The 2000 NPT Review
Conference
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York
Statement by H.E. Mr. Abdul
S. Minty
Deputy
Director-General Multilateral Affairs, South Africa
24
April 2000
Mr. President,
It is a pleasure for me,
on behalf of the Government of South Africa, to extend my
delegation's congratulations to you on your assumption of
the Presidency of the 2000 Review Conference of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
I also wish to extend our congratulations to the other
members of the Bureau, and especially to the Chairpersons
of the Main Committees, and other organs of this
Conference, on their assumption of those important tasks.
Given the important issues affecting international and
regional peace and security which we will be confronting
during this period, and given the complexities of the
matters which we will be dealing with, your assumption of
this post brings with it a heavy burden of
responsibility. Please be assured of my delegation's full
cooperation and assistance to you in ensuring that this
Review Conference has a successful conclusion.
Mr President,
To start, I wish to
clearly state South Africa's principled views on nuclear
weapons. our experience clearly demonstrates that nuclear
weapons are not the source of security that those who
possess or aspire to possess them seem to believe they
are. Nuclear weapons and the threat that they pose are in
fact sources of greater insecurity. As long as these
weapons exist in the arsenals of some, others will aspire
to possess them. International relations and the history
of States clearly indicate to us that the insecurity
created by the possession of superior power by a few will
be countered through the need -- real or perceived -- of
others to establish a balance. In the case of nuclear
weapons -- the only one of the three types of weapons of
mass destruction (chemical, biological and nuclear) that
has not been banned -- this issue is even more
complicated by the threat of indiscriminate and large
scale annihilation that these weapons pose to the
interests and survival of humanity as a whole. As States
Parties to the NPT -- the only international instrument
that strives to not only prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, but that also contains the legal
commitment for their elimination -- we are all obligated
to approach the strengthened review process fully
cognisant of the expectations of all the peoples of the
world not to be confronted by, or threatened with, the
destructive capacity of nuclear weapons. That is why we
need to direct our efforts to making the world a safer
place.
Mr President,
The solemn commitments
that were made to move the NPT process forward, as we
reached an agreed decision for the indefinite extension
of the Treaty at the last meeting of the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference, will be well remembered. The
undertakings that were given at the 1995 Conference, as
well as in its run-up, in which it was repeatedly stated
that an indefinitely extended NPT was essential for the
further pursuit and achievement of the provisions and
goals of the Treaty, especially as they related to the
NPT's Article VI nuclear disarmament provision, are also
well remembered. The time has come for us together to
look back and evaluate the progress or lack of progress
that has been achieved.
It will furthermore-be
recalled that when South Africa introduced, at the 1995
Review and Extension Conference, the concepts and
proposals for "Strengthening the Review Process for
the Treaty" and for the "Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament" it was stated that:
So as not to draw
these issues (i.e. the criticisms about the failures
and delays in the implementation of the NPT's
provisions) into the debate about the continued
existence of the Treaty, it is desirable that the
review process provided for by Article VIII(3) should
be strengthened. This (it was said) could be done by
the adoption of a set of "Principles for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" which would
be taken into account when the implementation of the
Treaty is reviewed. These principles would not be an
amendment to the Treaty; they would rather be a
lodestar which would focus attention on the
importance of these goals. Commitment to these
Principles would be renewed at every Review to ensure
that they are dynamic and that they adapt to changing
circumstances. (T)hey would be the yardstick by which
all the States Parties can measure their
non-proliferation and disarmament achievements.
On the process of Review,
South Africa further recommended that while the retention
of the basic structure of the Review Conference was
accepted, provision should be made for the debate and
substantive consideration of specific issues by
establishing subcommittees (i.e. subsidiary bodies) of
the three Main Committees. These sub-committees, it was
emphasised, should not be tasked with the consideration
of specific Treaty articles, but should rather study a
specific issue or issues which fall within the ambit of
those Treaty provisions which are being considered by the
parent Committee.
Mr President,
It was these proposals
that were accepted and adopted by all of the States
Parties to the NPT at the 1995 Review and Extension
Conference that form the fundamental directives for this
Conference that have been provided to my delegation by my
Government. We are tasked to ensure that the bargain that
was struck in 1995, and that provided the basis and the
rationale for the agreement to extend our Treaty
indefinitely, is met and fully implemented.
Mr President,
The review period of 1995
to 2000 is not one of the most auspicious in our Treaty's
history, especially with regard to the nuclear
disarmament obligations contained in Article VI. I t may
be an exaggeration to say that the NPT is under threat,
but it would be fair to say that developments since 1995
in areas directly related to, or having a direct impact
on, the nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament
provisions of the NPT contradict, and are counter
productive to, the achievement of the NPT's objectives. I
am here of course referring to:
- The continued, or
even greater reliance, which is being placed on
nuclear weapons in the strategic doctrines of the
Nuclear Weapon States and their military alliance
partners.
- The problems of
compliance being confronted with the situations in
Iraq and North Korea.
- The compliance
implications of nuclear sharing in, as well as
expansion of NATO.
