The 2000 NPT Review
Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York
STATEMENT
BY
AMBASSADOR HASMY AGAM
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MALAYSIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
AT
THE 2000
REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE STATE PARTIES
TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TUESDAY,
25TH APRIL 2000
Mr.
President,
It
gives me great pleasure to see you preside over this important Review
Conference of the Treaty on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
In congratulating you and members of the Bureau on your elections my
delegation extends to you its fullest co-operation and looks forward
to working closely with you in ensuring the success of this Review
Conference.
2.
My delegation associates itself with the statement by the
distinguished Permanent Representative of Indonesia when he introduced
the Working Paper by the Non-Aligned Movement, yesterday.
3.
Five years ago when the states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
agreed to extend the Treaty indefinitely the nuclear-weapon States
parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment to pursue in good
faith renegotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear
disarmament. The agreement reached was that the indefinite extension
would be integral to the determined pursuit by the Nuclear-Weapon
States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons
globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons under
strict and effective international control. The indefinite extension
was hailed by many as a new beginning in the serious efforts towards
ridding the world of these weapons of mass destruction. However, a
number of delegations, including Malaysia, had reservations about the
wisdom of extending the Treaty indefinitely. Malaysia had stated then
that the indefinite extension of the NPT provided the nuclear-weapon
States a "carte Blanche" and that it did not serve as an
incentive towards universality. Given the dismal record of nuclear
disarmament during the period under review my delegation sees no
reason to revise the conclusion it had made at that time. We continue
to believe that by indefinitely extending the NPT the international
community had lost the only leverage it had vis-a-vis the
nuclear-weapon States parties. Having secured their immediate
objective of extending the Treaty indefinitely they see no further
incentive or compulsion to make serious efforts towards the goal of
the reduction and elimination of their nuclear arsenals.
Self‑serving national interests of the nuclear-weapon States
parties have taken control of the process at the expense of the larger
interests of the international community that had placed their entire
faith on the good intentions of the nuclear-weapon States.
4.
Decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension conference, inter-alia,
requires that states parties at future review conferences "should
look forward as well as back", evaluate the results of the period
under review, including the implementation of undertakings by States
parties to the Treaty and identify areas in which and the means
through which further progress should be sought in the future.
Additionally, States parties should also address specifically what
might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to
achieve its universality. In other words we should, at this Review
Conference, engage in an objective and candid analysis of what we had
achieved or not achieved in the last five years and work out a roadmap
for the next five years.
5.
An analysis of the performance of States parties during the period
under review on the basis of Decision 2 of the Extension Conference
pertaining to the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament" would reveal more negative than positive
developments.
6.
On the positive side, a number of developments ought to be applauded.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was a major disarmament
achievement which must be recognized. While it still awaits the
required number of ratifications before its entry into force, we
should welcome its ratification by the Russian Duma last week as a
positive contribution towards that goal. Against the Russian decision,
the earlier decision by the United States Senate not to ratify the
CTBT was a disappointing let down especially when the international
community had looked to the United States for leadership on this
important matter. It is to be hoped that the United States Senate
would put matters right by ratifying the Treaty at the next opportune
moment.
7.
We also welcome the achievements with respect to the START process and
particularly welcome the Duma's ratification of START II in advance of
this Review Conference. We look forward to the beginning of the START
III process although we note the linkage being established with the
ABM Treaty. Malaysia shares the concern of the NAM on the
destabilizing effect of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile
defence system and expresses the hope that this linkage would not
complicate and delay the START III process. Indeed, in order not to
cause this complication, we would urge the United States to rethink
its intention to develop and deploy the said defence system.
8.
My delegation is also gratified at the positive developments in
respect of nuclearweapon-free zones, specifically with the
establishment of such zones in Africa, Southeast Asia, which, together
with those in the South Pacific and South America, would form
contiguous nuclear-weapon-free zones spanning the Southern Hemisphere.
