States parties reaffirmed the NPT is the cornerstone of the global
non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of
nuclear disarmament. In the current international climate, where security
and stability continue to be challenged, both globally and regionally, by
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of
delivery, preserving and strengthening the NPT is vital to peace and
security.
States parties stressed their commitment to the effective
implementation of the objectives of the Treaty, the decisions and the
resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conferences and the Final
Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, adopted by consensus.
States parties further stressed that continued support to achieve
universality of the Treaty was essential. They called on the four States
remaining outside the Treaty - Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan - to
accede unconditionally to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States,
particularly those three States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities. Concern was expressed about the ongoing development of nuclear
weapons and missile programs in different regions, including those of
States not parties to the Treaty.
It was stressed that the best way to strengthen the non-proliferation
regime was through full compliance by all States parties with the
provisions of the Treaty.
It was generally felt that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001
have given an even greater sense of urgency to the common efforts of all
States in the field of disarmament and nonproliferation. The view was held
that further strengthening and reinforcing the non-proliferation regime
was imperative to prevent the use of nuclear materials and technologies
for criminal/terrorist purposes. The enhancement of the non-proliferation
regimes covering all weapons of mass destruction, including efforts by the
IAEA, was considered to be the most important integral part of combating
terrorism.
There was emphasis on multilateralism as a core principle in the area
of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and
strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope. Strong support
was expressed for the enforcement of existing multilateral treaties. The
need to seek treaties and other international agreements that meet today's
threats to peace and stability was underlined.
The view was expressed that the Treaty should be seen in its larger
context of coherent commitments and credible progress toward nuclear
disarmament. Without the fulfillment of Article Vl over time, the Treaty,
in which non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually interdependent and
reinforcing, will lose its true value.
The importance of increased transparency with regard to the nuclear
weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to
article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support
further progress on nuclear disarmament was stressed. It was emphasized
that accountability and transparency of nuclear disarmament measures by
all States parties remained the main criteria with which to evaluate the
Treaty's operation.
States parties remained committed to implementing article VI of the NPT
and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and
Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and the
Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Disappointment was
expressed in the progress made in implementing the practical steps for the
systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and
paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", as agreed
at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. It was also noted that the goal of
nuclear disarmament can best be achieved through a series of balanced,
incremental and reinforcing steps.
The nuclear-weapon States informed the States parties of their
respective measures taken in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, for
example reductions of nuclear weapons arsenals, reduced reliance on
nuclear weapons, and that new nuclear weapons are not being developed.
Concern and uncertainty was expressed about existing nuclear arsenals,
new approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons, and possible
development of new generations of nuclear weapons.
Strong support was expressed for the CTBT, as reflected in the Final
Declaration adopted at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force
of the CTBT held on 11-13 November 2001 . The importance and urgency of
the early entry into force of the CTBT was underscored. States which have
not ratified the Treaty, especially those remaining 13 States whose
ratification is necessary, and in particular those two remaining
nuclear-weapon States whose ratification is a prerequisite, for its
entry-into-force, were urged to do so without delay. States reaffirmed the
importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions
or any other nuclear explosions. States parties noted the progress made by
the CTBTO PrepCom in establishing the international monitoring system.
Concern was expressed that the decision by the United States to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty, and the development of missile defense
systems, could lead to a new arms race, including in outer space, and
negatively affect strategic stability and international security. Hope was
expressed that the US-Russia bilateral negotiations to create a new
strategic framework will further promote international stability.
States parties welcomed the announcement in December 2001 that the
United States and the Russian Federation had completed reductions in their
nuclear arsenals required under START I. They further welcomed the
continuing US-Russia bilateral negotiations on strategic nuclear arms
reductions, and many expressed the hope that such efforts would result in
a legally binding instrument with provisions ensuring irreversibility,
verification and transparency.
The importance of further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons,
based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear
arms reduction and disarmament process, was emphasized. There were calls
for the formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and
1992 on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons. It was stressed that
non-strategic weapons must be further reduced in a verifiable and
irreversible manner. Negotiations should begin on further reductions of
these weapons as soon as possible.
States parties expressed regret at the inability of the Conference on
Disarmament to start negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral
and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices and to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear
disarmament. The Conference was urged to agree on a programme of work.
