The 2000 NPT Review Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York

NPT Notes: News from Behind the Scenes
(In reverse chronological order)

NPT Notes 10    17 May 2000

The Beginning of the End?

* The last week of the NPT has revealed the participating states in their true colours and diplomats are currently uncomfortably lodged between the diplomatic necessity of avoiding a total collapse of the conference and the political imperative of maintaining their national or bloc positions. Time is running out and it looks likely that Friday night (the last official day of negotiations) will be a long one for the delegates, potentially spilling over into Saturday morning.

* Just out (and on our website) is the latest incarnation of Subsidiary Body One's draft document. Of course, SB1 no longer formally exists, so the document is the result of "informal consultations" that Ambassador Baali requested. It seems to have been a deal cut between the P-5 and the New Agenda Coalition. Much of the document is weaker than before, but para. 17 (aka the New Agenda Coalition creed) has remained intact. Unfortunately, nobody cleared this plan with other NATO states, the NAM, or other would-be disarmers like Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, so there was much objection during the proceedings which followed and other drafts are hot on the heels of this one. It has been rumoured that the South African delegation has strict instructions from Pretoria that they are not to give any ground whatsoever on para. 17, even if it means wrecking consensus.

* The P-5 remain fairly quiet on this subject and their diplomats made no strongly worded comments against the document (even the French). However, sticking points can still be seen: transparency in 'nuclear...arrangements', for example.

* SB2 was also informally extended by Amb. Baali, who retained Amb. Westdal to facilitate discussions. Baali axed the Plenary session for Tuesday so that the SBs could report back, but hasn't scheduled another Plenary, so the Conference could conceivably go until Friday without another full meeting.

* Late-night discussions on Tuesday considered select portions of the reports from Main Committees I & II. From MC I's report, a document focused on language looking back over the past 5 years, two lists of key paragraphs were created: An "A" list, which constituted the more difficult language to negotiate from the Committee report; and a "B" list, which was language that needed to be negotiated, but is not as contentious. "A" list language considered in those discussions focused on first-use doctrines, the International Court of Justice opinion that nuclear disarmament is not linked to general & complete disarmament, and the Secretary General's idea for a conference that identifies ways of eliminating nuclear threats/dangers. No real progress was made in refining this controversial language.

* "B list" included comments on disarmament, which were tentatively approved, reaffirmation that nuclear testing moritoria will contribute to the non-proliferation regime and language on making nuclear disarmament irreversible, which was discussed at length. France, China, and Russia all take issue with irreversibility, and in talks wanted to modify the end of the paragraph to describe the disposition of fissile materials "designated as no longer required for defense purposes" (weaker than the earlier language of "excess to military needs."). 

* Other discussions looked at language on nuclear-weapon-free zones from Main Committee II, and paragraphs addressing security issues for non-nulcear weapon states, pulled from MC I & II discussions.

NPT Notes 9    12 May 2000

Amid much acrimony, Main Committee I has just submitted its final report, including text from Subsidiary Body 1. There was virtually no consensus and the report was not 'approved'. Rumours abound that Ambassador Baali might even discard it and enter into his own consultations with the key players.

Highlights include:
(a) the mention of Israel ('8. The Conference urges all States not yet party to the Treaty, namely Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without condition, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.')

(b) 'regret' over Chinese and American reluctance to sign the CTBT ('11. The Conference notes that the two States concerned have declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear tests by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The Conference regrets that the signing and ratifying has not yet taken place despite their pledges to do so.')

(c) Criticism of current strategic doctrines, first-use policies and the lack of security assurances: ('3. The Conference also expresses its concern over the reaffirmation of nuclear weapons doctrines by all nuclear-weapons States, including those that retain first use doctrines or do not exclude the use of such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.')

(d) Criticism of the continuing state of the P-5 arsenals: ('The Conference expresses its deep concern at the continued threat to humanity represented by the possession by nuclear-weapon States of these weapons, many of which remain on high alert, and at the attendant possibility of their use or threat of use.')

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Subsidary Body I produced some ambitious language, but was not able to come to consensus either. Apparently, the Chair of SB1, Ambassador Clive Pearson of New Zealand, will take on the role of "friend of the President" and remain in an advisory role as Amb. Baali seeks to attain consensus on a single document during the plenary sessions next week. Some interesting points:

'The Conference agrees on:

-6 Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.

-7 The principle of irreversibility being applied to all nuclear disarmament and nuclear arms control measures.

-10 Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear arsenals and fissile material inventories as a confidence building measure supporting progress on nuclear disarmament.'

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Main Committees II and III are due to report back imminently. Conference

Chair Ambassador Baali has delayed the time for reporting back to the Plenary until 3pm Friday afternoon (rather than Friday morning).

NPT Notes 8    11 May 2000

As the NPT nears the end of its third week of deliberations, the real  sticking-points are beginning to emerge. Listed below are topics of current concern, as well as a recent Indian statement on the NPT process. (India, as one of the four non-parties to the NPT, is of course not represented in New York)

* The French seem intent on blocking wording such as "irreversibility" and "unilateral" in the forward-looking disarmament negotiations, whilst the Chinese baulk at anything designed to improve transparency, and the US continues to rule out any language that includes an action verb.

* Egypt and the US are still worlds apart on the question of Israel and the Middle East, despite the general acceptance that "everyone" (incl. Israel, India, Pakistan, Cuba, Iraq & N. Korea) should be named in the eventual document(s). The US is still protesting that Israel should not be named. The Netherlands has acknowledged that the M. East question is the knottiest one which remains and, together with Belgium, has issued a counter-proposal to Egypt's suggestion of a M. East envoy. Their proposal would move the envoy idea to consideration in the wider universality discussion - the motive being not to single out Israel with the envoy, but to highlight all of the non-member states.

* A Japanese delegate feared that the initial "guarded optimism" may be moving to "disappointment," which was nonetheless "expected." However, he still maintained hope for a "reasonably forward-looking outcome."

* There is disagreement over the assertion that ABM/NMD could prove to be a potential difficulty for discussions in the last week. A UK delegate said that the NWS statement on 1 May had already addressed it in a manner that would generally be accepted by the conference. Besides, he went on, no states can realistically comment on what remains a "hypothetical situation" (NMD deployment). Many other delegations were not so sure.

* The same UK delegate emphasized that the UK would not move toward further disarmament measures without first seeing some in-kind measures from other larger NWS.

* An Australian official remarked that although states had arrived with a low level of expectation for a fruitful outcome, no delegation had yet written off the chances of an outcome at all.

* The issue of NGO access has been the subject of some discussion. The Netherlands and Japan both indicated that the "proper channel for NGOs is through governments," meaning that NGOs should use national-based processes to provide their input for these meetings, but Canada, New Zealand and others are still battling to gain more of a role for NGOs. NGOs stressed that the block of time given to them during the meetings had been useful in airing issues of importance to a global non-governmental community (and was well-attended by delegations) and that roundtables and informal access to governments continued to be vital to their participation in the process.

NPT Notes 7    4 May 2000

After the fairytale start, the reality of tough negotiating is beginning to set in for those attending the various Committees of the NPT RevCon. Diplomats this morning offered diverging views on the progress of Subsidiary Bodies 1 (on Disarmament) and 2 (on regional issues, including the Middle East and South Asia), now in closed session. One Ambassador said that 'robust statements' had been made on South Asia and that there was pressure to come up with 'forward-looking' language for what progress should be made in the next five-year period.

Another P5 diplomat said that China was beginning to throw more spanners into the works than it had done in the first week and that it was trying to introduce the same 'linkages' as it had suggested at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Chinese emphasis on NMD and the non-militarisation of space is re-emerging. The same diplomat also said that the Non-Aligned Movement is now worried that any language on Israel in the final documents might be bound up with a general statement on the 'non-adherents' (ie including Cuba, India and Pakistan) and that it would therefore have less political impact.

Discussions around the Chairman's Working Paper from Subsidiary Body 1 reveal some of the thorny issues likely to dominate next week. Key amongst them are: whether to replace or re-invigorate the stalled processes on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and nuclear disarmament talks in the Conference on Disarmament. US-Russian-Chinese perspectives will also be vital in determining how much linguistic linkage will be allowed between START II, START III and the ABM Treaty in final documentation.

Finally, Swedish and Canadian Foreign Ministers Lindh and Axworthy have issued a joint call in a Swedish newspaper for the US to show great restraint in unilaterally deploying any NMD system and for Russia and the US to play a greater role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

NPT Notes 6    4 May 2000

Peter Hain, Minister of State in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, said in a Westminster Hall debate in London on 3rd May: 

'My hon. Friend the Member for Bury, North referred to the new agenda coalition. I welcome the contribution made by some non-nuclear weapons states, including that coalition, to the debate on measures that might be pursued in the next five years. We are studying closely the speech made by the Mexican Foreign Minister on behalf of those countries. I assure hon. Members that we are ready to engage in constructive discussion of those and other ideas. I held such discussions with the Irish and New Zealand Foreign Ministers, and with the South African delegation in New York.

I have instructed my officials still at the NPT in New York to discuss with the leading countries involved in the new agenda coalition--including New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland--amendments that would enable the UK to support their proposals to the conference. We agree with the vast majority of their proposals, but there are some sticking points, one of which is the proposal to demate warheads from delivery systems. In Britain at least, that is impossible, because our weapons are submarine based. I hope that we can obtain an agreement with the non-nuclear weapons states, because we overwhelmingly share their aims for nuclear disarmament.'

NPT Notes 5    3 May 2000

Non-governmental organisations and representatives of civil society addressed delegates to the NPT on Wednesday 3rd May. 15 separate presentations were made on subjects as diverse as National Missile Defence, South Asia, deterrence policy and environmental issues to a reasonably full conference room and an attentive Ambassador Baali in the Chair.

The Mayor of Nagasaki, Iccho Ito, said: 'The citizens of Nagasaki and Hiroshima are not appealing for the abolition of nuclear weapons out of hatred or resentment over events of the past. Our only reason is our clear knowledge, gained from the miserable experience of the atomic bombings 55 years ago, that nuclear weapons are inhumane tools of indiscriminate, mass destruction that violate all rules of international law.'

The US author and journalist, Jonathan Schell, spoke of nuclear deterrence, saying that it was 'a prime engine of proliferation.' [...] 'In my country and in other powers, we hear nuclear arsenals called 'our deterrent'. In current circumstances, there is much more reason to call these arsenals 'our proliferant.'

Presenting the view from Russia, a former nuclear weapons scientist, Dr. Lev Feoktistov, stated: In the final analysis, we never found a reasonable argument which could define the place of nuclear weapons, apart from emotional, psychological and philosophical motives, which are widespread and have to be reckoned with. We must confront them with rational reasoning. And I challenge anyone to suggest the global idea, or purpose, for the sake of which it would be acceptable to sacrifice just one city, say, New York, to just one hydrogen bomb.'

Former Head of the Indian Navy, Admiral Ramdas concluded with a call to action: 'We the people demand that the decision makers do not hijack the entire planet to meet vested interests. We must set a timetable to meet targets along the nuclear disarmament route to zero.[...] This is the challenge before us.'

NPT Notes 4    2 May 2000

This story below, as translated and distributed by several NGO's at the NPT, was a key talking point on Tuesday, as was the muted reaction to the P5 statement, which left many delegations unimpressed.

NATO HOLDS ON TO ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS By Urs Gegehriger, Die Tagesanzeiger (Zurich) Unofficial Translation by Karel Koster and Oliver Meier, 25 April 2000

NATO's new strategy envisages the use of nuclear weapons against states possessing biological and chemical weapons. This contradicts the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. NATO, according to its still-secret Strategic Concept, doesn't want to use weapons only for deterrence and countering states armed with nuclear weapons. Potential users of biological and chemical weapons are also coming into the picture. More precisely, these are threshold states and so-called rogue states like Iran, Iraq, and Libya, which have these weapons programs.

In order to contain this danger, NATO must have an appropriate response, according to Colonel Frank Salis, spokesman of the NATO Military Committee. For this reason, the new strategy paper MC400/2 establishes that NATO wants to have "equivalent means of deterrence as well as defense against all forms of potential attacks" available. "Because the Alliance does not possess either biological or chemical weapons," Frank Salis continues, "the nuclear threat is the only thing that's left for us." 

In the footsteps of the United States

With this step towards broader nuclear deterrence, NATO is following the US. Since the 1991 Gulf War, the Pentagon has been paying more attention to the threat of biological and chemical weapons. Counter-proliferation has been added to the existing concept of non-proliferation. Since 1993, the Clinton administration has not ruled out the possibility that the US could use nuclear weapons against weapons of mass destruction. The aim of the US strategy is to leave potential users of weapons of mass destruction uncertain about US reaction, in this way, deter them.

NATO's policy converges with the US strategy at a time when the NPT Review Conference is meeting. While the 187 NPT member States debate about the only universal arms control treaty, the new strategy paper is on the table at the permanent NATO council. "The new military strategy places NATO states in clear contravention of the Treaty obligations which they have committed to," according to Otfried Nassauer, director of Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS).

In the NPT treaty, which has been in force for 30 years, signatories are obliged not to acquire or transfer nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, six non-nuclear NATO member States - Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey - possess all technical means necessary for air delivery of American nuclear weapons. There are up to 180 free-fall nuclear bombs deployed in Europe. In peacetime, these weapons are under control of US forces. In war, control of the bombs can be transferred to non-nuclear NATO states to conduct air attacks. "This would be a gross violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty," according to Nassauer. He also criticizes the possibility that, along with the new NATO Concept, the option of first use of nuclear weapons will become an indispensable part of Alliance strategy. "The use of nuclear weapons against possessors of biological or chemical weapons is, by definition, in most if not all cases, nuclear first use since the potential enemy does not possess nuclear weapons."

Counter-productive Consequences

The idea of biological and chemical weapons as "poor-man's atomic bomb" no longer applies. Some non-nuclear states may come to the conclusion that nuclear weapons are the only effective means of deterrence, Nassauer argues. In this way, the policy of nuclear deterrence increases the risks of nuclear proliferation. The permanent NATO council wants to approve the concept MC400/2 by 9 May. In this way, the outcome of the NPT Review Conference in New York, will be predetermined even before its official closure on 19 May.

NATO states, argues Nassauer, are being forced into the position which until now was the US national strategy. "As a result, the chances of the Conference's success are being significantly reduced, if not ruined."

NPT Notes 3       28 April 2000

Canadian diplomats today gave a briefing to NGO’s on their impressions of the Conference’s first few days and their hopes for what it might achieve. Noting the ‘cautious optimism’ and ‘businesslike start’ of the Conference, they highlighted the Chairman’s (Ambassador Baali of Algeria) success in overcoming procedural difficulties so rapidly. They also pointed out that the debate over National Missile Defence and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty remained the ‘leading current issue’, which could still throw discussions off course. They admitted with some candour that Canada’s position within NATO was indeed difficult to reconcile with its stated policy on nuclear disarmament, given that NATO consistently reaffirms the value of its nuclear weapons.

Rumours of cracks in the EU bloc are beginning to surface. The EU position remains stretched between Sweden and Ireland, who are keen supporters of the New Agenda Coalition, and those who favour a more conservative course, led by France and, to a lesser degree, the UK. France has also indicated that it will oppose a proposal by Canada to include non-governmental organisation participation as part of efforts to strengthen the NPT review process.

Opposition to the US’s proposed National Missile Defence is producing a series of vague ideas concerning strengthened missile technology export norms and / or enhanced MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) arrangements. Russia has been one of the key proponents of this initiative, knowing that it must counter ‘rogue state’ threat assessments with policy proposals which provide a credible alternative to NMD.

Friday 28th will be spent in private consultations, as there are no official plenary or committee sessions scheduled. One diplomat said that these meetings would be all about ‘setting out positions’ for next week, when the real bargaining would start. The P-5 is also slated to announce a position on Monday.

NPT Notes 2     26 April 2000

Despite announcements of substantial vertical reductions in nuclear arsenals in recent years, many delegations to the NPT Review Conference have complained that the salience of nuclear weapons remains unchanged and that the nuclear weapons states' military and security doctrines continue to reiterate the importance of their nuclear arms. This, they have said, is undermining those states' claims to be working towards disarmament. Here are some of those statements:

Kofi Annan (UN Secretary General): '.over the last few years, we have witnessed the re-affirmation of the nuclear weapons doctrines of all the nuclear weapons states. Some states retain first-use doctrines and some do not exclude the use of such weapons even against non-nuclear-weapon states.'

Mohamed ElBaradei (Director General of the IAEA): 'One important and concrete step to this latter end would be a comprehensive and in depth dialogue among the weapon states on practical measures to gradually reduce the number of, and move away from dependence on nuclear weapons for their defence strategies, and thus lead by example.'

Brian Cowen (Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs): '.how can we lift the nuclear threat when nuclear weapons are being reaffirmed as central to strategic concepts for the indefinite future?'

Abdul Minty (Deputy Director-General of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs): [some developments having a counter-productive impact on the NPT are] 'The continued, or even greater reliance, which is being placed on nuclear weapons in the strategic doctrines of the nuclear weapons states and their military alliance partners. [.] The compliance implications of nuclear sharing in, as well as the expansion of, NATO.'

Matt Robson (New Zealand Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control): [The problem of] 'nuclear doctrines still embedded among the nuclear weapons states, even gaining new currency with the so-called 're-rationalisation' of nuclear weapons.'

Rosario Green, (Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and Mexico): 'Yet, in place of such determination [to eliminate nuclear weapons] we continue to witness re-statements of policies and postures which reaffirm the central role of nuclear weapons in strategic concepts and the possibility of fighting war with the use of nuclear weapons.'

NPT Notes 1        25 April 2000

Below are some snippets from the opening of the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the United Nations in New York.

The NPT Conference began with three unexpected successes. First of all some twenty Foreign Ministers attended the opening, second the meeting attracted unexpectedly high media coverage in the US and the UK and third, the conference began without any procedural hitch and created special groups to discuss regional issues including the Middle East as well as one concentrating on nuclear disarmament.

In advance of the meeting many states had indicated that they would only be represented at best at deputy foreign minister level, stating that the meeting in 1995 was exceptional in attracting high level representation. NGOs including BASIC had argued that the importance of the issues demanded that the meeting be elevated to summit level. This did not happen, but a number of officials indicated that the pressure resulted in political decisions to send more senior officials. However, the Russian decision to send Ivanov followed by the decision, apparently late last week by the US to send Albright changed the perception of the conference. A powerful positive precedent has now been set that these meetings should be opened by high level political representatives and not be relegated to purely diplomatic attention.

Despite much acclaim for Russia's recent ratification of the CTBT and START II, many states drew attention to the continued salience of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines. These criticisms of nuclear weapons states' continued reliance on their nuclear arms effectively undermined the latters' claims for real action towards disarmament. Whilst the numbers of nuclear weapons may be diminishing, many states contended, their importance seems to remain paramount.

One unexpected voice of protest was that of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei. (The IAEA is responsible for the negotiating of safeguards agreements with individual states and therefore promoting verification of atomic energy usage, as well as overseeing the transfer of civil nuclear technology to all NPT member states.) He made two interesting complaints. First, that only 9 states had negotiated Additional Protocols with the IAEA and subsequently ratified them; and second that, despite the increase the IAEA's mandate, its 'budget for safeguards had been frozen for over a decade.' He claimed that this made it impossible for the Agency to fulfil its mandate.

A flavour of the backroom negotiations is beginning to emerge. The EU is trying to develop a common disarmament position (main Committee 1) as part of developing the common foreign policy. Despite Peter Hain's positive tone in his speech for the UK, some diplomats say that the UK is indistinguishable from France in taking a hard line in the EU meetings. The tendency may be for a joint EU position to effectively mute the voices of Ireland and Sweden. It also appears that the German delegation has more of the tone of the old Kohl government than the new political leadership in Bonn.

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