The 2000 NPT Review
Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York
ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Permanent
Mission to the United Nations
Statement
by
H.
E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi
Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Before
The
2000 NPT Review Conference
New
York, April 25, 2000
In
the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Mr.
President,
I
would like to begin by expressing my sincere congratulations on your
assumption of the presidency of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. With
your qualifications and diplomatic skills, I am confident that this
Conference would attain its goals.
Once
again and as the world is watching intently, we are to take stock of
the implementation of the NPT. The treaty crowns more than half a
century of unremitting international undertakings to deter the spread
of nuclear weapons and provide for their total elimination. It serves
as the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime,
comprising a series of unilateral statements, and bilateral, regional
as well as multilateral treaties.
This
Conference can undoubtedly bear comparison in significance with the
1995 Review and Extension Conference. It comes at a time of emergence
of new challenges and opportunities. The nuclear tests in South Asia,
rejection of the CTBT by certain NPT Member States, the challenges to
ABM Treaty and the risks of a new nuclear arms race have made our
collective effort for the success of this Conference ever more
imperative. Hopeful signs, particularly the ratification of the CTBT
and START II by the Russian Duma, provide positive impetus for our
common undertaking.
This
Review Conference offers, therefore, a propitious opportunity to
examine the prevailing circumstances and emerging trends so as to
finally set the stage for future work in ensuring full and effective
realization of the purposes of the NPT.
An
objective review of the NPT and its achievements bears a mix of
satisfaction and frustration. On a positive note, the Treaty, to a
large extent, though not completely, has succeeded in curtailing
horizontal nuclear proliferation, thereby enhancing international
peace and security.
However,
much remains to be accomplished. Progress on nuclear disarmament,
security assurances and cooperation in and transfer of nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes has been very slow and dismal. And,
more importantly, after so many years, the Treaty is yet to become
universal.
Nuclear
Disarmament
Nuclear
weapons are the most destructive weapons ever invented by mankind.
Given the magnitude of their devastation, the issue of nuclear
disarmament has constantly dominated the discussions at the review
conferences. While, qualitative development of nuclear weapons has
continued unabatedly, commencement of negotiations on a nuclear
weapons convention, which is the most effective way to curb, reduce
and ultimately eliminate the threats of nuclear weapons, has so far
proved inconclusive.
Despite
the ever-growing call for nuclear disarmament, the nuclear weapon
states have shown no sign of relenting. They still believe that
holding on to extremely risky nuclear arsenals would secure them a
prominent international status forever. It should be noted that the
NPT has never meant to perpetuate a permanent classification of some
states as nuclear-weapon states.
Stipulated
in the NPT and reiterated by the declaration on Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, ''the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control" remains to be "the ultimate goal" of the
Treaty. Therefore, it can be effectively argued that nuclear-weapon
states have an international obligation to cease the manufacture of
nuclear weapons, liquidate all their existing stockpiles and eliminate
nuclear weapons and their means of delivery from their national
arsenals. Their duty to negotiate in good faith for the elimination of
these weapons has been underlined by no less authority than the
International Court of Justice.
However,
a growing number of indicators suggest the persistence of nuclear
deterrence doctrines and refusal of nuclear-weapon states to agree to
eliminate their nuclear arsenals. This would certainly increase the
perils of vertical and even horizontal nuclear proliferation.
Therefore, things may not last forever to the liking of the
nuclear-weapon states.
Moreover,
as long as nuclear weapons exist, the risk of an accidental nuclear
attack or temptation to resort to these weapons in time of perceived
necessity will prevail.
The
international community has banned the use, development and
stockpiling of two categories of weapons of mass destruction, namely
chemical and biological ones. Nuclear weapons should not be exempted.
We can envisage and start negotiating an additional protocol to the
NPT to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.
Indeed,
the time has come to start negotiations on a nuclear weapon
convention. Nuclear threat is global and its removal is a legitimate
international concern. Nuclear weapons are increasingly losing their
relevance. Their deployment under any pretext of military doctrine or
alliance preferences is by no means justifiable.
Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy
In
the meantime, peaceful uses of nuclear energy are numerous. The
potential of further diversification and development of its use is
enormous. Besides electricity generation, it has also been used
extensively in agriculture, industry, medicine, biology and hydrology.
Mindful
of this fact and determined to unfold the great potential of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, Article IV provides a broad-based scheme
for development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it is
explicit in assertion of the inalienable right of all parties to the
NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, without discrimination. It further affirms that
"All the parties to the treaty undertake to facilitate and have
the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy…”
The
record of commitment to Article IV is not however promising and this
fact bears much resemblance to that of Article VI. In other words,
there has been a wide gap between reasonable expectations and
realities.
One
cannot but express dismay over the systematic denial of transfer of
technology to developing non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT
and restrictive export control policies exercised by the nuclear
suppliers. The ad-hoc parallel and non-transparent regimes, acting in
defiance of the letter and spirit of the Treaty, continue to pursue
subjective, arbitrary and discriminatory policies. The main objective
of these regimes, disguised under the pretext of non-proliferation, is
to secure the dominance and exclusive possession of nuclear technology
by developed countries. The situation should be rectified. The
existence of these regimes undermines the credibility and integrity of
the NPT and the IAEA. They render the IAEA safeguards irrelevant. This
is further compounded by the unilateralist approach of certain starts,
with less than desirable record on non-proliferation, who have
abrogated to themselves the right to determine compliance by others
and to take interventionist and extra-territorial measures to prevent
access to peaceful nuclear technology by members of NPT.
