The 2000 NPT Review
Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York
STATEMENT
BY
AMBASSADOR SAEED HASAN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
AT THE
2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE STATE
PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE
NONPROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
MONDAY,
MAY I ST, 2000
Mr.
Chairman,
It
gives me great pleasure to offer you at the outset my warmest
congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of this important
Conference. Your election confirms the great trust which the
international community has in your country, Algeria, a sister-country.
and in you personally with regard to leading this Conference, on which
the international community puts great hope, to full success.
Mr.
Chairman,
Five
years ago we met in this room to consider the fate of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons after its expiration. The
non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty had a general feeling
of frustration because during the quarter century it was in force, the
Treaty failed to achieve even a minimum of the hopes pinned on it,
foremost of which being to put an end to both the horizontal and
vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons with a view to their final
elimination, providing the non-nuclear-weapon States with binding and
unconditional guarantees against the use or the threat of use of
nuclear weapons, achieving the universality of the Treaty, and
facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. After four weeks of
meetings marked by pressures and promises on the part of some nuclear
powers, the 1995 Conference adopted an array of resolutions that
contained a package of reciprocal commitments made by both the
nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty.
Nonetheless, numerous non-nuclear-weapon States delegations, including
mine, expressed their reservations concerning the indefinite extension
of the Treaty on the basis of non-binding promises to undertake
nuclear disarmament and to achieve its universality.
Today
we meet to review the extent of the implementation of the array of
resolutions adopted by the 1995 Conference. We are faced with the
clear fact that while the non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the
Treaty have abided by their commitments under the Treaty and the
resolutions of the Extension Conference, some of the nuclear-weapon
states parties to the Treaty have failed to abide by theirs: the
objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons continues to
be unattainable; there is no clear prospect of or a timetable for
attaining it; we are still far from achieving the universality of the
Treaty; Israel, armed with its nuclear weapons, continues its arrogant
behaviour in our Arab region; no concrete steps have been taken to
assure non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty against the use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and no clear progress has been
achieved to assure the exercise by all the parties to the Treaty of
their right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Backing out of the
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and the array of the
resolutions of the extension Conference was part of an unhealthy
international atmosphere governed by the policies of hegemony and an
increased reliance on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, on policies
of military alliances and on the principle of "might above
right", the unilateral use of force, and the constant
marginalization of the United Nations and its mechanisms. When these
mechanisms are used at all, it is only to achieve the political
interest of the dominating great power: such is the case with regard
to the comprehensive sanctions imposed on Iraq and the use of
inspection activities in Iraq for American intelligence purposes.
We
in the Arab world, have additional causes for concern due to the non-implementation
of the Middle East Resolution of the extension conference of 1995. We
are faced with a clear and present danger that is threatening us and
subjecting us all to blackmail on a daily basis, that is the Israeli
nuclear weapons. No action has been taken to force Israel to accede to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and place its facilities under the
safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
while Israel continues to build up its nuclear capability and practice
a policy of hegemony. In an interview with Al-Hayat daily newspaper on
29 March 2000, Shimon Perez, the architect of the Israeli nuclear
programme, said: "When l made the nuclear choice, I didn't have
Hiroshima in mind; I made it to reach Oslo. " He then added:
"We are not infatuated with military force; but make no mistake
about it: if we have to use force, we will. "
Recent
reports have revealed that Israel's nuclear arsenal includes advanced
and sophisticated systems of tactical and strategic weapons built with
the help of the United States. The latest manifestation of American
sponsorship of the Israeli nuclear program is the agreement concluded
by Israel with the United States on 22 February 2000, which gives
Israeli experts access to American nuclear facilities and allows them
to make use of American experience and expertise to develop Israel's
nuclear technology. In addition, Israel has turned into a backdoor for
transferring American nuclear technology to other parties; and we all
remember that the apartheid regime in South Africa acquired its
nuclear bomb with the help of Israeli expertise.
It
is unfair to have the Arabs stay bound for perpetuity by a Treaty that
provides them with no guarantee against Israeli nuclear weapons while
Israel continues to develop its nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction with no control whatsoever.