The progress in the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones is
gratifying indeed and reflects positively on the continuing commitment
of the non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty. So far more
than 100 non-nuclear-weapon States in four continents are covered
under the nuclear-weapon-free-zone umbrella. There has also been
encouraging progress in the creation of a Central Asian
nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty, and in the acceptance of the
innovative concept of a single-state weapon-free zone initiated by
Mongolia. Similarly, Belarus' equally innovative proposal for a
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Corridor merits serious consideration as part of a
global concerted effort towards nuclear disarmament. We look forward
to establishment of other nuclear nuclear-weapon-free zones in other
regions, including the Middle East and South Asia.
9.
However, the period under review witnessed the following negative,
even, disturbing developments:
-
The nuclear-weapon States failed to 'fulfil with determination"
the undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the
NPT. Contrary to what was enjoined in the Principles and Objectives,
nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were not
"vigorously pursued". indeed, it was one of the low points
in the nuclear disarmament process with no serious efforts being made
on the multilateral disarmament track and half-hearted efforts on the
bilateral track.
-
Far from attaining the universal adherence to the NPT, the period saw
the emergence of two more or less declared nuclear-weapon powers in
South Asia. Contrary to what was stipulated in Decision 2, no serious
efforts were made to attain the objective of securing the non-States
parties to accede to the Treaty "at the earliest date".
While nine new States have joined the NPT—which is welcomed
indeed—four continue to remain outside of the Treaty, three of which
have nuclear weapons options and operate unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities. It is regrettable that no serious efforts were made to
bring them into the NPT regime in spite of our earlier proposal for a
serious dialogue with these countries. In this context, I would like
to reiterate our call for the establishment of a high level
consultation mechanism to encourage universality.
Far
from "preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other
nuclear explosive devises", as called for in Decision 2, the
period under review witnessed the explosion of nuclear devices by the
abovementioned non-States parties who conducted a series of tests in
quick succession to attain the status of nuclear powers, thereby
adding to the proliferation of these weapons, with serious
implications to regional and international security.
Contrary
to the objective stipulated in the Decision, the nuclear-weapon States
parties failed to "pursue in good faith" negotiations on
effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. Indeed, soon after
the Review and Extension Conference, two nuclear weapons states
proceeded to conduct a series of nuclear weapon tests explosions.
Also,
contrary to one of the stated objectives contained in the Decision 2
document, there was no "immediate commencement and early
conclusion of negotiations" on a convention "banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices".
10.
We are, therefore, of the view that the agreements made at the 1995
NPT Review and Extension Conference have not been fully honoured. The
process of nuclear disarmament these past five years has become more
of a case of taking one small hesitant step forward but two steps
backward. While some small progress has been achieved over the last
decade in the reduction of the total number of nuclear weapons
deployed by the Nuclear-Weapon-States, these states reasserted their
total commitment to the dangerous and outmoded doctrine of nuclear
deterrence as a cornerstone of their defence and security policies. In
the mistaken belief that the possession of nuclear weapons increases
their security, they continue to ignore the Advisory Opinion of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) "to pursue in good faith and
conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament under strict and
effective international control". The Conference on Disarmament
continues to be in a state of limbo as demonstrated by its inability
to constitute a Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament and to commence
negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). New players
in the deadly game of nuclear armaments have emerged, with all its
ramifications to regional and global security.
11.
If anything has been affirmed these past five years it is the
conviction of the nuclear-weapon States parties in the doctrine of
nuclear deterrence as an essential element of their security. It is
clear that while the total numbers of nuclear weapons may be reduced
over time out of economic or strategic imperatives, their potency has
not— hence, the importance attached by these States to making these
weapons more lethal and devastating based on the philosophy that one
can do more with less. Indeed, there is an alarming tendency on the
part of some strategic thinkers and policy-makers in nuclearweapon
circles of the desirability of relying on nuclear arsenals for an
indefinite period; hence, the apparent soft-pedalling on the issue of
the total elimination of nuclear weapons in some circles. Some of them
are even openly suggesting that such a concept is naive and even
dangerous!