States that have not yet done so were called upon to declare a moratorium
on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.
The importance of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place,
as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no
longer required for military purposes, under IAEA or other relevant
international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such
material for peaceful purposes was stressed.
Several States parties endorsed the work being carried out under the
Trilateral Initiative - involving the IAEA, the Russian Federation and the
United States - in developing techniques and methodologies for placing
excess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons permanently under IAEA
safeguards. States parties were informed that the United States had
already placed some of its fissile material under IAEA safeguards and that
both the United States and the Russian Federation were working to develop
practical measures for the monitoring and inspection of fissile material,
including verification by the IAEA. Some States parties also noted the
IAEA's safeguards experience in verifying nuclear materials and expressed
the view that the IAEA could play an important role in verifying nuclear
disarmament agreements.
The view was held that the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free world
should be accompanied by the pursuit of other effective arms control
agreements at a global and also particularly at a regional level.
States parties recalled that regular reports should be submitted by all
States parties on the implementation of Article VI as outlined in
paragraph 15, subparagraph 12 of the 2000 Final Document. It was stressed
that such reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall NPT
regime through transparency. Views with regard to the scope and format of
such reporting differed. Some States parties suggested that such reports
should be submitted, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States, at each
session of the Preparatory Committee, and should include detailed and
comprehensive information, e.g. in a standardized format. Several States
parties expressed interest in open-ended informal consultations on
reporting to prepare proposals for consideration for subsequent sessions
of the Preparatory Committee. Other States parties advocated that the
specifics of reporting, the format and frequency of reports, should be
left to the determination of individual States parties.
States parties recalled the 2000 Final Document and the request that
all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of
the Middle East and other interested States, report through the UN
Secretariat to the President of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, as well as
to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in
advance of that Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote
the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the
realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the
Middle East.
Support was expressed for the concept of internationally recognized
nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) established on the basis of arrangements
freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned. The contribution
of such zones to enhancing global and regional peace and security,
including the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation, was emphasized.
It was noted that the number of States covered by the NWFZs has now
exceeded 100. The establishment of NWFZs created by the Treaties of
Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba was considered as a positive
step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. The
importance of the entry into force of the existing NWFZ treaties was
stressed. Efforts aimed at establishing new NWFZs in different regions of
the world were welcomed. It was also stressed that assurances against the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zones should
be provided by the nuclear-weapon States. Support was expressed for the
efforts among the Central Asian countries to establish a NWFZ in their
region. States parties noted that no progress had been achieved in the
establishment of NWFZs in the Middle East, South Asia and other regions.
On the issue of universality, States parties reaffirmed the importance
of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference and recognized that the resolution remains valid
until its goals and objectives are achieved. The resolution is an
essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis
on which the NPT was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States
parties reiterated their support for the establishment of a Middle East
zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.
States parties noted that all States of the region of the Middle East,
with the exception of Israel, are States parties to the NPT. States
Parties called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and
to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Some
States parties affirmed the importance of establishing a mechanism within
the NPT review process to promote the implementation of the 1995
resolution on the Middle East.
States parties expressed concern at the increased tension in South Asia
and the continuing retention of nuclear weapons programmes and options by
India and Pakistan. States parties urged both States to accede to the NPT
as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities
under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. States parties noted that both States
have declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to
enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear testing by
signing and ratifying the CTBT. States parties called upon both States to
sign the CTBT. States parties noted the willingness expressed by both
States to participate in negotiations on a treaty banning the production
of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive
devices. Pending the conclusion of a legal instrument, States parties
urged both States to commit to a moratorium on the production of such
fissile material. The importance of the full implementation by both States
of Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) was emphasized.
The importance of full compliance by all States parties with the
provisions of the NPT was stressed. States parties remained concerned that
the IAEA continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness
of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the DPRK. The DPRK
was urged to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with
the IAEA. States parties expressed concern over the lack of implementation
of the 1994 Agreed Framework.
