16 May 2000

RESULTS OF THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON OUTSTANDING
ISSUES FROM THE REPORT OF MC.II

[Editor’s Note: Bolded language is still under discussion as of 17 May 2000]

1. The Conference recalls and re-affirms 1995 Review and Extension Conference's Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", noting paragraph 1 of the Principles and Objectives and the elements relevant to Article III of the Treaty, in particular paragraphs 9-13 and 17-19, and to Article VII of the Treaty, in particular paragraphs 5-7. It also recalls and reaffirms the resolution on the Middle East adopted by that Conference.

2. The Conference notes that recommendations at previous Conferences for the future implementation of article III provide a helpful basis for States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and provide assurance of compliance with non-proliferation undertakings.

3. The States Parties urge the international community to enhance co-operation in the field of non-proliferation issues, and to seek solutions to all concerns or issues related to non-proliferation in accordance with the obligations, procedures and mechanisms established by the relevant international legal instruments.

4. The Conference reaffirms that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is vital to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in providing significant security benefits. The Parties remain convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty can achieve this goal and they urge all four States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it unconditionally and without delay, and to bring into force the required safeguards agreements.

5. The Conference reaffirms the fundamental importance of full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and the relevant safeguards agreements. (Explanatory note: content acceptable; placement to be decided)

6. The Conference recognizes that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty, and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament and to nuclear co-operation.

7. The Conference reaffirms that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the IAEA's safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States Parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under Article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard. States Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States Parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

8. The Conference emphasizes that measures should be taken to ensure that the rights of all States Parties under the provisions of the preamble and the articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State Party is limited in the exercise of these rights in accordance with the Treaty.

9. The Conference notes with concern that the IAEA continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and is therefore unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK. (Explanatory note: content acceptable; placement to be decided)

10. The Conference emphasizes the importance of access to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations by the IAEA, including its Director General, in accordance with Article XII.C. of the statute of the IAEA and paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), and the role of the Security Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to it by the IAEA.

11. The Conference considers that IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings under relevant safeguards agreements and assist States to demonstrate this compliance.

12. The Conference stresses that the non-proliferation and safeguards commitments in the Treaty are also essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and co-operation and that IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

13. The Conference stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocol should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved. In the meantime, the Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources.

14. The Conference reiterates the call by previous Conferences of the States Parties for the application of IAEA safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States Parties in accordance with the provisions of Article III of the Treaty. The Conference notes with satisfaction that, since 1995, twenty-eight States have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA in compliance with Article III, paragraph 4 of the Treaty, twenty-five of which States have brought the agreements into force¹.

15. The Conference looks forward to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) fulfilling its stated intention to come into full compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which remains binding and in force. The Conference emphasizes the importance of the DPRK preserving and making available to the IAEA all information needed to verify its initial declaration.

16. The Conference reaffirms that IAEA safeguards should regularly be assessed and evaluated. Decisions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.

17. The Conference reaffirms that the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty should be designed to provide for verification by the IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a State's declaration, so that there is a credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

18. The Conference notes the measures endorsed by the IAEA Board of Governors in June 1995 for strengthening and making more efficient the safeguards system and that these measures are being implemented pursuant to the existing legal authority conferred upon the IAEA by comprehensive safeguards agreements.

19. The Conference also fully endorses the measures contained in the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreements(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997. The safeguards-strengthening measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol will provide the IAEA with, inter alia, enhanced information about a State's nuclear activities and complementary access to locations within a State.

20. The Conference recognizes that comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 has been successful in its main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and has also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Conference notes that implementation of the measures in the Model Additional Protocol will provide, in an effective and efficient manner, increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole and that those measures are now being introduced as an integral part of the IAEA's safeguards system. The Conference notes, in particular, the relationship between the additional protocol and the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and a State party as set out in Article 1 of the Model Additional Protocol. In this regard, it recalls the interpretation provided by the IAEA Secretariat on 31 January 1997 and set out in GOV/2914 of 10 April 1997 that, once concluded, the two agreements had to be read and interpreted as one agreement.

21. The Conference notes the high priority that the IAEA attaches, in the context of furthering the development of the strengthened safeguards system, to integrating traditional nuclear-material verification activities with the new strengthening measures and looks forward to an expeditious conclusion of this work. It recognizes that the aim of these efforts is to optimize the combination of all safeguards measures available to the IAEA in order to meet the IAEA's safeguards objectives with maximum effectiveness and efficiency within available resources. Furthermore, the Conference notes that credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, notably related to enrichment and reprocessing, in a State as a whole could permit corresponding reduction in the level of traditional verification effort on declared nuclear material in that State that is less sensitive from the point of view of non-proliferation. The Conference notes the important work being undertaken by the IAEA in the conceptualization and development of integrated safeguards approaches, and encourages continuing work by the IAEA in further developing and implementing these approaches on a high-priority basis.

22. The Conference recognizes that strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system with a view to providing credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities must be implemented rapidly by all nuclear States party to the NPT. The Conference also recognizes that the interests of nuclear non-proliferation will be effectively served by the acceptance of IAEA safeguards strengthening measures by States with item-specific safeguards agreements. The Conference welcomes the additional protocol concluded by Cuba and urges it also to bring the protocol into force as soon as possible.

23. The Conference notes that bilateral and regional safeguards play a key role in the promotion of transparency and mutual confidence between neighbor States, and that they also provide assurances concerning nuclear non-proliferation. The Conference considers that bilateral or regional safeguards could be useful in regions interested in building confidence among its member States and in contributing effectively to the non-proliferation regime.

24. The Conference recalls the commitment of nuclear-weapon States in article I of the Treaty not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices, directly or indirectly. The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves not to enter into any kind of nuclear technical cooperation and assistance with States not party to the NPT.

25. The Conference stresses the need to respect the letter and the spirit of the NPT with respect to technical co-operation with States not party to the NPT.

26. The Conference recognizes that nuclear material supplied to the nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes should not be diverted for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and should be, if required by the supplier, subject to appropriate IAEA safeguards agreements.

27. The Conference notes that all nuclear-weapon States have now concluded additional protocols to their voluntary offer safeguards agreements incorporating those measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol that each nuclear-weapon State has identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol, when implemented with regard to that State, and is consistent with that State's obligations under Article I of the NPT. The Conference invites such States to keep the scope of those Additional Protocols under review.

28. The Conference commends the IAEA for making its experience in the verification of nuclear non-proliferation available to the Conference on Disarmament in connection with the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

29. The Conference takes note of the Declaration of the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit of April 1996, including in relation to the safe and effective management of weapons Missile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes, and the initiatives stemming from it.

30. The Conference underlines the importance of international verification of nuclear weapons material no longer required for military programmer that has been irreversibly transferred to peaceful purposes. The Conference supports recent unilateral offers and mutual initiatives to place excess material under appropriate IAEA verification arrangements. Fissile materials designated by each of the nuclear-weapon States as no longer required for military purpose should as soon as practicable be placed under IAEA or other relevant verification.

31. The Conference notes the considerable increase in the IAEA's safeguards responsibilities since 1995. It further notes the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards system is functioning and calls upon all States Parties, including in particular nuclear-weapon States, to continue their political, technical, and financial support of the IAEA in order to ensure that the IAEA is able to meet its safeguards responsibilities.

32. The Conference welcomes the significant contributions by States Parties through their support programmer to the development of technology and techniques that facilitate and assist the application of safeguards.

33. The Conference considers that the strengthening of IAEA safeguards should not adversely impact the resources available for technical assistance and co-operation. The allocation of resources should take into account all of the IAEA's statutory functions, including that of encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses with adequate technology transfer.

34. The Conference recognizes that the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices should be consistent with States' obligations under the NPT.

35. The States Parties remain concerned about the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain nuclear material, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The States Parties call for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance to States not party to the Treaty without exception in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields which may enable them to produce or develop nuclear weapons capabilities.

36. The Conference reaffirms that each State Party to the Treaty has undertaken not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by Article III of the Treaty.

37. The Conference reaffirms paragraph 12 of decision 2 (Principles and Objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament), adopted on 11 May 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

38. The Conference recognizes that there are nuclear-related dual use items of equipment, technology, and materials not identified in Article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty that are relevant to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore to the Treaty as a whole. The Conference calls on all States Parties to ensure that their exports of nuclear-related dual use items to States not party to the Treaty do not assist any nuclear-weapons programme. The Conference reiterates that each State Party should also ensure that any transfer of such items is in full conformity with the Treaty.

39. The Conference reaffirms that nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II and III of this Treaty.

40. The Conference notes that a number of States Parties engaged in the supply of nuclear material and equipment have met regularly as an informal group known as the Zangger Committee, in order to co-ordinate their implementation of Article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty. To this end, these States have adopted certain understandings, including a list of items triggering IAEA safeguards, for their export to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty, as set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC1209 as amended. The Conference invites all States to adopt the understandings of the Zangger Committee in connection with any nuclear co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty.

41. The Conference is aware that a number of States parties have informed the IAEA that they co-operate on a voluntary basis through guidelines for their nuclear-related exports (INFCIRC/254 as amended).

42. The Conference notes the two international seminars on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation, held in 1997 in Vienna and 1999 in New York, and other related activities, organized as a first step to contribute to transparency in the context of paragraph 17 of Decision 2 (Principles and Objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament) adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and expects this preliminary step to evolve within a framework of transparency in nuclear-related export control.

43. The Conference recognizes the particular requirement for safeguards on unirradiated direct-use nuclear material, and notes the projections by the IAEA that the use of separated plutonium for peaceful purposes is expected to increase over the next several years. The Conference recognizes the non-proliferation benefits of the conversion of civilian research reactors to low enriched uranium fuel. The Conference notes with appreciation that many research reactors are discontinuing the use of highly enriched uranium fuel in favour of low-enriched uranium fuel as a result of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Programme. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the considerable work undertaken to ensure the continuing effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in relation to reprocessing, to the storage of separated plutonium, and to uranium enrichment.

44. The Conference welcomes the additional transparency on matters pertaining to the management of plutonium resulting from the establishment, in 1997, of Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549), setting out the policies that several States, including the nuclear-weapon States, have decided to adopt.

45. The Conference notes the announcement made by some nuclear-weapon States that they have ceased the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and urges those that have not done so to make a similar announcement.

46. The Conference notes the conclusion drawn by the Board of Governors of the IAEA that the proliferation risk with regard to neptunium is considerably lower than that with regard to uranium or plutonium and that at present there is practically no proliferation risk with regard to americium. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the recent decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors which enabled the IAEA to enter into exchanges of letters with States, on a voluntary basis, to ensure the regular and timely receipt of information, as well as the application of measures required for efficient implementation of certain monitoring tasks regarding the production and transfer of separated neptunium, and which requested the Director General of the IAEA to report to the board when appropriate with respect to the availability of separated americium, using relevant information available through the conduct of the IAEA's regular activities and any additional information provided by States on a voluntary basis.

47. The Conference notes the paramount importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and calls on all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials. The Conference notes the need for strengthened international co-operation in physical protection. In this regard, the Conference notes that sixty-three States have become party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

48. Expressing concern about the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the Conference urges all States to introduce and enforce appropriate measures and legislation to protect and ensure the security of such material. The Conference welcomes the activities in the fields of prevention, detection, and response being undertaken by the IAEA in support of efforts against illicit trafficking. The Conference acknowledges the IAEA's efforts to assist Member States in strengthening their regulatory control on the applications of radioactive materials, including the IAEA's ongoing work on a registry of sealed sources. It also welcomes the IAEA's activities undertaken to provide for the enhanced exchange of information among its Member States, including the continued maintenance of the illicit trafficking database. The Conference recognizes the importance of enhancing cooperation and co-ordination among States and among international organizations in preventing, detecting, and responding to the illegal use of nuclear and other radioactive material.

50. The Conference welcomes and supports the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.

51. The Conference supports proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East and South Asia.

52. The Conference welcomes and supports the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon free status, and takes note of the recent adoption by the Mongolian parliament of legislation defining the status, as a unilateral measure to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons on its territory, bearing in mind its unique conditions, as a concrete contribution to promoting the aims of nuclear non-proliferation and a practical contribution to promoting political stability and predictability in the region.

53. The Conference further welcomes the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and urges its rapid implementation.

54. The Conference recognizes the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards the achievement of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas, and towards keeping the areas covered by these treaties free of nuclear weapons, in accordance with international law. In this context, the Conference welcomes the vigorous efforts being made among States Parties and signatories to those treaties in order to promote their common objectives.

55. The Conference stresses the importance of signature and ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba by all regional States, as well as by the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols of these treaties, recognizing that security assurances are available to States parties to these Treaties. In this context, the Conference takes note of the statement of the five nuclear-weapon States that the internal processes are underway to secure the few lacking ratifications to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba, and that consultations with the States Parties to the Treaty of Bangkok have been accelerated, paving the way for adherence by the five nuclear-weapon States to the Protocol to that Treaty.

56. The Conference welcomes the consensus reached in the United Nations General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. It urges Israel, the only State in the region which is not party to the NPT, to accede to the Treaty and to place its nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards, according to Security Council resolution 487 (1981), and to take the practical and urgent steps required for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a first step towards the establishment in the same region of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction. The Conference calls upon all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards. The Conference also invites those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories or territories under their control of nuclear weapons or nuclear devices.

57. The Conference further welcomes the report on the " Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned", adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission on 30 April 1999.

58. The Conference regards the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones as a matter of priority and in this respect supports the intention and commitment of the five Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region and welcomes the practical steps taken by them towards implementation of their initiative and notes with satisfaction the substantial progress which has been made by them in drawing up and agreeing on a draft treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

59. The Conference strongly believes that the international community should continue to promote the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the globe and welcomes the efforts and initiatives by the States Parties on the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, including the initiative on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free space in Central and Eastern Europe proposed by the Republic of Belarus.

60. The Conference notes with concern that fifty-one States Parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive agreements2, and urges them to do so as soon as possible. This includes States Parties without substantial nuclear activities. The Conference notes that in the case of States without substantial nuclear activities, the conclusion of safeguards agreements involves simplified procedures. The Conference recommends that the Director General of the IAEA continue his efforts to further facilitate and assist these States Parties in the conclusion and the entry into force of such agreements.

61. The Conference welcomes the fact that since May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors has approved Additional Protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements with forty-three States and that ten of those Additional Protocols are currently being implemented. The Conference encourages all States Parties, in particular those States Parties with substantial nuclear programmes, to conclude Additional Protocols as soon as possible and to bring them into force or provisionally apply them as soon as possible.

62. The Conference invites States Parties to consider at the next Review Conference the possibility of establishing an additional protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.) as constituting an element of IAEA fullscope safeguards referred to in paragraph 12 of Decision 2 of the 1995 NPT Conference.

63. The Conference urges the IAEA to continue implementing strengthened safeguards measures as broadly as possible and further urges all States with safeguards agreements to co-operate fully with the IAEA in the implementation of these measures.

64. The Conference recommends that the Director General of the IAEA and the IAEA Member States consider ways and means, which could include a possible plan of action, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of such safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including, for example, specific measures to assist States with less experience in nuclear activities to implement legal requirements.

65. The Conference calls on all States Parties to give their full and continuing support to the IAEA safeguards system.

66. The Conference recognizes the agreement under which the United States is purchasing low enriched uranium blended down from high enriched uranium from Russian nuclear weapons and the purchase of 80 tons of such material to date. The Conference also recognizes the affirmation, by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in the Moscow Statement of 1998, of the intention of the Russian Federation and the United States to remove approximately 50 tonnes of plutonium from their nuclear weapons and convert it so that it can never again be used in nuclear weapons. The Conference further recognizes the measures taken to implement this commitment.

67. The Conference calls upon all four States not yet party to the Treaty, namely Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan, particularly those three which operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to become Parties to the Treaty without delay and without conditions, and to conclude without delay comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA and Additional Protocols consistent with the Model contained in INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

68. The Conference requests the IAEA to continue to identify the financial and human resources needed to meet effectively and efficiently all of its responsibilities, including it safeguards verification responsibilities. It strongly urges all States to ensure that the IAEA is provided with these resources.

69. The Conference recognizes that national rules and regulations of States parties are necessary to ensure that the States Parties are able to give effect to their commitments with respect to the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual use items to all States taking into account articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and, for States parties, also fully respecting article IV. In this context, the Conference urges States parties that have not yet done so to establish and implement appropriate national rules and regulations.

70. The Conference recommends that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementations, in accordance with Article III.2, be reviewed from time to time to take into account advances in technology, the proliferation sensitivity, and changes in procurement practices.

71. (Explanatory note: this request for insertion was made pending a decision on paragraph 22 of NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/1, paragraph 7) The conference further recommends that States parties consider further ways to improve the measures, in accordance with the Treaty, to prevent the diversion of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive purposes or nuclear weapon capabilities, including two States not party to the Treaty.

72. The Conference invites coordination of national export control policies among all interested States parties to the extent possible, including through the IAEA, in a manner that will contribute to the non-proliferation objectives of the NPT and facilitate transparency and participation of all interested States parties in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in conformity with Articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty.

73. The Conference requests that the Zangger Committee and any other supplier arrangement should be transparent and should continue to take appropriate measures to ensure that the export guidelines formulated by them do not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States Parties, in conformity with Articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty.

74. The Conference recommends that transparency in export controls should continue to be promoted within a framework of dialogue and co-operation among all interested States Parties to the Treaty.

75. The Conference encourages all other states that separate, hold, process, or use separated plutonium in their civil nuclear activities to adopt policies similar to those which have been adopted by the participants in the Plutonium Management Guidelines (INFCIRC/549). Furthermore, the Conference encourages the States concerned to consider similar policies for the management of highly enriched uranium used for peaceful purposes.

76. The Conference urges all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material at the earliest possible date and to apply, as appropriate, the recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities contained in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) and in other relevant guidelines. It welcomes the ongoing informal discussions among legal and technical experts, under the aegis of the IAEA, to discuss whether there is a need to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.