Mr. President,

I take the floor today to speak on behalf of members of the South Pacific Forum group of countries: Australia, Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. Allow me to congratulate you, on behalf of the group, on your election to office as President of the Review Conference.

Fifty-five years ago the world witnessed the awesome and unparalleled power of nuclear weapons with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For the first time in history, man possessed weapons so lethal that it posed a real threat to all human life.

The world recognized quickly the disastrous consequences of nuclear weapons so that as early as 1946, an international system, called the Baruch Plan, sought to control all potentially dangerous nuclear activities but was unsuccessful. Thus, it was not until the NPT's entry into force in 1970 that practical means were widely accepted to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond those of the nuclear weapon states.

Since then, the NPT has become a central pillar of the international system for maintaining peace and security. With 187 States parties it is the most widely supported arms control agreement ever. The countries of the South Pacific take this opportunity to call upon states that have not yet acceded to the NPT to do so at an early date.

While South Pacific countries are geographically far removed from the contemporary centers of international tension, all nations, wherever they may be, enjoy security benefits because of the NPT and have, therefore, major interests in its continued success. Without the NPT regime, nuclear weapons could have been acquired by other states and could have undermined our security individually and collectively. That the disturbing predictions of a world with 25 or more nuclear weapon states by the 1980s did not come to pass is a direct consequence of the NPT.

The commitment of nuclear weapons states to pursue nuclear disarmament is a central element of the "bargain" at the heart of the NPT. South Pacific countries welcome the progress made towards nuclear disarmament. However there is still much to be done to realise Article VI of the Treaty. South Pacific countries welcome the recent decision of the Russian Duma to ratify START II and look forward to the early conclusion of the ratification process, so that START III negotiations can commence. We encourage the United States and Russia to work for the early conclusion of START III. As all nuclear weapon states have agreed to the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, we also encourage such states to continue to take steps towards the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear disarmament is an issue of direct and fundamental interest to all non-nuclear weapon States parties of the NPT. South Pacific countries encourage the United States and Russia, and the other nuclear weapon states, to display maximum transparency on their actual and potential nuclear arms reductions.

A strong non-proliferation regime is essential to further progress towards nuclear disarmament. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a key reinforcing element of that regime. South Pacific countries consider that the CTBT is crucial to the process of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. For the South Pacific countries the CTBT has a direct and practical benefit. When the NPT was last reviewed in 1995 the issue of French nuclear testing in the South Pacific was a matter of great concern. Since then France has signed and ratified the CTBT and, in 1998, completed the dismantlement of its South Pacific testing sites on Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls. While we welcome the moratorium by nuclear weapon states on nuclear testing which we consider to be consistent with their signature of the CTBT, we call upon those nuclear weapon states that must yet ratify the CTBT to do so without delay. We welcome the recent decision of the Russian Duma to ratify the CTBT and look to all states to ensure the Treaty's early entry into force. In the meantime we are proceeding with the establishment of the International Monitoring System network of stations in the South Pacific region.

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference's Principles and Objectives identified negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) as vital to fully realising and effectively implementing Article VI of the NPT. South Pacific countries are concerned and disappointed that the Conference on Disarmament is yet to start work on this important agreement. We hope this Conference will give new impetus for an early start to FMCT negotiations.

South Pacific countries strongly support the International Atomic Energy Agency's strengthened safeguard system and consider it crucial that NPT States parties comply fully with their safeguards obligations. We call on States parties who have not already done so to conclude the necessary NPT safeguards agreements. We look forward to fully realizing the non-proliferation benefits of this system through its universal application.

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones are an important component of the global arms control regime by complementing the NPT in limiting the threat posed by nuclear weapons. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ), established in 1986 by the Treaty of Rarotonga, is the region's particular contribution to strengthening the nonproliferation regime and enhancing global security. We welcome the ratification of the SPNFZ Protocols by certain nuclear weapon states and we very much hope that the only nuclear weapon state yet to ratify the Protocols, may, at this Conference, be able to confirm its commitment to doing so.

Shipments of radioactive materials and mixed oxide (mox) fuel through the region pose a continuing concern for South Pacific countries taking into account the risks of an accident occurring and the consequences of such an accident. Such shipments should be carried out in a manner, which addresses all possible contingencies and the concerns of relevant countries, including coastal-states, of the region. South Pacific countries expect that shipments would be made only if the cargo was of demonstrably minimal risk, on ships that are of the highest standards and by shipping states that agree to promote the safety of the material and, in the event of an accident, provide compensation for any industries harmed as a result of changes in the market value of the region's fisheries and tourism products.

South Pacific countries note the constructive dialogue with nuclear industry representatives from France, Japan and the United Kingdom on the current liability and compensation regime for shipments of radioactive materials and mox fuel through the region. We affirm our readiness to engage again, at an early point, and to continue to explore possible new and innovative arrangements that could address the inadequacies of the current regime. South Pacific countries underline also the importance of international efforts in the IMO and IAEA to pursue a strong regime of prior notification to, and consultation with, coastal states on planned shipments of radioactive materials and mox fuel (consistent with security requirements), and the development of a regime for the preparation of Environmental Impact Statements and Emergency Response Plans.

The countries of the South Pacific recognize that the NPT serves our interests well in preventing nuclear proliferation. It remains the only treaty in which nuclear weapon states have committed themselves to the goal of the eliminating nuclear weapons. In order to achieve non-proliferation and disarmament goals the NPT remains of irreducible importance.

The Treaty has achieved much over its thirty years. Yet much more remains to be done. Fully achieving the NPT goals requires determined effort and demonstrated commitment by all parties to the Treaty. The countries of the South Pacific are so committed, ready to make that effort individually and collectively in order to ensure the Forgoing strength of this cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime.