The 2000 NPT Review Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York

   The 2000 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Statement by
H.E. Ms. Anna Lindh
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sweden
 

25 April 2000

 
Mr. President, 

Let me begin by congratulating you on your election as President of this Conference. Its success lies in your hands and I can assure you of the support of the Swedish delegation in this important endeavour. 

Sweden fully subscribes to the European Union statement and the views expressed by Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. 

Mr. President, 

The late 80s and early 90s were a time of hope. A time of great political change and opening towards democracy. A time when decades of cold war gave way for disarmament and increased security. A time when the positive developments led  us to believe that the nuclear threat was history. 

Today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we must ask ourselves:  What went wrong? 

Thirty years after the entry into force of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) we face a near stand-still in nuclear disarmament negotiations in fact, since 1995 we have seen more set-backs than progress in nuclear disarmament. The US Senate has refused to approve the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), while China and other states have not yet ratified it. Nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan contribute to a deteriorating regional security situation in South Asia. The situation concerning weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East gives cause for concern. North Korea remains in violation of its NPT obligations. The United States are making plans for a national missile defence system which might restart the nuclear missile race. Are these temporary setbacks or are we seeing the beginning of a new era of mistrust? 

Out of concern for this situation, Sweden together with seven other non­nuclear-weapon states and with the strong support of the majority of non-nuclear-weapon states and the NGO community, launched a new initiative in 1998 calling for progress towards the treaty-bound objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Today, there is still an urgent need to turn the commitment to the 1995 Principles and Objectives into practical disarmament steps. This meeting takes place at a decisive moment in the nuclear era. It is the right time and place to get the process restarted. 

If we do not act today, we, the generation which rallied against nuclear weapons and for peace, will see our own children demonstrating against us. 

The NPT is based on balanced commitments. The majority of states have agreed to forego the nuclear option in return for negotiations in good faith, chiefly among the five nuclear-weapon states, towards nuclear disarmament. Our common goal is a nuclear-weapon-free world. This is the foundation of the global non-proliferation regime. The absence of negotiations on disarmament would risk eroding the NPT regime. 

In 1995, the nuclear-weapon states committed themselves to a programme of action that included "the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally”. 

Some positive steps have been taken in this regard. The systematic implementation of the START I treaty ahead of schedule, by the United States and Russia, is one. The unilateral reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons by France, the United Kingdom and the US, is another. We consider the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty an important achievement and we also welcome the strengthening of the Safeguards system. The efforts by some nuclear-weapon states to increase transparency in the disarmament process and to place fissile material under appropriate international safeguards should be acknowledged. We also welcome the UN Disarmament Commission's valuable work on nuclear-weapon-free zones. 

However, this is far from enough. Let me point out four areas of concern, where we lack progress or where we face new problems. These are: 

reducing nuclear weapons arsenals

bringing into force the CTBT

halting the development of new weapons and systems

nuclear weapons in regional conflicts. 

We need reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals. Instead, thousands of strategic nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert. In some countries there is a tendency to accord nuclear weapons a growing importance in military doctrines and postures. This is unacceptable. 

Although this certainly applies to all nuclear-weapon states, those with the largest arsenals bear a special responsibility. The Swedish Government calls on the Russian Federation and the United States to accelerate the process which, together with measures adopted by the other three nuclear-weapon states, will lead to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Sweden strongly supports the START process and recalls the 1985 joint US-Soviet statement entailing commitments to reductions in nuclear armaments to achieve the complete elimination. of nuclear arms everywhere. 

While of course welcoming Russia's ratification of the START II treaty, Sweden remains deeply concerned that it still has not entered into force seven years after being signed and that negotiations on START III are not yet underway.  The Russian Federation and the United States must now assume their special responsibility, bring START II and its protocol into force without further delay and immediately begin negotiations on a START III treaty. 

Sweden welcomes the unilateral reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons carried out by some nuclear-weapon states and calls for further cutbacks by the remaining ones - in particular the Russian Federation. We also call for transparency in holdings of non-strategic nuclear weapons. These weapons have outlived themselves and have no place in the 21^st century. 

We need the entry-into-force of the CTBT. In this context, we warmly welcome the progress achieved through Russia's on-going ratification. All other states that have not yet done so, in particular the United States and China, should now follow suit. A special responsibility to show immediate progress rests on India, Pakistan and North Korea, who have not yet signed the treaty. 

No states - and least of all the nuclear-weapon states - have the right to hold our common security environment hostage to domestic policies. Nor is it acceptable that differences between the nuclear-weapon states on unrelated issues should interfere with their responsibility for advancing the nuclear arms control agenda. 

