The 2000 NPT Review Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York

STATEMENT 

BY H.E. MR. OLEXANDER O. CHALYI

FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF

UKRAINE

IN THE GENERAL DEBATE OF THE

2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION

OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NEW YORK, 25 APRIL 2000

Mr. Chairman, 

Let me join the previous speakers in congratulating you on your presidency at this forum. I am hopeful that its importance will inspire us with determination to work constructively in the spirit of mutual trust and respect to achieve forward-looking and far-reaching results. I would like to reiterate to you my delegation's full support and readiness to invest into the work of the Conference. 

Mr. Chairman, 

My delegation fully shares your thought, that the common dream of a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons has yet to be realized, and that the road leading to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons remains long and rugged. 

Five years ago at the 50th session of the UN General Assembly the President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma from this very rostrum launched an initiative of making the world of the twenty-first century free from nuclear weapons. He also proposed to translate this idea into the concrete actions within a United Nations programme. This concept has been echoed in the joint declaration "Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: The Need for a New Agenda", made by a number of countries wishing to put the nuclear agenda back on track. We believe that the only way to turn this idea into reality should be the genuine contribution of all Member States into the process of practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It applies both to the nuclear powers and non-nuclear states. 

In this context, Mr. Chairman, the voluntarily renunciation of nuclear weapons by Ukraine and other newly independent states, emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, or renunciation of national nuclear programmer by the others, could hardly be overestimated in the context of current situation in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We strongly believe that these unprecedented steps could serve as an example of great moral significance and political courage to be followed. The international community welcomed this contribution Of Ukraine as reflected in a number of international documents, including resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council as well as in the documents of the Preparatory Committee for this Conference. We expect that it will be also properly reflected in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference. 

We reaffirm our commitment to the NPT, to which Ukraine acceded as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1994. At the same time we take full account of the fact that Ukraine possessed the third largest nuclear potential in the world. We believe, this is fundamental both to our legitimate interests as a party to the Non­-Proliferation Treaty and to Ukraine's succession, in conformity with international law, in respect of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM Treaty), the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate ­Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) and the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty). In this context let me underscore that Ukraine has been and will remain in the forefront of international efforts to enhance nuclear disarmament. 

As of today Ukraine has made a significant reduction of strategic armaments deployed on its territory – 77% of the total number of its strategic offensive arms is already eliminated under START-I Treaty. At present Ukraine has embarked upon the third and final phase of reducing its strategic arms, which has to be completed by December 2001. We are convinced that the START process should only be sustained and developed further on by decisive measures of the states parties. Now it is imperative to ensure the implementation of START-II and to resume talks on the START-III. The recent ratification by the Russian Federation of START-II is a very important step in this direction. 

We reaffirm the importance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) as one of the pillars of strategic stability, and we wish to see the Treaty preserved. We believe that any possible actions of the party to this Treaty in order to decrease the possibility of a missile attack should not contradict the Treaty obligations. We call upon the parties to the Treaty to find a mutually acceptable solution to this problem, that would enable to preserve the arms control treaties (ARM Treaty, INF Treaty, START Treaty) and strategic stability. 

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is rightfully regarded as another key element in the architecture of strategic stability in the world and as a major complimentary effort to the non-proliferation at large. The initial role of the Treaty is significant in its essence: to stop or considerably constrain the nuclear states from improving their nuclear arsenals and to prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapon states. 

From this perspective we welcome the ratification by the Russian Duma of the CTBT as a positive historic step towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We hope that the precedent, set by Russia, will be followed by other nuclear weapon states. This is crucial in the light of their obligations under article VII of the APT, and it would also substantively promote the ratification of the CTBT by other states-parties to the Treaty. 

Mr. Chairman, 

Ensuring of the universality of the NPT is a matter of priority for Ukraine. Regretfully, the progress made in this field up till now can be seen more in terms of quantity than in quality. The fundamental principle of the non-proliferation has been undermined by the developments in South Asia and also challenged by the states not yet parties to the Treaty, which possess unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Therefore, we believe it is imperative that those states accede to the NPT as non-nuclear states without delay and put their nuclear objects under the IAEA safeguards. 

Another clear priority in the advancement of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is the negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). This Treaty would provide valuable security benefits to both nuclear weapons states and to non-nuclear weapon states. Such a treaty would be an integral and indispensable part of nuclear disarmament and an important step towards a world free of nuclear weapons. It is discouraging to note that negotiations on the FCMT have not moved forward. We stand for the immediate commencement of those negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament as the next necessary step. 

We fully recognize the importance of the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones, and consistently support such initiatives. We believe that, established on the basis of the arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned, such zones could play a valuable role in maintaining regional and global security as well as contribute to the strengthening of the international non­proliferation regime. It is clear that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the regions of Central Asia and Middle East could serve as important step to this end. 

We believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an increasingly important role in the areas of non-proliferation and peaceful uses of atomic energy. We commend the Agency's efforts in strengthening safeguards regime. Since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference Ukraine has considerably improved its non-proliferation record. In 1997 Ukraine ratified the Agreement with the IAEA for the application of comprehensive safeguards in connection with the l\TPT. We intend to sign the Additional Protocol to this Agreement next year. 

Mr. Chairman, 

This Conference is convened at the critical moment in the history of non­proliferation, when mostly negative external and internal tendencies dominate over the viability of the NPT. A lot of pessimism has been recently expressed over the future of the nuclear non-proliferation. The lack of speedy progress on genuine nuclear disarmament, serious threats to the existing non-proliferation regime coming from South Asia, the continuing reliance on the nuclear weapon benefits, and, as a result, stalemates in the multilateral disarmament fora - all these aspects- create an atmosphere of frustration and despair. In our view, should build on the progress achieved, rather than criticize regressive developments. 

May I recall that the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 - a legally binding instrument - provided to Ukraine the guarantees of its national security on the part of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation as well as did the unilateral statements by France and China. They were among the key factors that contributed to Ukraine's decision to accede to the NPT and reflected the unique situation of Ukraine in terms of security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states. 

We believe that experience of my country could be of value for elaborating a universal, legally binding document on assurances. I would like to state here that we are particularly concerned over the failure of the negotiations within the Ad Hoc Committee established by the Conference on Disarmament in 1998 to hold collective consultations on security assurances. If we want to make progress, we will need to re-establish this Committee and enable it to bring its work to a successful conclusion. 

Allow me to say a word on the Security Council resolution 984 (1995). It is noteworthy for its considerable impact on the design of the non­proliferation regime. This resolution was adopted by the Security Council in conjunction with the unilateral declarations by five nuclear weapon states to substitute the Security Council resolution 255 (1968), adopted 27 years earlier and widely considered inadequate. I believe, the Council should pursue further expansion of the nature and scope of application of the security assurances in line with the entire non-proliferation review process. 

Mr. Chairman, 

To sum up, we expect that all the parties to the NPT will demonstrate their faithful commitment to the real disarmament and non-proliferation. We should double our efforts to provide a favorable arena for honest and comprehensive discussion. Our common task is to use this momentum to achieve progress in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.