The 2000 NPT Review
Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York
NORWAY
2000
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons
STATEMENT
BY
H.E.
MR. THORBJ0RN JAGLAND
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
NEW
YORK, 26 APRIL 2000
Mr.
President,
May
I join the other speakers in offering you my congratulations,
Ambassador Baali, on your election as President of this Conference.
Under your able guidance I am confident we will achieve concrete
results at this conference.
The
Non-Proliferation Treaty is a cornerstone of the international
security system. This year's Review Conference gives us an opportunity
to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime.
In
order to succeed we must recognize that nuclear non-proliferation and
nuclear disarmament are two sides of the same coin. If we are to stem
proliferation of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon states will have
to increase transparency on nuclear weapons issues and make further
reductions in their nuclear arsenals.
The
1995 Review and Extension Conference was a major success. The Non-proliferation
treaty was extended indefinitely. The two decisions on
"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament" and "Strengthening the Review Process for the
Treaty" represent major achievements that must be upheld. They
set clear goals for further steps to promote nuclear non-proliferation
and reaffirm the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons. My government continues to fully support these goals.
Mr.
President,
The
events of the past five years show that we have achieved progress in
some fields, too little progress in other fields, and no progress at
all in some fields.
India's
and Pakistan's nuclear tests were a blow to the non-proliferation
regime and to the notion that social and economic development should
take precedence over military development and national prestige. It
has taken more than six years to get START II off the ground.
Negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) continue to
be blocked in the Conference on Disarmament, and the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty is still far from entering into force. Nuclear weapons
seem to become more important for certain actors in international
politics. This is a trend that must be reversed.
We
must therefore intensify our efforts to create new momentum in the non-proliferation
and disarmament process. Agreed principles and objectives must be
translated into concrete action. New measures and initiatives must be
developed. This Conference should spur us on to achieve concrete and
lasting results.
Mr.
President, Our general objectives for this conference should be:
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to retain and build on the results of the 1995 Review Conference,
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to revitalize and improve working procedures with a view to
strengthening the NPT process, and
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to improve the substantive work of the NPT process by initiatives and
measures that both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states
can agree to.
What
then, is a realistic way of pursuing these objectives?
The
experience of the NPT process has consistently shown that it is
difficult to achieve general agreement on the operation and
implementation of the Treaty. However, we must not let our future
efforts be hampered by different views on the past. Now is the time to
act and this is what we must do:
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We must look ahead and concentrate on developing a Programme of Action
for the next five-year period.
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We must give more attention to regional issues in our non-proliferation
and disarmament deliberations. In regions of tension and distrust, it
is the underlying causes of conflict that are hampering progress.
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We must develop a comprehensive strategy for dealing with fissile
material. The recent pressure on the non-proliferation regime has
demonstrated even more clearly that fissile material is a key issue,
which must be addressed urgently.
Mr.
President.
During
this year's Review Conference, Norway will therefore submit proposals
on a Programme of Action for the NPT process, including regional
issues, and a comprehensive strategy for dealing with fissile
material. The rationale behind these proposals is as follows:
We
must acknowledge that the strengthened review process of the non-proliferation
treaty has not functioned as it should. It is essential to improve the
operation of the Treaty and maintain its credibility. To this end we
should create working procedures that can give new life to our
efforts. Appropriate arrangements should be set up to prevent
backsliding and facilitate the implementation of agreed measures. Our
focus should be on a strategy for revitalizing the review process by
making it more operative and forward-looking.
This
strategy should start with the need to preserve the integrity of the
principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review Conference. With a few notable
exceptions, most of these principles and objectives have not been
realized. But they are important guidelines that must be retained and
not subject to renegotiation.
A mechanism must be
developed to transform principles and objectives into action. A
Programme of Action for the review process would serve this purpose.
Under
such a programme, the parties would commit themselves to a follow-up
of the decisions taken by the Review Conference. To make this
possible, each of the annual meetings of the review process should be
devoted to a limited number of specific issues. The process could also
be made more continuous, and hopefully more effective, by extending
the number of annual review meetings from three to four.
The
Programme of Action should include the following elements:
-
developing a comprehensive strategy for dealing with fissile material,
including negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile
material for weapons purposes,
- promoting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
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reviewing information on strategic nuclear arms reductions, including
the START process,
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promoting transparency in relation to tactical nuclear weapons and the
destruction of such weapons,
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signing and ratifying the International Atomic Energy Agency's new
additional protocol on full scope safeguards,
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increasing transparency in nuclear-related export controls.
Mr.
President,
India's
and Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998 were a clear reminder of the
connection between a volatile regional security situation and the risk
of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If we are to reduce
this risk, we must cast our net wide enough to include the underlying
causes of conflict and tension - the most important force driving
proliferation. Thus, when dealing with regional issues, we must take
into account arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The goal
should be to use the multilateral dialogue to build confidence and
promote security and disarmament.
Today
the only regional issue that the parties to the Non-proliferation
treaty are obliged to discuss is the situation in the Middle East. The
Review Conference should put together a more ambitious package of
regional issues to be dealt with at the annual meetings of the review
process. This would make regional discussions more balanced and give
them a coherent framework. Such a package should in particular include
South Asia. We should consider how India and Pakistan could be drawn
into the non-proliferation treaty framework for discussions on
security issues related to South Asia. At the same time it is
important to address regional situations where parties to the
non-proliferation treaty fail to comply with their treaty
obligations.
Mr.
President,
We
must achieve further and irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons
arsenals. As part of this effort, we need international assurances
that weapon-grade fissile material is no longer being produced. We
also need assurances that existing stockpiles are being brought
properly under control with a view to net reductions. This means that
a coherent strategy is needed for developing an international
framework to deal with fissile material. My delegation will submit a
proposal for such a strategy to the conference. The strategy has four
elements:
Firstly,
a ban on the future production of fissile material for weapons
purposes as an integral and indispensable part of nuclear disarmament.
I am very disappointed to see that the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva has still not started negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty.
Secondly,
the amount of weapons-usable fissile material that is now in excess of
military requirements is steadily increasing and represents a
proliferation risk. We must ensure that these surplus stocks will not
be diverted to weapons programmes.
Thirdly,
highly enriched uranium produced for non-explosive purposes also
involves a risk of proliferation. This issue should be addressed by
the international community in order to improve safety and the control
of such material.
Fourthly,
voluntary transparency measures should be established for military
inventories of fissile material. Reporting, inspection and safeguard
procedures should first be developed in order to prepare the ground
for agreed monitored net reductions in these stockpiles.
The
issues of stockpiles related to excess weapons material, highly
enriched uranium for nonexplosive purposes and military inventories
should be included in a process established in parallel with or
independent of any negotiations in Geneva on a production ban.
Mr.
President,
The
nuclear-weapon states have a particular responsibility for nuclear
disarmament. A continual process of reductions in nuclear weapons is
essential if we are to improve the working climate for the
multilateral machinery in this field. This will signal that the role
of nuclear weapons in international politics is diminishing. Given the
devastating effect of these weapons, the international community is
entitled to greater transparency as regards existing nuclear weapons
arsenals, planned and initiated cuts in these arsenals, and nuclear
policies.
Mr.
President,
We
greatly welcome the recent decisions of the Russian Duma on START II
and the Test Ban Treaty. It is of great importance that the USA and
the Russian Federation now intensify a new round of START negotiations
with a view to further strategic reductions. We encourage the Russian
Federation and the USA to implement new measures for strategic arms
control. One example would be specific measures relating to the
transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories as agreed by
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at the Helsinki Summit in 1997. START
III negotiations and specific transparency measures related to
strategic and non-strategic inventories could both contribute
significantly to a more constructive climate of cooperation. This
would demonstrate that the nuclear‑weapon states take their
obligations seriously.
I
would like to add, Mr. President, that it would be unfortunate if
current doubts about the viability of the ABM Treaty were to aggravate
an already difficult situation. We share the general concern about the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to irresponsible groups
and regimes. We hope that the United States and the Russian Federation
will agree to retain the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic
stability.
Mr.
President,
An
issue that should be moved up the international disarmament agenda is
tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons should be subject to extensive
safeguards and control. Tactical nuclear weapons can be rapidly
deployed and play a politically destabilizing role in areas subject to
conflict. The handling and reduction of such weapons must be made part
of a more comprehensive disarmament process. Increased transparency
with regard to tactical nuclear weapons could be a first step, and
would be an important confidence-building measure. Next, a programme
for warhead destruction could be developed, underpinned by bilateral
verification procedures. The unilateral declarations of the USA and
Russia in 1991 to withdraw and eliminate tactical nuclear weapons
should be reconfirmed and a time frame set for their implementation.
Mr.
President,
Nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation are closely linked with
environmental security. The legacy left by the Cold War needs our
urgent attention. I am thinking not only of the enormous stock of
weapons of mass destruction that we can now do away with, but also of
their means of delivery. There are a large number of nuclear-powered
submarines that are now obsolete and decommissioned and are waiting to
be scrapped. The former Soviet Union had more of these submarines than
the rest of the world put together. Over the years they have produced
a lot of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. This not only
constitutes a serious threat to the environment, but also involves a
risk of proliferation.
The
Russian Federation has had to accept this legacy and will have to deal
with it in a responsible manner. This includes building a whole new
infrastructure to condition, transport and store these materials in a
safe way. This will be a lengthy, costly and complicated process. We
have offered to cooperate with the Russian Federation to help speed up
the process. However, we realize that this task is so huge that a
broad-based international effort will be required if these problems
are to be solved in the near future.
In
order to facilitate international action, we have initiated
negotiations with Russia and a number of potential donor countries
that are interested in assisting Russia. We hope that the negotiations
will be successfully concluded as soon as possible and that a fruitful
cooperation with Russia will soon be under way.
Mr.
President,
The
non-proliferation regime has been under pressure in recent years. If
confidence in the Non-proliferation treaty is weakened, further
progress in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation might be beyond
our reach. To combat this, there are a number of things we must do:
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We must
demonstrate sufficient political will to meet the challenges we are
all facing.
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We must use
this Conference to set out clearly what can and should be done by all
states parties, individually and collectively, in order to strengthen
the non-proliferation regime.
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We must
develop concepts and aims built on the foundations laid in 1995.
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We must
implement already adopted decisions.
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We must
develop new initiatives and measures.
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We must
carefully balance global and regional initiatives.
By
enhancing the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, we
will be strengthening the international security system and at the
same time safeguarding our own national security interests. In the
second half of the last century we were haunted by the fear of nuclear
war. Nuclear weapons still pose a threat. We all have a responsibility
to reduce this threat. Real security can only be achieved through our
joint efforts. This conference offers us an excellent opportunity. We
must seize that opportunity.
Thank
you
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