The 2000 NPT Review Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York

  Statement by 
Mr. Brian Cowen T.D.,
Minister for Foreign Affairs 

PERMANENT MISSION OF IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS 

to the 

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 

New York, 24 April 2000

Mr. President,

May I begin by expressing to you my congratulations on your assumption of the office of President of this Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non­Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I wish to express my confidence in your skills to successfully guide us towards a substantive outcome of our work over the coming four weeks. Allow me to assure you of the full support of my delegation in the achievement of that goal. 

Mr President, 

We begin this Review Conference with some particularly positive developments. The completion of ratification procedures to START II by the Russian Federation is very welcome and timely at the commencement of our proceedings here. We now urge the United States to complete its ratification procedures as soon as possible so that full and effective implementation of the Treaty can proceed. We hope that with this important step it will be possible without further delay to embark on START III, and thereby re-establish the indispensable momentum we need if we are to progress towards nuclear disarmament. 

We salute the United States and the Russian Federation for the bilateral nuclear force reductions they have undertaken to date and we encourage them to engage in the next steps with renewed vigour. 

The adoption last Friday of the legislation required for Russian ratification of the CTBT is another significant contribution towards bringing that Treaty into force. Together with the ratification of the two nuclear weapon States, that are members of the European Union, France and the United Kingdom, we are now a considerable step closer to that goal. We encourage the two remaining nuclear weapon States to ratify the CTBT. We can then move with more confidence towards the achievement of one of the goals explicitly laid down in the NPT. We must quickly establish a norm that nuclear testing has no place on our small planet. 

The Secretary General of the United Nations m his recent Millennium Report noted that: "When the bipolar balance of nuclear terror passed into history, the concern with nuclear weapons also seemed to drift from public consciousness... Whatever rationale these weapons may once have had has long since dwindled. Political, moral and legal constraints on actually using them further undermine their strategic utility without, however, reducing the risks of inadvertent war or proliferation". 

This 2000 Review Conference is a defining moment in the development of the Nuclear Non­Proliferation Treaty. On the one hand, 182 States have demonstrated a commitment to refrain from the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which is a singular achievement. On the other hand, the goal of the Treaty to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, remains distant. 

For me, the key question is whether I can state, in all honesty, that the ambition of my predecessor, the late Mr Frank Aiken, when he first proposed such a Treaty in 1958, is now being realized? And if - thirty years after its entry into force - we are still no closer to the achievement of nuclear disarmament, can I promise my children a more secure world, where these monstrous weapons are no more than memories of an ill-adjusted age? 

The NPT has provided states that have refrained from the development of nuclear weapons with assurances that others would exercise similar restraint. The non-nuclear weapon States Parties have implemented these Treaty undertakings in the context of corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear weapon States to eliminate their weapons. That is the underlying bargain in this Treaty. 

On each of the five previous occasions when the States Parties have met to review the implementation of this Treaty, the non-nuclear weapon States have insisted that the nuclear weapon States demonstrate greater determination to achieve the goal of a nuclear-weapon­free world. 

A decade after the end of the Cold War it became clear to Ireland that neither nuclear strategies nor arms control efforts were predicated on the elimination of nuclear weapons at an early date. Where we had earlier acknowledged the constraints on progress, we could no longer do so as the end of the century approached. 

Towards a Nuclear-Weapons Free World: the Need for a New Agenda is the response to this state of affairs put forward by Ireland and six other countries and now co-sponsored by no less than sixty States of the United Nations in the lead up to this 2000 Review Conference. As the Foreign Minister of Mexico has outlined this afternoon, the New Agenda proposes a realistic programme of action leading to the achievement of a nuclear weapons free world. It is premised on a new political undertaking to be made by the five nuclear weapon States Parties to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, and on foot of that undertaking, to engage in an accelerated process of negotiations and steps leading to nuclear disarmament. 

Why do so many states parties consider it essential to call for such an undertaking? It is because there has not been an adequate response to the new opportunities to achieve the Treaty's goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Certainly, considerable nuclear force reductions have taken place, as I indicated earlier, but these are coupled with further force modernization. And how can we lift the nuclear threat when nuclear weapons are being reaffirmed as central to strategic concepts for the indefinite future? What reassurance is there for humanity when battlefield nuclear weapons are still being deployed, and when new types of nuclear weapons are developed by means of sub-critical testing and computer simulation? 

A fundamental objective of Ireland's foreign policy is to uphold the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its non‑proliferation regime. At this juncture our concern is that, without serious new steps to underpin its purposes and provisions, the Treaty may wither away through complacency and neglect. We could amend the Treaty to correspond to the new post-Cold War realities. We could even write a new Treaty. But should we not rather implement the Treaty we actually have, and do so in the manner which reinforces it as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation? 

To achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons at the earliest date will require political determination. Nuclear weapons were developed in an era burdened with the prospect of the mutual annihilation or entire continents. their peoples and their cultures. Yet, at no stage has the possible use of these weapons found common moral acceptance. On the contrary, the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons in the new millennium would be indefensible, as the International Court of Justice concluded in 1996. Regrettably, there has also been too much complacency on the part of public opinion in responding to this challenge. This Treaty may not survive intact for another five years without a fundamental change in approach by all. The time to proceed, with serious intent, to rid the world of these weapons is now. 

As we meet here to review the implementation of our Treaty, three non-states parties: India, Pakistan and Israel continue to disregard the very norms which one hundred and eighty seven nations have made their own. By implementing their reciprocal Treaty obligations, nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT deny legitimacy to any state embarking on nuclear weapons proliferation. 

We must overcome interminable arguments about the retention of nuclear weapons to respond to every new perceived threat to security. And we must not allow ourselves to be deflected from our determined pursuit of a nuclear weapon free world by anticipating new sources of proliferation, but rather address these challenges as they arise. What we are addressing here are the thousands of nuclear weapons that threaten an Armageddon, intentionally or by accident.

Nor do we accept that nuclear weapons might be retained for use against those that possess other weapons of mass destruction. Such arguments would ultimately sanction the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any state similarly threatened and quickly defeat the purposes of the Treaty. 

This Review Conference may be our last best chance to put in place a programme leading to the achievement of the goal of a nuclear weapon free world. It will require political determination to change existing nuclear weapons policies. By the time we conclude our review on l 9 May, it is vital that we do not find ourselves in a situation where the future of the non-proliferation regime and the Treaty itself might not be assured. That assurance will require an approach such as the one I have outlined in the New Agenda. 

Mr. President, In the 1995 Principles and Objectives we undertook "the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations" on a convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes by the five nuclear weapon states may not appear to be as pressing a goal today as when it was originally proposed. One of these five states has already irreversibly dismantled its production facilities. However, the conclusion of a Cut Off Treaty is an important preliminary step in the NPT scheme of nuclear disarmament. It begins a process leading to the steady extension of controls over all fissile materials for weapons purposes. 

As NPT States Parties, we must not allow the pace of this negotiation to be set by the three states that choose to remain outside the international consensus that brings us together at this Conferee e. Nor can we allow inaction on our part to contribute to the development of the nuclear option by these same states. We must not delay while events unfold which could undermine the role of this Treaty as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 

Ireland is committed to the early resumption of negotiations on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament. However, in an effort to accelerate the early application of a Cut-Off Treaty to the five nuclear weapon States, which is its main purpose, would it not be possible in the first instance for these same five states to negotiate the text of a draft treaty? They could then jointly submit this drab to the Conference on Disarmament for further elaboration and adoption as a multilateral instrument, while they, for their part proceeded with the provisional application of its core provisions pending its adoption. 

Mr. President, In our review of implementation we must address the question of compliance with all the purposes and provisions of the Treaty. The application of safeguards as well as the right to participate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are core provisions of the NPT. While there has been no new allegation of non-compliance by non-nuclear weapon states since our last review, the satisfactory resolution of earlier cases remains a matter of ongoing concern to Ireland. The agreement reached in 1997 on the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement was an important demonstration of political will on the part of the non-nuclear weapon states to enhance non-proliferation assurances when required. And I can inform the Conference that within the past week ratification legislation was moved in the Irish Parliament in respect of the Additional Protocol. 

In 1995 the States parties decided to strengthen the review process for the Treaty. We all agree that, in spite of our efforts, we have not achieved our shared intentions in this regard. Clearly, the chosen mechanism - a preparatory committee - is inadequate to achieve what we had in mind in 1995. 

I am aware, Mr. President, that you intend to address the question of the effectiveness of the review mechanism in the course of this Conference. I would suggest that in your consultations, consideration be given to the convening of annual general conferences of States Parties supported by a small secretariat so as to achieve a more systematic and regular review of implementation, such as we intended in 1995. We could build on the experience of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in this regard. 

Mr. President, My delegation together with other like-minded delegations will strive to achieve a result from this review conference that upholds and reinforces the NPT. We must be firm in our demands on all Parties, nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon States alike. In the implementation of our respective responsibilities, we must take the appropriate steps required to reinforce the Treaty. We must give up nuclear weapons as a factor in international security, not reinforce their role at new levels, however low. The choice is ours. This Treaty needs strengthening Let us try to achieve in 2000 what has hitherto escaped us: let us finally and definitively agree on a common understanding of what the full implementation of this Treaty requires and what our peoples expect of us. 

Thank you. 

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