Mr. President,

Distinguished Delegates,

I have the honour to congratulate you, Ambassador Abdallah Baali, on your election as President of this Review Conference. It is my sincere belief that under your skilful presidency the Conference will be able to face the challenge of assessing the accomplishments under a strengthened review process, agreed upon at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and of providing a forward looking way to seek further progress. I would like to assure you of my delegations' full support and cooperation in your efforts to lead our work to a successful conclusion.

Lithuania fully supports and has aligned itself with the statement of the distinguished representative of Portugal presented on behalf of the European Union. Allow me to make a few additional comments.

Mr. President.

The Treaty of the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. For 30 years it has been increasingly recognised that the politically strong and vital treaty is essential for promoting non-proliferation and achieving nuclear disarmament. By extending the Treaty indefinitely in 1995 we have maintained and perpetuated the core of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The work of the Preparatory Committee for this Review Conference appears to have been rich in debates but not as productive as some of us had hoped for. But it is essential to keep in mind that at the outset we have embarked upon the Strengthened Review Process being unaware of its real potential. A new instrument needs time to develop. And it is up to us to shore up the review process at the end of its first cycle, if need be, by modifying and fine-tuning it. Yes, there are unmet expectations, but the fundamental purposes of the NPT remain credible, despite the problems of implementation and enforcement which, I believe, will be addressed during our Conference. In this regard, Lithuania would support the calls for a strategy for revitalization of the review process aiming at preservation of the integrity of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives, and proposing a mechanism to transform principles and objectives into action as well as extension of the review process from three to four sessions.

Mr. President,

Lithuania warmly welcomes the nine states that acceded to the Non-proliferation Treaty since 1995, thus making the membership of the treaty nearly universal. A gap between nearly and truly universal, however, is big and we call upon four non-state parties to the NPT to join the Treaty.

The most positive and encouraging event occurred on the eve of this conference which may have a great positive stimulus to seek further progress towards the full implementation of the NPT. We wholeheartedly welcome the ratification of the START II agreement by the Russian Federation and hope for the timely implementation of this agreement as well as for a prompt commencement of negotiations on a START III treaty. We recognize that the progress towards nuclear disarmament has been made. Since 1995 nuclear weapon stockpiles have diminished and a number of nuclear weapons' systems have been eliminated. We sincerely welcome the unilateral steps by France and the UK to downsize their nuclear arsenals and commend measures taken by some nuclear weapon states to increase transparency in the field of nuclear disarmament.

We strongly believe that the momentum maintained by the 1999 Vienna Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty will not be lost. We call upon states, whose ratification is needed for the Treaty to enter into force, to ratify the CTBT without delay, as the UK, France, the Russian Federation and other 53 states, including my own country Lithuania, have done. We especially welcome the most recent ratification of the CTBT by the Duma of the Russian Federation. This strengthens our hope for the early entry into force of the CTBT, the treaty that is meant to put to an end the nuclear testing. We further call upon India, Pakistan and the DPRK to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay. It is important to achieve the earliest possible entry-into-force of this treaty, drawing upon all measures consistent with international law.

We also believe that the resolute support by almost all states for the early commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should not be allowed to vanish. This Review Conference can make its contribution for the negotiations take off.

It is extremely concerning that instead of working towards disarmament we have to increasingly divert our efforts towards stemming proliferation. It is incumbent upon this Review Conference to evaluate the dangerous course of events in the South Asian sub-continent and come up with thoughts how to lock up further deterioration.

Lithuania firmly believes that progressive reductions, involving all nuclear weapon states and covering both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, should gain momentum. Moreover, apart from reductions there are many urging problems to deal with. We share the growing concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their technology and means of delivery. It is critical to enhance efforts underway to close some of the nuclear weapon facilities, to dismantle and to destroy the weapon-related materials, to place 'excess' nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards, further pursue transparency and openness. Many of these concerns are voiced time and again and, in this regard, Lithuania supports a proposal to set up an appropriate mechanism within the Conference on Disarmament for a general airing of nuclear disarmament issues as this could foster conditions favourable to nuclear disarmament.

Mr. President,

We take a positive note that nuclear-weapons-free zones have expanded their boundaries, especially the zones created under the treaties of Rarotonga and Tlatelolco. We also look forward to seeing entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba and successful outcome of the Bangkok Treaty. At the same time Lithuania accentuates a need for greater efforts to establish such zones in the Central Asia as well as in the Middle East. In this regard, we welcome the adoption of guidelines on the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones by the UN Disarmament Commission, that will have a positive effect on current and future efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among states in the region concerned.

Mr. President,

Against the background of growing energy demands world-wide, Lithuania recognises the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the importance of Article IV of the Treaty. In this regard, the International Atomic Energy Agency plays the crucial role - the non-proliferation regime would be hardly effective without the input from the IAEA.

However, IAEA safeguards could only be effective as long as all member states honour their commitments.

For Lithuania, the safety of its nuclear facility and nuclear materials is one of its top priorities. Lithuania has acceded to almost all international conventions and bilateral agreements signed with the IAEA in the field of nuclear energy. Our nuclear facility and nuclear materials are placed under IAEA safeguards, as of 1998 under full-scope safeguards. Since 1995 we have signed the Joint Convention on the Safety of the Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the Protocol to Amend Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. The Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreement is now presented to the Parliament for ratification.

At the same time, we recognise the importance of sound nuclear-related export controls to curb proliferation and wholeheartedly welcome steps to promote transparency therein. Over the past years Lithuania has made rapid strides in building its export control system, bringing into line its national legislation and practice with that of the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) states.

Mr. President,

Despite some difficulties, the non-proliferation treaty by all accounts works. It has achieved many successes and weathered the challenges. The challenge ahead now is not to abandon the course we have charted, but rather to reaffirm the validity of the decisions and the resolution adopted in 1995. Perhaps the consensus on all issues is not possible, but I am certain that it is possible to craft a compromise that would maintain and reinforce the Treaty. I hope we will also come up with new forward looking initiatives that all parties would be in a position to endorse and take action upon during the next review cycle.

Thank you.