We need an end to the development of nuclear weapons once and for all. Sweden remains committed to negotiating a Treaty on fissile material eased on the Shannon report, which would effectively prevent the further development of nuclear weapons. We cannot accept attempts by China or any other state to block progress on this crucial Treaty. China and all other States that have not yet done so must immediately cease production of fissile material for weapons purposes and refrain from further development of nuclear weapons. 

My Government is deeply concerned about the United States' plans for a national missile defence (NMD) system. Such a system could run counter to efforts to halt proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Proliferation must instead be met by strengthening the non-proliferation regime. An NMD system would put in question the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) which is repeatedly referred to by both States Parties as being a cornerstone of strategic stability. There is a risk that such actions jeopardise this balance, and have negative consequences for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. I reiterate Sweden's call on the States Parties to refrain from an deployment that could create uncertainties. Russia and the United States share the responsibility for negotiating it solution that will have a positive impact on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. 

This said, the debate must not be taken as a pretext for continued development of nuclear weapons There is no excuse for departing from the road towards nuclear disarmament. 

We need a halt to regional nuclear threats. In June 1998 India and Pakistan carried out test explosions of nuclear weapons. This deplorable development constituted a serious blow to the global non-proliferation regime. Far from Improving the security of the States concerned, these nuclear tests set off an arms race that constitutes a risk to peace and security in the entire region. 

India and Pakistan must reverse their nuclear ambitions in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1172. They both have a responsibility to leave the path of escalation and return to regional security. Signing the Test-Ban Treaty would be the first step in that direction. 

The situation regarding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East to be a cause for concern. Iraq continuously tries to evade inspections to which it is bound by Security Council resolutions. We urge Iraq to co-operate with the UN Monitoring, Observation and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC). The countries of the region must take decisive steps to wards a comprehensive solution to the security situation, including the setting up of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. 

On the Korean Peninsula, Sweden hopes for a solution to the nuclear situation, based on the “Agreed Framework" between the US and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Sweden, along with the EU, supports these efforts through participation in the KEDO project. We urge all States concerned to exercise restraint and to refrain from developing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Meanwhile, the DPRK must abide by its safeguard commitments in accordance with article III of the NPT. 

Mr President, 

Sweden strongly supports the Safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy System (IAEA) We have assisted several new states of the former Soviet Union in setting tip their own nuclear accountancy systems. We welcome the approval in 1997 of a system which a ill strengthen the IAEA's ability to detect secret nuclear weapons programmes. However, the rate of ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards agreement must be speeded up. Sweden is now ready to ratify the Protocol nationally. 

Together with our partners in the European Union we have also agreed to conclude our collective ratification process as soon as possible and urge all other States parties to make the same efforts. 

Illicit trafficking is a threat to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Swedish Government co-operates with several states in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as with the IAEA, to improve physical protection and prevent illicit trafficking. We call upon states to accede to the Physical Protection Convention as soon as possible and to implement fully their ensuing commitments. Thought should be given to co­operative measures, including verification, which would strengthen world-wide physical protection.  

Mr. President, 

My Government remains committed to co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, for instance in agriculture, medicine and water resource management. I welcome the IAEA's efforts to align its activities in this field more closely with those of the developing countries. Export control has an important role to play in facilitating such co-operation whip preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. 

Any activities relating to nuclear applications must be based on internationally agreed safety standards. All states that have not yet done so should accede to all relevant conventions and fully implement their ensuing commitments. 

Mr. President, 

Some of the problems that we discuss at this Review conference are a legacy from a bygone political era, missed by few. Others are new arising from regional conflicts and the political and economic reality of globalization. They do, however, have one thing in common - that today the prospects for finding sustainable solutions are better than ever before. Provided that we have the political will and commitment, that is. 

This Conference offers an opportunity to add more substance to the strengthened review process and to renew our commitment to the full implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We cannot afford to let it slip through our fingers. 

Sweden calls on the Conference to commit to the following steps: 

To undertake unequivocally to eliminate nuclear arsenals and to engage without delay in an accelerated process of negotiations thus achieving nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Nuclear Non­Proliferation Treaty. 

To do its utmost to achieve the entry‑into‑force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty unconditionally and without delay. 

To ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, through immediate negotiations as agreed in the Conference on Disarmament. 

To increase transparency regarding strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenals and holdings of fissile material stocks. 

Henceforth to let the principle of irreversibility guide all measures undertaken in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. 

Mr. President, 

We have four weeks to show to the world that the global non­proliferation regime still stands strong. We expect the nuclear-weapon states to implement their share of the NPT bargain. My Government will do everything in its power to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. 

Thank you, Mr. President. 

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