In
1995, the Review and Extension Conference underlined that States
Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the
safeguards agreements, should direct such concerns along with
supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA. Five years later we
should ask how States Parties and ad-hoc control clubs have responded
to this requirement.
Article
IV is to offer incentives for adherence to commitments of nonproliferation.
The NPT constitutes an integrated whole, whose relevance, integrity
and effectiveness lie in full and balanced compliance with all its
provisions by all its States Parties. Continued failure by nuclear
weapon states to live up to their side of the bargain will render the
regime unstable and untenable.
The
review conference, thus, must take effective measures to guarantee
realization of Article IV in all its aspects, especially with regard
to transfer of technology, equipment and nuclear materials to
developing states. It should make every effort to improve the
assurance of nuclear supply and the development of common approaches
and generally agreed arrangements for international peaceful nuclear
trade.
Security
Assurances
The
horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons have made the
long sought security assurances all the more essential. Putting behind
old bloc rivalries, the chances for building on the limited nuclear
security assurances appear greater.
The
provisions in the NPT preamble, the relevant UN Security Council
resolutions and unilateral declarations by nuclear weapon states fall
short in responding to the new circumstances. They are vague and
inadequate. On the other hand some nuclear-weapon states have tried to
confine the security assurances to nuclear-weapon-free zones or to
condition their obligations towards non-nuclearweapon states in
certain ways that make it almost inconsequential. We should strive to
obtain more stringent and specific nuclear security assurances in the
form of a legally binding international instrument.
Universality
of the Treaty
Effectiveness
of arms control or disarmament treaties and their contribution to
international peace and security lie in their ability to enjoy
universality. The NPT is not an exception to this general rule.
We,
as NPT States Parties, have great interests in ensuring its
universality. To attain this sublime objective, more genuine and
concerted efforts are required. The review process should provide for
deliberations on ways and means of promoting the universality of the
treaty, in particular through accession of those operating
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
Middle
East
We
should recall the threat posed by clandestine nuclear weapon programs
of Israel for the regional and international peace and security as a
major impediment on the way of the NPT to achieve its goals. Despite
its intransigence in disregarding the NPT and other WMD regimes,
Israel has enjoyed unrestricted transfer of nuclear technology,
equipment and material. In fact, its endless hunger for armaments, in
particular weapons of mass destruction, has been fully catered to by
the same self-appointed guardians of non-proliferation.
It
is all the more imperative, therefore, to build on the 1995 Middle
East resolution and explore ways and means of its implementation.
Israel should be forced to denounce nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT
and bring all its unsafeguarded facilities and programs under the IAEA
safeguards. Those who have helped Israel to develop such weapons have
a special responsibility in this regard.
May
I emphasize here that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was part
and parcel of a package solution, which secured the indefinite
extension of the treaty. It is therefore imperative at this Conference
to honor that collective commitment and maintain the balance. This
cannot be compromised.
Permanent
Compliance Monitoring
The
review Conference at this very important juncture should also examine
the implementation of the document on the strengthening of the review
process of the Treaty. Following the 1995 decision, the preparatory
process of the review conference experienced a setback. It failed to
produce any substantive input for the conference. In addition to
inherent institutional shortcomings of the review mechanism, lack of
political will and accommodation, as well as adoption of a selective
approach towards provisions of the NPT by some nuclear weapon states
contributed to the impasse.
There
is a need for a critical examination of such failure so as to avoid
recurrence of similar situation. Further work on strengthening of the
review mechanism is certainly needed. To guarantee compliance of
States Parties and full implementation of the decisions of the review
conference, a standing body should be setup. While Chemical Weapons
Convention and the Draft Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention
have established organizations to harmonize and secure their
implementation, under the NPT, even a coordination body has not been
established. This is a major shortcoming, which can be addressed
without amending the treaty and through a multi-phase scenario. The
Conference can set up a study group to examine the appropriate means
of establishing such a mechanism, and report to the following PrepCom.
Conclusion
Nuclear
non-proliferation is at stake. It is not the time for complacency, for
we run the risk of unraveling decades of unsparing effort. We should
act apace. Apathy towards the NPT, half-hearted commitment to its
objectives and selective compliance with its provisions would
undermine its relevance, integrity and validity. 'The Treaty should be
viewed and implemented in its totality. All the provisions of the
Treaty are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.
Our
presence here today should be seen as indicative of our collective
commitment to the Treaty and our conviction to ensure full realization
of its objectives. The Islamic Republic of Iran's conviction to the
cause of nuclear nonproliferation is rock solid. It has forgone the
nuclear weapon option and will remain committed to its freely
undertaken commitment to non-proliferation. It would also lend its
support to every global or regional effort to attain the objectives of
the Treaty. Let us seize the opportunity and work together to
guarantee the survival and relevance of the NPT and the
non-proliferation regime. The price of inaction is extremely high.
Thank
you
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