The 2000 NPT Review Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York   

Statement by 

H.E. Mr. Sun Joun-yung
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations
at
The Sixth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

26 April 2000, New York

 
Mr. President. 

Allow me to begin by extending my warm congratulations to you on your election as President of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. I would like to assure you and other members of the bureau of my delegation's full support and cooperation in dealing with the important issues that lie ahead. 

Mr. President, 

Even before the end of the Cold War, the international community saw the need to secure collective security through multilateral treaties controlling weapons of mass destruction. One such instrument has been the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Although we have experienced both welcome achievements and disappointing setbacks over the past five years, my delegation believes that our efforts to consolidate the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime should be intensified for the 21^st century. 

On the positive side, the NPT has moved closer than ever before to attaining universality, with 187 countries onboard. The long-awaited Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was concluded. Progress in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones has been achieved in Africa, Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been strengthened. These are all welcome developments. 

Nevertheless, nuclear tests conducted in South Asia in May 1998 and the continuing non-compliance with the NPT by certain States parties have posed grave challenges to the global non-proliferation regime. The limited progress in nuclear disarmament and increasing emphasis placed on nuclear weapons in the military doctrines of some countries are other sources of serious concern. Furthermore, the impasse at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the delay of the entry into force of the CTBT and differences among major powers over the national missile defense (NMD) system are also worrisome. 

Mr. President, 

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference was an historic milestone, as the NPT - considered the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime - was indefinitely extended together with decisions on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and on Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty. 

As the first Review Conference since the indefinite extension of the Treaty, this Conference carries a great deal of significance indeed. It will give us an opportunity to assess the achievements of the 1995 benchmarks and to reach a consensus on our future plan of action. It will also serve as a forum for the international community to renew its political commitment to the NPT . 

Although many worries have been voiced over the Conference's potential outcome, we should not discount the significance of our gathering together here with a common goal in mind: strengthening the NPT. 

Mr. President, 

My delegation believes that, among others, the principal issues that this Conference must address in order to make the NPT a strong and effective regime include nuclear disarmament and the immediate program of action, universality, non-compliance, safeguards and negative security assurances. 

Nuclear disarmament is a highly political issue, as clearly shown by the voting patterns on relevant resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly. Consensus was reached on none of these resolutions and conflicting resolutions have been adopted simultaneously. Obviously, the main responsibility for nuclear disarmament rests with nuclear-weapon states themselves. 

We believe that, in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty and the 1995 Principles and Objectives, nuclear-weapon states should pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons. While we appreciate the progress made thus far, nuclear-weapon states should exert even greater efforts to this end with the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. In this vein, we welcome the recent ratification by the Russian State Duma of START II, and hope that START II will be implemented soon. Furthermore, we look forward to the commencement of START III negotiations, which will contribute to further reductions in nuclear arsenals. 

My delegation hopes that nuclear-weapon states will demonstrate their renewed determination to reduce their nuclear arsenals and enhance the transparency of the process, by presenting both their track record and concrete future plans in terms of the reduction of nuclear weapons during periodic NPT Review Conferences. We also consider it important that nuclear‑weapon states try to lessen their dependence on nuclear weapons in their military strategies. 

Recognizing that nuclear disarmament is closely linked to global strategic relations in that the five nuclear-weapon states are concurrently permanent members of the UN Security Council, we believe that a practical, step-by-step approach should be taken. Moreover, we share the view that it is time to enhance a multilateral exchange of information and views on nuclear disarmament. We will therefore support the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group in the CD for this purpose. 

Mr. President, 

As a pillar of our nuclear disarmament efforts, the CTBT should come into force as early as possible, as it will significantly contribute to stemming the nuclear arms race. We call upon all states that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty, especially those states among the forty‑four whose adherence is required for its entry into force, to do so without further delay. For the facilitation of the entry into force of the CTBT, the nuclear-weapon states must provide leadership. In this regard, my delegation welcomes the recent decision of the Russian Duma to ratify the CTBT. We believe that the United States and China should expedite their ratification process as well. Even before the entry into force of the CTBT, all states concerned are called upon to maintain moratoria on further nuclear tests. 

The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations should begin immediately on the basis of the Shannon mandate. While pursuing a treaty aimed at banning the future production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, my delegation considers it necessary to enhance transparency with regard to states' existing stockpiles of such fissile materials. In this connection, it is desirable for all states concerned to provide relevant information on their stockpiles of fissile materials during the negotiations. Moreover, we believe that, pending the conclusion of the FMCT, all states concerned should place a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. 

Mr. President, 

Universality and strict observance of the Treaty are central to preserving the NPT's role in contributing to international peace and security. The non-acceptance of or non-compliance with the NPT by any country diminishes the NPT's value as an effective multilateral instrument. We are all aware that the dangers posed by nuclear weapons have a universal impact, not limited to one country or region. 

The nuclear tests in South Asia run counter to global efforts for nuclear non­proliferation and disarmament. In this regard, the international community should redouble its efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race in the region. We would like to call upon the states concerned to take concrete steps to implement Security Council resolution 1172 as soon as possible. 

We urge the four countries that remain outside the NPT - India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba - to accede to the Treaty. My delegation is of the view that no states, other than the current five nuclear-weapon states, should be recognized as such, nor should any new category of states be created in the NPT. 

Over the past five years, the international community has seen continuing non­compliance with the Treaty obligations by two states. We note with concern the statement by the Director General of the IAEA on Monday that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. During the review period, the international community has made various efforts to bring the DPRK into full compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement. As was called for by UN General Assembly and IAEA resolutions, we call upon the DPRK, as a State party to the NPT, to implement the IAEA safeguards agreement fully and faithfully.

Mr. President, 

My delegation would like to reiterate its support for the competent authority of the IAEA in providing assurance of the compliance of the States parties with their safeguards undertakings. In this regard, we believe that all States parties concerned, in particular, those with nuclear capabilities, should bring into force and fully comply with IAEA's comprehensive safeguards agreements. We welcome the adoption of an Additional Model Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency the IAEA's safeguards system by enhancing its capability to detect undeclared nuclear materials and activities. We wish to underline the importance of the universal application of the said Additional Protocol. We hope that the IAEA will establish an Integrated Safeguards System as soon as practicable. 

Negative security assurances can form an essential part of the preferential treatment for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, which forgo the option of nuclear weapons. My delegation upholds the principle that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT that fully comply with their obligations, in particular with those in Articles II and III of the NPT, have a legitimate right to receive assurances from nuclear-­weapon states that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against them. 

Mr. President, 

My delegation believes that we should work together to agree on a forward-­looking document, which will contain a concrete plan of action. This document could incorporate the unfulfilled tasks from the 1995 Principles and Objectives and updated expectations for 2000 and beyond. Given the importance of this document to the vitality of the NPT regime, it is essential that States parties find consensus on new course of action for the next five years. 

Mr. President, 

We believe that strengthening the NPT is the interest of us all, and therefore, the preservation and enhancement of its authority and integrity should be of vital importance to the entire international community. Convinced that the NPT provides a solid foundation for global efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Republic of Korea reaffirms its unswerving commitment to the NPT, and pledges to work with other countries to achieve our common goal of strengthening the NPT regime. 

Thank you. 

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