The
international community and its organizations have the legal
responsibility to force Israel to join the NPT and place its nuclear
facilities under the IAEA's safeguards regime. This responsibility
emanates from the provisions relating to the objectives of the Treaty
the provisions of the extension Conference's resolution on the Middle
East. as well as from the General Assembly and Security Council
resolutions' including SC Resolution 487(1981) which was adopted after
the Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear reactor placed under
the IAEA's safeguards regime, calling upon Israel to place its nuclear
facilities under the safeguards regime, and Security Council
resolution 687(1991) adopted under chapter VII of the Charter,
paragraph 14 of which considered the measures taken by Iraq as set out
in paragraphs 8-13 of the same resolution to be steps towards the goal
of the establishment in the region of the Middle East of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone as well as a zone free of weapons of mass
destruction. I should also like to recall here the resolution adopted
by the XIII Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement held on
8 and 9 April 2000 in Cartagena, Colombia, which states the following:
"We
express great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by
Israel which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of
neighbouring and other States and we condemn Israel for continuing to
develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. We are of the view that
stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in
military capabilities are maintained particularly through the
possession of nuclear weapons which allow one party to threaten its
neighbours and the region. ',
This
Conference is therefore called upon to adopt specific recommendations
to facilitate the full implementation of the Middle East resolution of
the extension conference of 1995 and send a clear message to Israel to
accede to the Treaty without any further delay and place all its
nuclear facilities under the IAEA's safeguards regime. Arab Group
working paper submitted to the Second Main Committee of this
conference contains the appropriate mechanism to achieve this goal.
Mr.
Chairman,
Attempts
by the United States to intrude the issue of Iraq's relationship with
the Security Council on the conference agenda aim to distract the
Conference from the Israeli Nuclear Weapons and from the United States
own violation of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty
through various practices including supplying nuclear technology to
Israel, the deployment of nuclear weapons in non nuclear weapon States
parties to the Treaty, its refusal to ratify the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its intention to develop the "Star
Wars" Programme in violation of its obligations under the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), also through its insistence on
the continuation of comprehensive regime of sanctions on Iraq, which
is tantamount to the use of weapons of mass destruction. Those
sanctions killed 1.5 million Iraqi civilians a figure much higher than
the total number of victims of all use of weapons of mass destruction
throughout the history of mankind.
In
order to clarify the facts relating to the subject of Iraq I should
like to state the following:
1.
Iraq is in full compliance with all its obligations under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and IAEA's safeguards regime. In the period from 22 to 25
January 2000, a team of IAEA inspectors visited Iraq within the
framework of the safeguards agreement signed between Iraq and the IAEA.
Upon the conclusion of the inspection, the IAEA issued on 24 March
2000 a statement in which it affirmed that Iraq had given its full
cooperation to the Inspection Team and that all nuclear materials had
been verified and found to be in agreement with the IAEA inventory.
Resumption by the IAEA of its inspection activities in Iraq within the
framework of the safeguards agreement comes after the IAEA fulfilled
its disarmament tasks in Iraq in accordance with Resolution 687(1991),
paragraph 17 of the IAEA Director General's report dated 7 October
1998(S/1998/927) to the Security Council highlights this fact as
follows:
"
As reported in detail in the progress report dated 8 October 1997
(document 5/1997/779), and based on ad credible information available
to date, the Agency's verification activities in Iraq have resulted in
the evolution of a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine
nuclear programme. The verification activities have revealed no
indications that Iraq had achieved its programme objective of
producing nuclear weapons or that Iraq had produced more than a few
grams of weapon-usable nuclear material or had clandestinely acquired
such material. Furthermore, there are no indications that there
remains in Iraq any physical capability for production of weapon-usable
nuclear material of any practical significance. In February 1994, IAEA
completed the removal from Iraq of all weapon-usable nuclear material
- essentially research reactor fuel - under IAEA safeguards."
2.
The activities of the IAEA and the defunct Special Committee (UNSCOM)
have been used as a cover for prolonging the embargo imposed on Iraq
and achieving certain political aims of the United States, a matter
which constitutes a serious deviation from their mandates as specified
by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Senior officials
of the American Administration directed the inspection and monitoring
activities in Iraq and obtained there from information relating to the
security and leadership of Iraq. Agents of the United States Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) participated in the inspection and
monitoring activities in Iraq, one of whom, as an example, being the
American David Kay, who headed an IAEA inspection team who transmitted
to Washington all information the IAEA obtained from inspection
activities in Iraq. Their aim was to hatch conspiracies against Iraq
and its leadership. They also installed eavesdropping and spying
instruments to monitor and observe the movements and communications of
Iraqi officials. The inspection and monitoring regime in Iraq was a
tool in the hands of the American Administration which directed it in
accordance with the dictates of its own interests. It has thus caused
serious damage to the credibility of the IAEA and the United Nations
and their role in verification as well as an equally serious damage to
the interests of Iraq by continuing the embargo which is a veritable
genocide being committed in the name of the United Nations. Iraq
demands to be compensated for the damage it has suffered as a result
of these acts of aggression; it also demands that those responsible
for the aggression against its security and safety be punished and
that the Conference include among its recommendations paragraphs that
clearly condemn the exploitation of the activities of the IAEA for
political purposes and emphasize compliance with neutrality and
impartiality in the work of that Agency.