- The nuclear test
explosions conducted in South Asia.
- The delays that are
experienced in bringing the START II into force and
to commence negotiations on the START III.
- The potential
repercussions of the proposals for a national missile
defence system in the United States and the related
proposals to modify the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty.
- The continuing
difficulties being confronted on bringing the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into
force.
- The continuing
inability of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in
Geneva to commence its negotiations on a fissile
material treaty (FMT).
It will, however, not
serve the interests of the NPT well if we are to focus
only on the litany of disappointed expectations and
unfulfilled undertakings within the NPT regime. As South
Africa stated in 1995 -- and it is unfortunate that we
again have to follow this approach in 2000 -- many have,
with good reason, been critical about the failures and
delays:
to fully implement the
disarmament provisions of the Treaty by totally
eliminating the arsenals of the Nuclear Weapon
States,
to provide the
Non-Nuclear Weapon States with effective security
assurances, and
to ensure unencumbered
transfer of peaceful nuclear technology.
In our deliberation on
these issues we should, however, again not be drawn into
a self-defeating debate about the continued existence of
the regime. There have been positive developments. These,
especially in the context of the continued fulfilment of
nonproliferation obligations by the vast majority of
non-nuclear weapon States. Here I would highlight and
congratulate those States that have acceded to the
Treaty. I refer to Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Comoros,
Chile, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu.
I would also like to extend South Africa's
congratulations for the recent steps undertaken by Russia
with regard to the ratification of START II and the CTBT.
Mr President,
While it is important for
the international community to welcome, support and
encourage the bilateral nuclear arms reductions which are
taking place between the United States and the Russian
Federation within the context of the START process as
well as unilateral steps which are being undertaken by
certain individual Nuclear Weapon States it is also
important not to confuse nuclear arms reductions with
nuclear disarmament. A commitment to nuclear arms
reductions -- which has to do with a strategic balance of
power and with the removal of the Cold War's excessive
nuclear destruction capacity -- does not necessarily
translate into a commitment to nuclear disarmament and to
a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. As a f irst
step on the pathway to nuclear disarmament the Nuclear
Weapon States (China, France, Russian Federation, United
Kingdom, United States) should make an unequivocal
undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals and, in the course of the forthcoming
review period, to engage in an accelerated process of
negotiations and to take steps leading to nuclear
disarmament to which all States Parties are committed
under Article VI of the NPT. Such an undertaking would
not only be of momentous symbolic importance but would
also provide the basis for greater confidence in the
nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament
regimes. A confidence which has, inter alia, been eroded
by the development of new strategic doctrines for the use
of nuclear weapons and the potential consequences of
proposals to revise the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(ABM) and of new strategic doctrines which lower the
threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Such an
undertaking would also lay the foundation for a
step-by-step process which would reduce the threat of
nuclear weapons, de-emphasize their importance and lead
to their elimination.
Without such a clear and
unequivocal undertaking, the world will always be
confronted by the risk of a break-out from the nuclear
non-proliferation regime established by the NPT. Such an
undertaking would also demonstrate the validity of the
core bargain which was struck in the NPT, namely that the
overwhelming majority of States have entered into
legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices on the basis of the corresponding
legally-binding commitments by the Nuclear Weapon States
to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. It would also
demonstrate a commitment to the full implementation of
international law as contained in the unanimous
conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its
1996 advisory opinion. This conclusion clearly stated
that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith
and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control.
Other steps which should
be undertaken by the Nuclear Weapon States on the pathway
to the elimination of nuclear weapons are:
1. For START II to be
fully implemented, and for the substantive
negotiations on START III to commence;
2. For steps to be
taken to integrate those Nuclear Weapon States, which
have not been a part of START, into the process which
the United States and Russia have embarked on;
3. For the five
nuclear-weapon States to take a number of early and
interim steps de-emphasising the role of nuclear
weapons and expanding the nuclear arms reduction
process with a view to their complete elimination.
4. For the principle
of irreversibility to be applied in all nuclear
disarmament, nuclear arms reduction and nuclear arms
control measures.
While the primary
responsibility for undertaking the necessary steps for
the elimination of nuclear weapons lies with the Nuclear
Weapon States, it should be emphasized that the
obligation to work towards this goal also lies with all
States. Nuclear Weapons are not only a threat to their
possessors, they are a threat to all of humankind. We all
share in the responsibility to reduce the nuclear threat
which these weapons pose to the peoples of the world. As
such there are steps in the process which cannot be
undertaken by the Nuclear Weapon States alone, but which
will need the participation and cooperation of the
international community as a whole. These include:
1. The requirement for
those three States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities and that have not yet acceded to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(India, Israel, Pakistan) to reverse clearly and
urgently the pursuit of all nuclear weapons
development or deployment and to refrain from any
action which could undermine regional and
international peace and security and the efforts of
the international community towards nuclear
disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons
proliferation;
2. The requirement for
these States to also adhere unconditionally and
without delay to the NPT and to take all the
necessary measures which flow from adherence to this
instrument as Non-Nuclear Weapon States;
3. The early and
unconditional entry-into-force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and
4. The need for the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to urgently
pursue and conclude its negotiations on a fissile
materials treaty.
