the agenda of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and its PrepCom Sessions is the question of security assurances.

We recall that both the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference underscore the importance of this question The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, in its Decision on Principles and Objectives, provides: "… further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument." The 2000 NPT Review Conference, in its Final Document, also provides "The Conference agrees that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) strengthen the nonproliferation regime. The Conference calls on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue."

Mr Chairman,

In view of the above, we believe that the forthcoming sessions of the Preparatory Committee should allocate special time or make a similar arrangement to address the question of security assurances and that the 2005 NPR Review Conference should set up a subsidiary body or a similar mechanism to deal effectively with the question of security assurances.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.