The 2000 NPT Review Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York
   

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Permanent Mission to the United Nations 

Statement by 
H. E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran 

Before 
The 2000 NPT Review Conference

  New York, April 25, 2000
 

 
In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful

  Mr. President,

I would like to begin by expressing my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. With your qualifications and diplomatic skills, I am confident that this Conference would attain its goals.

Once again and as the world is watching intently, we are to take stock of the implementation of the NPT. The treaty crowns more than half a century of unremitting international undertakings to deter the spread of nuclear weapons and provide for their total elimination. It serves as the cornerstone of the nuclear non­proliferation regime, comprising a series of unilateral statements, and bilateral, regional as well as multilateral treaties.

This Conference can undoubtedly bear comparison in significance with the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. It comes at a time of emergence of new challenges and opportunities. The nuclear tests in South Asia, rejection of the CTBT by certain NPT Member States, the challenges to ABM Treaty and the risks of a new nuclear arms race have made our collective effort for the success of this Conference ever more imperative. Hopeful signs, particularly the ratification of the CTBT and START II by the Russian Duma, provide positive impetus for our common undertaking.

This Review Conference offers, therefore, a propitious opportunity to examine the prevailing circumstances and emerging trends so as to finally set the stage for future work in ensuring full and effective realization of the purposes of the NPT.

An objective review of the NPT and its achievements bears a mix of satisfaction and frustration. On a positive note, the Treaty, to a large extent, though not completely, has succeeded in curtailing horizontal nuclear proliferation, thereby enhancing international peace and security.

However, much remains to be accomplished. Progress on nuclear disarmament, security assurances and cooperation in and transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes has been very slow and dismal. And, more importantly, after so many years, the Treaty is yet to become universal.
 

Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons ever invented by mankind. Given the magnitude of their devastation, the issue of nuclear disarmament has constantly dominated the discussions at the review conferences. While, qualitative development of nuclear weapons has continued unabatedly, commencement of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, which is the most effective way to curb, reduce and ultimately eliminate the threats of nuclear weapons, has so far proved inconclusive.

Despite the ever-growing call for nuclear disarmament, the nuclear weapon states have shown no sign of relenting. They still believe that holding on to extremely risky nuclear arsenals would secure them a prominent international status forever. It should be noted that the NPT has never meant to perpetuate a permanent classification of some states as nuclear-weapon states.

Stipulated in the NPT and reiterated by the declaration on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, ''the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" remains to be "the ultimate goal" of the Treaty. Therefore, it can be effectively argued that nuclear-weapon states have an international obligation to cease the manufacture of nuclear weapons, liquidate all their existing stockpiles and eliminate nuclear weapons and their means of delivery from their national arsenals. Their duty to negotiate in good faith for the elimination of these weapons has been underlined by no less authority than the International Court of Justice.

However, a growing number of indicators suggest the persistence of nuclear deterrence doctrines and refusal of nuclear-weapon states to agree to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. This would certainly increase the perils of vertical and even horizontal nuclear proliferation. Therefore, things may not last forever to the liking of the nuclear-weapon states.

Moreover, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the risk of an accidental nuclear attack or temptation to resort to these weapons in time of perceived necessity will prevail.

The international community has banned the use, development and stockpiling of two categories of weapons of mass destruction, namely chemical and biological ones. Nuclear weapons should not be exempted. We can envisage and start negotiating an additional protocol to the NPT to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, the time has come to start negotiations on a nuclear weapon convention. Nuclear threat is global and its removal is a legitimate international concern. Nuclear weapons are increasingly losing their relevance. Their deployment under any pretext of military doctrine or alliance preferences is by no means justifiable.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

In the meantime, peaceful uses of nuclear energy are numerous. The potential of further diversification and development of its use is enormous. Besides electricity generation, it has also been used extensively in agriculture, industry, medicine, biology and hydrology.

Mindful of this fact and determined to unfold the great potential of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, Article IV provides a broad-based scheme for development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it is explicit in assertion of the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination. It further affirms that "All the parties to the treaty undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy…”

The record of commitment to Article IV is not however promising and this fact bears much resemblance to that of Article VI. In other words, there has been a wide gap between reasonable expectations and realities.

One cannot but express dismay over the systematic denial of transfer of technology to developing non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT and restrictive export control policies exercised by the nuclear suppliers. The ad-hoc parallel and non-transparent regimes, acting in defiance of the letter and spirit of the Treaty, continue to pursue subjective, arbitrary and discriminatory policies. The main objective of these regimes, disguised under the pretext of non-proliferation, is to secure the dominance and exclusive possession of nuclear technology by developed countries. The situation should be rectified. The existence of these regimes undermines the credibility and integrity of the NPT and the IAEA. They render the IAEA safeguards irrelevant. This is further compounded by the unilateralist approach of certain starts, with less than desirable record on non-proliferation, who have abrogated to themselves the right to determine compliance by others and to take interventionist and extra-territorial measures to prevent access to peaceful nuclear technology by members of NPT.