The steps which I have
identified are not exhaustive nor revolutionary. It will
be recognized that I have drawn heavily from the nuclear
disarmament agenda which has been proposed by the
"New Agenda Coalition", and that has been
introduced by the distinguished Foreign Minister of
Mexico at this Conference, and which is sourced in a deep
sense of concern about the lack of progress that has been
achieved in our Treaty's shared and common goals. The
core of the Coalition's call is for a new international
agenda to achieve a nuclear weapon free world, through
the pursuit, in parallel, of a series of mutually
reinforcing measures at the bilateral, plurilateral and
multilateral levels. An initiative which has in the
context of the UN General Assembly been cosponsored by
over 60 countries -- all of them States Parties to the
NPT; almost a third of the States Parties -- and which is
supported by an overwhelming ma3ority of the nations of
the world.
As I have mentioned, what
is important, from South Africa's perspective, in this
initiative is the need for an unequivocal undertaking to
nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear
weapons, and to a process of step-by-step measures which
will lead us to our common goal. If we are unable to
succeed in establishing the imperative for the
elimination of nuclear weapons then we will never be
liberated from the unspeakable destruction and human
suffering which these weapons can cause.
In this context also, as
Chair of the Movement of Non-Aligned States, we recall
the principled positions of the NAM on nuclear
disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear
testing. The NAM, as well as other States Parties that
associate themselves with the Movement, have prepared a
considered and substantive working paper as a
contribution to the work of this Conference. That paper
also represents a clear demonstration of the expectations
of a vast majority of the peoples of the world who can
only rely on the voices of their representatives in this
Chamber to defend their interests.
Mr President,
South Africa welcomes the
steps that were taken since 1995 to strengthen the IAEA's
safeguards system. The negotiations for the Additional
Protocol were concluded, and already a significant number
of protocols have been signed and some have entered into
force. South Africa has started negotiations with the
IAEA with the view to signing and ratifying the
Additional Protocol soon. We support the universal
implementation of the Additional Protocol. In this
regard, however, we have noted with some concern that
about 60 States Parties have not yet taken the first
basic step before the Additional Protocol can be signed,
i.e. the conclusion of a Safeguards Agreement with the
IAEA as required by Article III of the Treaty. We realize
that this may be mostly due to the absence of a nuclear
infrastructure in many countries. Corresponding to
paragraph 10 of the Principles and Objectives, those
States Parties who still have to fulfil this Treaty
Obligation, are urged to do so without delay. They should
be reminded that in most, if not all, of their cases
simplified requirements for the Safeguards Agreement and
the Additional Protocol apply. The IAEA is also urged to
make a special effort to assist these States in guiding
them through the process. States Parties who are in a
position to do so are encouraged to assist the Agency in
this important endeavour through suitable support
programmes.
The IAEA now has greater
legal authority than before for exercising its
responsibility in the implementation of international
safeguards. With this authority also comes the
responsibility of integrating classical safeguards, based
on highly quantitative perspectives, with new measures
which are of a more qualitative nature, into a new
Integrated Safeguards System. This should not result in
an add-on system but in an optimized new system -flexible
but effective and above all cost-efficient. This is a
major challenge that will in a certain sense require a
change in culture. Work is well underway in the IAEA, in
Advisory Groups and through Member States Support
Programmes, to reach the objectives of an Integrated
System, but it is also evident that much still has to be
done.
Mr President,
Non-Nuclear Weapon States
Parties to the Treaty benefit potentially in two
important ways. The threat that would be posed to them by
the further proliferation of nuclear weapons is
constrained, and under the NPT there is a promise in
Article IV of the promotion of nuclear energy for
peaceful uses and of the transfer of technology,
materials and equipment to those countries who could
greatly benefit from it.
Many interpret Article IV
to be about the promotion of nuclear power. This is
certainly true, but the requirements for developing
States are in many instances more basic. The peaceful
uses of nuclear energy in health, agriculture and
industry has the potential of affecting and improving the
situations of countless numbers of people.
It is for this reason that
South Africa places a high premium on the IAEA's
Technical Cooperation Programme, and why we are concerned
about the inability of the Voluntary TC Fund to meet the
legitimate needs of developing countries. In fact, we
have noted that for the last 15 years or so, the needs
and the resources pledged have diverged in an ever
increasing way. In this respect States Parties are urged
to pledge, and pay, their contributions to the TC Fund.
Ways should be sought to make this Fund stable and
assured as required by paragraph 19 of the Principles and
Objectives.
Mr President,
There are many serious
issues that will confront us at this Review Conference
over the next four weeks. Our success will have to be
grounded on our unequivocal commitment to all of the
provisions of the Treaty and to our unequivocal
commitment to ensuring that the Treaty plays its full
role in the achievement and continued maintenance of
international peace and security.
Mr President, I thank you.
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