3.
The United States and Britain, both of which are depositories of the
NPT and Permanent Members of the Security Council have used Depleted
Uranium in their aggression against Iraq in 1991 and again in their
aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999 although they knew beforehand
the disastrous effects the use of such a radiological weapon will have
on human beings and the environment in the areas where it is used, to
say nothing of its effects on thousands of American and British troops
who are suffering now from the Gulf syndrome. The Americans and the
British used more than 300 tons of ammunitions of Depleted Uranium
against Iraq, causing pollution by radiation to Iraq's environment and
increasing ten times the registered cases of cancer, especially among
children. The radioactive effects of Depleted Uranium will continue
for centuries to come unless action is taken to free Iraq's
environment from this radioactive material. We invite the Conference
to include in its resolutions a call for the prohibition of the use of
Depleted Uranium for armament purposes, and we also invite the IAEA to
take concrete steps to help Iraq reduce the negative effects of this
disaster on the environment and human life and affirm Iraq's right to
demand compensation for this unjustified use against it of this weapon
of mass destruction.
4.
Mr. Richard Butler withdrew the IAEA inspectors from Iraq on two
occasions, once in November 1998 and another time on 15 December 1998,
upon instructions received from senior American Administration
officials and without the authorization of the Security Council or the
Secretary General of the UN or even the Director General of the IAEA.
Those who refer to the cessation of activities in Iraq since 16
December 1998 should remember this fact if they wish to be objective
and deal with the causes and consequences of this serious measure that
was aimed at facilitating military aggression against Iraq.
5.
Only hours after the departure of the inspectors from Iraq, two states
depositories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, namely the United States
and Britain, waged on 16 December 1998 a full aggression against Iraq,
in the course of which they directed air strikes at the sites placed
under the monitoring regime of the IAEA and the defunct Special
Committee and destroyed those sites together with the monitoring
instruments installed therein such as cameras and sensors. In addition
to being an illegitimate use of force against an independent State
without the authorization of the Security Council, that aggression
gave a fatal blow to the IAEA's monitoring regime in Iraq, and the
Conference is called upon to condemn these acts of aggression and
compensate Iraq for the damage it has suffered as a result thereof. It
is to be noted in this connection that a previous blow directed at the
IAEA's safeguards regime was Israel's aggression in 1981 against the
Iraqi nuclear reactor devoted to peaceful purposes. In its resolution
487(1981), the Security Council condemned that aggression and demanded
that Israel place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA's
comprehensive safeguards regime, but that resolution continues to be
mere ink on paper. We hope that the Conference will take an explicit
position prohibiting military attacks against nuclear facilities
placed under the IAEA's safeguards regime.
Mr.
Chairman,
While
referring to these facts, I would like to bring to your attention that
the background papers submitted by the IAEA and the Secretariat of the
United Nations have failed to make any reference to these facts, on
the contrary, the background papers submitted lay the Secretariat of
the U.N. have gone very far in presenting a distorted picture of the
Iraqi situation, exhuming the past in a selective fashion that
bespeaks total surrender to the American master.
Mr.
Chairman,
Our
delegation will endeavour together with other delegations to have this
Conference come up with the kind of resolutions that will respond to
the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty
and open the prospect of the proper implementation of all its
provisions. On the other hand, experience has proved that a
Conference's decisions and its calls are not enough by themselves. We
therefore urge all States parties to the Treaty that are genuinely
concerned with the full achievement of its objectives to intensify
their efforts on all levels to increase their peoples' awareness of
the threats to humankind posed by nuclear weapons. In this connection,
we welcome the international and regional initiatives in the area of
nuclear disarmament, including the initiative of Egypt, South Africa,
Mexico, New Zealand, Brazil, Ireland and Sweden as represented by the
working paper entitled "Nuclear Disarmament" they have
submitted to the Conference. We also welcome the Russian Parliament's
decision to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the
START II Treaty. Furthermore, we must stress the legal and moral
responsibility requiring those who possess such weapons to eliminate
them at the earliest time. This necessitates a campaign to be
undertaken at the grassroots level and through the media with the
participation of States and regional and non-governmental
organizations. We must say to those nuclear States that try to teach
the peoples of the world lessons in democracy and human rights that
the first principles of democracy and human rights are the equality of
all human beings on the level of security and safety, and that they
should save their preachments for themselves until the time when they
will declare that they have ceased to possess such weapons capable to
annihilate hundred times the life on earth. We have a great deal to do
after the end of this Conference. We must make of the goal of the
elimination of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction an
incessant, daily demand; nay, we must adopt it as the standard by
which to measure the extent to which States have abided by their
commitments under all international treaties and conventions. We must
light a great many candles rather than limit ourselves to cursing the
darkness.
Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
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