The 2000 NPT Review
Conference (RevCon) 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons General Debate STATEMENT Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Poland New York, 26 April 2000
At the outset of my intervention let me congratulate you, Mr. President, upon your election to this highly prestigious and demanding post of the President of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Algeria and Poland have traditionally enjoyed good bilateral relations. Indeed, recently these productive and satisfactory relations have been reaffirmed by the visit of the minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Professor Bronislaw GEREMEK, to Algeria. I wish to assure you, Mr. President, of the Polish Delegation's full support and cooperation in the discharge of your important mandate. I should also like to take this opportunity to extend congratulations to the other members of the Bureau. Mr. President, Poland fully associates itself with the statement made by the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Mr. Jaime GAMA, on behalf of the European Union and the associated States. Nevertheless, due to the exceptional importance of this Conference and the Polish involvement in the attainment of the goals and objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, I would like to emphasize some of its aspects, which in our view are of particular significance. It is now thirty years since the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been in force. The Government of the Republic of Poland is strongly convinced that the NPT remains the key instrument for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As the mainstay of a global non-proliferation regime, it is the principal factor of international peace and security. During the five years since the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 Poland has sought, to the best of its ability, to bring its constructive contribution to the reinforcement of that instrument. One of the major steps in that regard was the ratification by Poland of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on May 25 1999. Mr. President, The Republic of Poland has been taking an active part in the proceedings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, The Zangger Committee as well as in a preparatory works of the CTBT Organization in Vienna. Our commitment to the goals of non-proliferation and our dedicated involvement in this field has been recognized from the very beginning - since these important mechanisms have been established. Poland has always complied fully with the IAEA Safeguards procedures, having the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in force since 1972. It is also my pleasure to inform the distinguished delegations, that the Additional Protocol to the Agreement, which was signed as early as 1997, has recently passed the due ratification procedure. It was signed by the President of Poland earlier this year. We, therefore, are entitled to urge other States Parties to proceed as soon as possible to the ratification of the additional protocols, which the IAEA considers - and rightly so - to be of the utmost importance for the NPT regime. Moreover, the National Atomic Energy Agency, a Polish regulatory body, has carried out a thorough revision of the Polish Atomic Act in order for the binding law of the land to reflect the agreed conventions and radiation protection standards. Mr. President, distinguished delegates, Out of the 187 States Members of the United Nations only four remain outside the NPT. Of this number, three are believed to possess nuclear weapons capability. To the dismay of the international community, India and Pakistan, unfortunately, proceeded two years ago to nuclear weapons testing thereby putting in jeopardy the Treaty as well as the international peace and security. The fact that not all the declared nuclear-weapons States have yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is also the cause of our serious disappointment and concern. However, we trust that the US Senate will soon reconsider its position with regard to CTBT ratification. Indeed, Mr. President, our hopes are being revived by the determination manifested by the US administration to continue to endeavor and to press for the US ratification of CTBT as soon as possible. We welcome with a deep satisfaction the ratification of CTBT by the Russian Duma - what has happened just recently. This significant step has been taken in the wake of the most welcome though belated decision of the Russian parliament to ratify START II. We are also hopeful that China will not fail to pursue with due dedication the CTBT ratification procedures. It is gratifying to us that France and United Kingdom were the first nuclear-weapons States to ratify the CTBT. As nuclear weapon States they did even more during the past five years by unilaterally reducing their nuclear arsenals and making them more transparent. By doing so they made an important contribution to a climate of confidence among countries. Following this positive development and keeping the momentum achieved, we would most sincerely encourage the governments of the United States and of the Russian Federation, to embark as soon as possible on the START III negotiations, which - as already announced - would substantially lower the nuclear potential of the two countries, thereby, constituting a critically important contribution to nuclear disarmament. Mr. President, The delegation of Poland is disappointed and concerned that the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to proceed to a productive negotiating process in regard to a FISSBAN Treaty. The prohibition of the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes - as agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference - should follow CTBT as yet another pillar of the global non-proliferation regime. It is our deep conviction that a new nuclear arms race, wherever it occurs, would not serve the interests of international security, or the security of any individual country. On the contrary, it would upset and deteriorate the now existing international security balance. The considerable threats and challenges to the non-proliferation regime do not allow for complacency. They arise from a pattern of noncompliance on the part of some State-Parties to the NPT. The behavior of certain States in Asia and in the Middle East speak for themselves. We urge the governments concerned to fully comply with their safeguards obligations. Poland welcomes the Security Council Resolution 1284 setting a new United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission for Iraq and we vigorously support the need for its full and early implementation. Mr. President, The experience of the past five years eloquently demonstrates that the strengthened review process - as elaborated in 1995 - needs a more effective implementation mechanism. This is not to say that it needs any substantial, revolutionary change. Both theory and concept are good. It is practice that needs to be developed further, especially in the light of the experience we have all gathered so far. Notwithstanding the setbacks that I have referred to earlier, it is our strong belief that during those last five years important progress has been achieved in the fulfillment of our obligations under the NPT as well as those deriving from the Principles and Objectives of 1995. Poland is deeply convinced that, looking ahead to the next five years, the NPT Review Conference-2000 needs to focus on a positive and realistic program of action that will genuinely reinforce the NPT and - in the process -consolidate international peace and security. The delegation of Poland stands ready to support you, Mr. President, in your efforts to achieve such an objective. Thank you, Mr. President. |