States parties noted that since the cessation of the IAEA inspections
in Iraq in December 1998, the Agency has not been in a position to provide
any assurance of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under Security
Council Resolution 687 (1991). Many States parties expressed grave concern
and called for the full implementation of relevant Security Council
resolutions, including UNSC resolution 1284, and for the re-establishment
of an effective disarmament, ongoing monitoring and verification regime in
Iraq, and hoped that UN inspectors will be able as soon as possible to
resume their work in Iraq. Iraq reiterated that it is in full compliance
with its Treaty obligations and maintained that the IAEA successfully
carried out inspections in 2000, 2001 and 2002 pursuant to Iraq's
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
It was recalled that both the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference
and the 2000 NPT Review Conference underscored the importance of security
assurances. It was emphasized that negative security assurances, a key
basis of the 1995 extension decision, remained essential and should be
reaffirmed. Many States parties reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States
parties should be effectively assured by nuclear-weapon States against the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Reaffirmations were expressed of
commitments under UNSC resolution 984 (1995). Many States parties stressed
that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally-binding
instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be
pursued as a matter of priority. Some States parties were of the view that
this could take the form of an additional protocol to the Treaty, without
prejudice to the legally-binding security assurances already given by the
five nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the treaties regarding
nuclear-weapon-free zones. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations,
the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to honour their commitments
under the respective UNSC resolutions. Concern was expressed that recent
developments might undermine commitments taken under the respective UNSC
resolutions. A view was held that the issue of security assurances was
linked with fulfillment of the Treaty obligations. Several States parties,
including one nuclear-weapon State, emphasized the importance of a
no-first use policy.
Education on disarmament and non-proliferation was considered important
to strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations.
In this connection, the ongoing work of the group of governmental experts
which is expected to submit its report for consideration by the 57th
session of the General Assembly later this fall was commended.
States parties recognized that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar
of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and commended the important work
of the IAEA in implementing the safeguards system to verify compliance
with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty.
States parties welcomed the efforts of the IAEA in strengthening
safeguards and the Agency's completion of the conceptual framework for
integrated safeguards. The importance of the Model Additional Protocol was
underlined. Some drew attention to the fact that States parties must have
both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in
place for the IAEA to be able to provide an assurance of both
non-diversion of declared material and the absence of undeclared
activities or material. The goal of universality was stressed. States that
have not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA
were called upon to do so without delay. Many States parties called on
those who have not yet signed or ratified the Additional Protocol to do so
as soon as possible.
It was reiterated that export controls are a key element of the
non-proliferation regime under the NPT. The important work of the existing
export control regimes was noted, in particular their function in guiding
States parties in setting up their national export control policies. The
importance of transparency in export controls was widely recognized. It
was reaffirmed that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as
affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Many States parties noted both the importance of combating nuclear
terrorism and the many instruments available for doing this, including the
physical protection of nuclear material and export controls. The IAEA's
action plan on the prevention of nuclear terrorism was widely noted and
supported. The Agency's work in support of States' efforts to prevent
illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material was also
commended.
States parties called for the strengthening of the physical protection
of nuclear material, inter alia through a well-defined amendment of
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Many States
parties called on States, that have not yet done so, to accede to the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Support was
expressed for the IAEA's International Physical Protection Service (IPPAS).
The importance of strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection,
safety of radioactive waste management and the safe transport of
radioactive materials was stressed. The IAEA's efforts in the promotion of
safety in all its aspects were welcomed. States parties that have not yet
acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, as well as the Joint
Convention of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of the Radioactive
Waste Management, were encouraged to do so.
States parties emphasized that transportation of radioactive material,
including maritime transportation, should be carried out in a safe and
secure manner in strict conformity with international standards
established by the relevant international organizations such as the IAEA
and the IMO. Some States parties called for effective liability
arrangements, prior notification and consultation. Some States parties
noted the conclusions on safety in the IAEA General Conference resolution
GC (45) RES/10. The holding of an IAEA conference on safe transport of
radioactive materials in July 2003 was welcomed by many.
States parties reiterated their strong support for Article IV of the
Treaty, which provides a framework for cooperation and confidence for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, States parties expressed
wide support for the Technical Cooperation activities of the IAEA. It was
underlined that Technical Cooperation plays an important role in further
developing the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
including human health, pest eradication, food and agriculture, and the
environment. The importance of aligning Technical Cooperation programs
with development goals and needs of the country concerned was emphasized.
Several States parties stressed the importance of providing the Agency
with adequate resources for these activities.
