The 2000 NPT Review
Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York
Regional Issues
May
16, 2000
The
Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 resolution on the
Middle East:
1. The Conference
reaffirms the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted
the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recognizes that the
Resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved.
The Resolution, which was cosponsored by the depositary States (the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the United States of America), is an essential element of
the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was indefinitely
extended without a vote in 1995.
2. The Conference
reaffirms its endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle
East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well
as other efforts, contribute to, inter
alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other
weapons of mass destruction.
3. The Conference
recalls that operative paragraph 4 of the 1995 resolution on the
Middle East calls upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet
done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as
possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards." The Conference
notes, in this connection, that the report of the United Nations
Secretariat on the Implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle
East (NPT/CONF.2000/7) recalls that several States have acceded to the
Treaty and that, with these accessions, all States of the region of
the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, are States parties to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The
Conference emphasizes the importance of Israel acceding to the Treaty
and placing all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA
safeguards.
4. The Conference
notes the requirement under article III of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to conclude agreements
with the IAEA to meet the requirements of the Statute of the IAEA. In
this regard, the Conference notes the concerns raised in paragraph 60
of the report of Main Committee II that nine States parties in the
region have yet to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with
the IAEA and invites those States to negotiate such agreements and
bring them into force as soon as possible. The Conference welcomes the
additional protocol concluded by Jordan and invites all other States
in the Middle East, whether or not party to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, to participate in the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system.
5. The Conference
notes the unanimous adoption by the United Nations Disarmament
Commission, at its 1999 session, of guidelines (A/54/42) on the
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones on the basis of
arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region
concerned. The Conference notes that, at that session, the Disarmament
Commission encouraged the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone
in the Middle East, as well as the development of zones free from all
weapons of mass destruction. The Conference notes the adoption without
a vote by the General Assembly for the twentieth consecutive year, of
a resolution proposing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone
in the region of the Middle East.
6. The Conference
invites all States, especially States of the Middle East, to reaffirm
or declare their support for the objective of establishing an
effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as
well as other weapons of mass destruction, to transmit their
declarations of support to the Secretary General of the United
Nations, and to take practical steps towards that objective.
7. Recalling
paragraph 6 of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the Conference
reiterates the appeal to all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons to extend their cooperation and to exert their
utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by
regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The Conference
notes the statement by the five nuclear-weapon States reaffirming
their commitment to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.
8. The Conference
calls upon the President of the 2000 Review Conference to convey the
final documents of the Conference, including its conclusions and
recommendations, to the Governments of all States, including those
States Parties unable to attend the Conference and to states that are
not party to the Treaty.
9.
The Conference recognizes that
the establishment of a mechanism to monitor implementation of the 1995
resolution on the Middle East in the period leading to the 2000 Review
Conference would contribute significantly towards realizing the goals
of the resolution. In this regard, the Conference agrees to appoint a
Special Representative of the States parties to the Treaty to conduct
discussions with Israel on its early accession to the Treaty, and to
report progress to the forthcoming Review Conference in 2005.
10. The Conference
notes that, in his letter of 10 April 2000 to the President of the
Security Council (S/2000/300), the Director-General of the IAEA stated
that the Agency has not been in a position, since 16 December 1998, to
implement its mandate under the relevant Security Council resolutions,
including 687 (1991), and that the Agency is thus unable to provide
any measure of assurance with regard to Iraq's compliance with it's
obligations. The Conference further notes that, in light of the fact
that the Security Council-mandated activities had ceased in December
1998 and given the requirements of the IAEA safeguards system, an IAEA
team carried out in January 2000 an ad hoc inspection under the terms
of its Safeguards Agreement with Iraq. With the necessary cooperation
from Iraq, the IAEA was able to verify the nuclear material subject to
safeguards. Noting that the inspection had the limited objective of
verifying the nuclear material in question, the Conference emphasizes
the importance of Iraq's full cooperation with the IAEA in the
execution of the Agency's mandate.
South Asia and
other regional issues:
11. The Conference
emphasizes that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are
mutually reinforcing.
12. With respect to
the nuclear explosions carried out by India and then by Pakistan in
May 1998, the Conference recalls Security Council Resolution 1172
(1998), adopted unanimously on 6 June 1998, and calls upon both States
to take all of the measures set out therein. Notwithstanding their
nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear-weapon
States.
13. The Conference
calls on India and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
as non‑nuclear weapon States and to place all their nuclear
facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. The Conference
further calls on both States to strengthen their non-proliferation
export control measures over technologies, material and equipment that
can be used fop; the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery
systems.
14. The Conference
notes that India and Pakistan have declared moratoriums on further
testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to
conduct any further nuclear testing by signing and ratifying the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
The Conference calls on both States to sign the Treaty, in
accordance with their pledges to do so.
15. The Conference
notes the willingness expressed by India and Pakistan to participate in the
negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear
explosive devices. Pending the conclusion of a legal instrument, the
Conference calls on both countries to observe a moratorium on the
production of such material. The Conference calls on both States to
join other countries in actively seeking an early commencement of
negotiations on this issue, in a positive spirit and on the basis of
the agreed mandate with a view to reaching early agreement.
16. The Conference
notes with concern that, while the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea remains a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, IAEA continues
to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the
initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea and is therefore unable to conclude that
there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea. The Conference looks forward to the
fulfilment by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's of its
stated intention to come into full compliance with its safeguards
agreement with IAEA, which remains binding and in force. The
Conference emphasizes the importance of action by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea to preserve and make available to IAEA all
information needed to verify its initial inventory.
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