In 1995, the Review and Extension Conference underlined that States Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements, should direct such concerns along with supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA. Five years later we should ask how States Parties and ad-hoc control clubs have responded to this requirement.

Article IV is to offer incentives for adherence to commitments of non­proliferation. The NPT constitutes an integrated whole, whose relevance, integrity and effectiveness lie in full and balanced compliance with all its provisions by all its States Parties. Continued failure by nuclear weapon states to live up to their side of the bargain will render the regime unstable and untenable.

The review conference, thus, must take effective measures to guarantee realization of Article IV in all its aspects, especially with regard to transfer of technology, equipment and nuclear materials to developing states. It should make every effort to improve the assurance of nuclear supply and the development of common approaches and generally agreed arrangements for international peaceful nuclear trade.
 

Security Assurances

The horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons have made the long sought security assurances all the more essential. Putting behind old bloc rivalries, the chances for building on the limited nuclear security assurances appear greater.

The provisions in the NPT preamble, the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and unilateral declarations by nuclear weapon states fall short in responding to the new circumstances. They are vague and inadequate. On the other hand some nuclear-weapon states have tried to confine the security assurances to nuclear-weapon-free zones or to condition their obligations towards non-nuclear­weapon states in certain ways that make it almost inconsequential. We should strive to obtain more stringent and specific nuclear security assurances in the form of a legally binding international instrument.
 

Universality of the Treaty

Effectiveness of arms control or disarmament treaties and their contribution to international peace and security lie in their ability to enjoy universality. The NPT is not an exception to this general rule.

We, as NPT States Parties, have great interests in ensuring its universality. To attain this sublime objective, more genuine and concerted efforts are required. The review process should provide for deliberations on ways and means of promoting the universality of the treaty, in particular through accession of those operating unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
 

Middle East

We should recall the threat posed by clandestine nuclear weapon programs of Israel for the regional and international peace and security as a major impediment on the way of the NPT to achieve its goals. Despite its intransigence in disregarding the NPT and other WMD regimes, Israel has enjoyed unrestricted transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and material. In fact, its endless hunger for armaments, in particular weapons of mass destruction, has been fully catered to by the same self-­appointed guardians of non-proliferation.

It is all the more imperative, therefore, to build on the 1995 Middle East resolution and explore ways and means of its implementation. Israel should be forced to denounce nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT and bring all its unsafeguarded facilities and programs under the IAEA safeguards. Those who have helped Israel to develop such weapons have a special responsibility in this regard.

May I emphasize here that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was part and parcel of a package solution, which secured the indefinite extension of the treaty. It is therefore imperative at this Conference to honor that collective commitment and maintain the balance. This cannot be compromised.
 

Permanent Compliance Monitoring

The review Conference at this very important juncture should also examine the implementation of the document on the strengthening of the review process of the Treaty. Following the 1995 decision, the preparatory process of the review conference experienced a setback. It failed to produce any substantive input for the conference. In addition to inherent institutional shortcomings of the review mechanism, lack of political will and accommodation, as well as adoption of a selective approach towards provisions of the NPT by some nuclear weapon states contributed to the impasse.

There is a need for a critical examination of such failure so as to avoid recurrence of similar situation. Further work on strengthening of the review mechanism is certainly needed. To guarantee compliance of States Parties and full implementation of the decisions of the review conference, a standing body should be setup. While Chemical Weapons Convention and the Draft Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention have established organizations to harmonize and secure their implementation, under the NPT, even a coordination body has not been established. This is a major shortcoming, which can be addressed without amending the treaty and through a multi-phase scenario. The Conference can set up a study group to examine the appropriate means of establishing such a mechanism, and report to the following PrepCom.
 

Conclusion

Nuclear non-proliferation is at stake. It is not the time for complacency, for we run the risk of unraveling decades of unsparing effort. We should act apace. Apathy towards the NPT, half-hearted commitment to its objectives and selective compliance with its provisions would undermine its relevance, integrity and validity. 'The Treaty should be viewed and implemented in its totality. All the provisions of the Treaty are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.

Our presence here today should be seen as indicative of our collective commitment to the Treaty and our conviction to ensure full realization of its objectives. The Islamic Republic of Iran's conviction to the cause of nuclear non­proliferation is rock solid. It has forgone the nuclear weapon option and will remain committed to its freely undertaken commitment to non-proliferation. It would also lend its support to every global or regional effort to attain the objectives of the Treaty. Let us seize the opportunity and work together to guarantee the survival and relevance of the NPT and the non-proliferation regime. The price of inaction is extremely high. 

Thank you


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