Mr.
Chairman,
12.
In contemplating future steps that should be taken in fulfillment of
our obligations to the NPT, it is worthwhile recalling the historic
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In one
of the most significant and important milestones in the development of
international law the Court found that the use of nuclear weapons
"seems scarcely reconcilable" with the provisions of
humanitarian law protecting civilians and combatants from unnecessary
and indiscriminate effects of warfare, and further found that nuclear-weapon
States had not demonstrated any circumstances justifying of self
defence, in which a survival of a State would be at stake. Without
being asked to do so, the Court also gave its opinion on the meaning
of Article VI of the NPT, which calls for good faith negotiations
towards nuclear disarmament. It stated in paragraph 2F of the
disposition and endorsed by every judge that "there exists an
obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under
strict and effective international control".
13.
On the obligation to bring to conclusion negotiations on nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects, let us ponder on what the President of
the World Court, Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui of Algeria--your illustrious
countryman, Mr. President—had said, "With nuclear weapons,
humanity is living on a kind of suspended sentence....Since Hiroshima,
on the morning of 6 August 1945, fear has gradually become man's first
nature. His life on earth has taken on the aspect of what the Quran
calls a "long nocturnal journey," like a nightmare whose end
he cannot yet foresee". He went on to say that, "...humanity
is subjecting itself to a perverse and unremitting nuclear blackmail.
The question is how to stop it...it is to be hoped that the
international community will give the Court credit for having carried
out its mission - even if its reply may seem unsatisfactory - and will
endeavour as quickly as possible to correct the imperfections of an
international law which is ultimately no more than the creation of the
State themselves."
14.
Inspired by the ICJ Advisory Opinion, Malaysia has, since 1996 and at
subsequent sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, followed
up on the Opinion with a resolution in the First Committee and the
General Assembly. Of the four nuclear-weapon States, only China voted
in favour of operative paragraph I of the Resolution which underlined
the unanimous conclusion of the ICJ while the United Kingdom had
abstained. Regrettably, the other nuclear-weapon States continue to
oppose it.
Mr.
Chairman,
15.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty is at the crossroads. The good-will and
patience of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States are being put under severe
strain by the lack of a demonstrable political will on the part of the
nuclear-weapon states to fulfil their part of the bargain they had
solemnly made. Unless there is a serious change of attitude on the
part of the nuclear-weapon States, there would be the risk of serious
erosion in the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and in the
Treaty itself, which would, indeed, be most regrettable.
16.
There is no dearth of ideas on how to propel the disarmament process
forward such as those proposed by the Canberra Commission, the New
Agenda Coalition and the Tokyo Forum, to name a few. Many of these
ideas, of course, deserve serious consideration. However, if we are
serious in our commitment towards nuclear disarmament in all its
aspects what is really required is for us to work for a comprehensive
legally binding international instrument prohibiting the development,
production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use nuclear
weapons and their destruction under effective international control.
Indeed, there is in circulation since 1997 a model Nuclear Weapons
Convention which deserves the serious consideration of the
international community.
17.
The problem that we face, Mr. President, is not a lack of ideas. It is
lack of political will to move the process forward. This has been
clearly demonstrated in the preparatory process of this Review
Conference. If we wish to ensure the success of this Conference, and
the NPT in the long term, all States parties, particularly the
nuclear-weapon States must manifest this political will. We believe
it is within their power, singly or collectively as a group, to create
the conditions.—not overnight, but in the foreseeable future—for
the attainment of the goal for complete nuclear disarmament.
18.
Notwithstanding its continued disappointment at the lack of concrete
progress made on the implementation of the NPT following its
indefinite extension, Malaysia remains committed to the Treaty and
will make every effort to work towards its full realisation in concert
with other States parties. We will work to ensure that this Review
Conference will serve its intended purpose, namely, to strengthen the
Treaty and enhance its efficacy on the basis of the universal
adherence to its provisions.
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