The 2000 NPT Review
Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York
Speech
by
State Secretary Wolfgang Ischinger
Federal Foreign Office
at the 2000 Review Conference of the State Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
New
York, 24 April 2000
This
Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons is the first multilateral conference to be held in
the year 2000 on nonproliferation and disarmament. The Conference
addresses an issue of cardinal importance for the future of humanity
in the 21st century: curbing the threat posed by the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and of nuclear weapons in particular.
The
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone
of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, the
foundation of Germany's nuclear nonproliferation policy as well as
the binding legal basis for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
Over
the past 30 years the Non-Proliferation Treaty has become one of the
most valuable instruments of cooperative security, it has played a key
role in safeguarding international peace and continues to do so This
Conference will serve, I believe, also as an important indicator of
whether in the 21st century cooperative security policy will continue
to play a key role in international efforts to safeguard peace.
With
187 States Parties the Non-Proliferation Treaty has virtually
universal support, more than any comparable document apart from the
Charter of the United Nations. It is important to recall that this was
not always the case. In the early 60s President John F. Kennedy feared
the number of nuclear-weapon states might rise to 15 or 20 by the
mid-70s. This was prevented by the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty - a realistic response to the nuclear challenge.
We
must be aware, however, that the Non-Proliferation Treaty strikes a
difficult balance. Unlike other conventions banning weapons of mass
destruction, it does not prohibit nuclear weapons as such but only
their- proliferation. At the same time it commits the five recognized
nuclear-weapon states at the time of the Treaty's entry into force to
pursue negotiations on ending the nuclear arms race and nuclear
disarmament, it further commits all States Parties to general and
complete disarmament on the basis of strict and effective
international control.
The
indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 brought
also further clarification of the obligation of the nuclear-weapon
states: the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts
to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of
eliminating those weapons.
Nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament are contingent on each other:
without progress on nuclear disarmament, the proliferation of nuclear
weapons cannot be effectively prevented in the long term.
The
1995 Review and Extension Conference, in particular the indefinite
extension of the Treaty, was for the whole international community a
remarkable achievement and it still is. We attach great importance to
all four documents adopted in 1995 by consensus of the States Parties:
the indefinite extension, the decisions on strengthening the review
process and on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament as well as the resolution on the Middle East together
with the Treaty itself, they constitute the solid, indispensable basis
for the work ahead.
The
sixth Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty has for a
number of reasons special significance:
It
is the first to take place following the indefinite extension of the
Treaty. All States Parties must demonstrate their commitment to honour
the undertakings under the Treaty, including those entered into when
it was extended. We will honour ours.
The
tasks we face are clearly defined in the decision on strengthening the
review process adopted in 1995: firstly, to evaluate the results
achieved since 1995; secondly, to identify areas in which and the
means through which further progress should be sought in future Review
conferences should consider specifically what might be done to
strengthen implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its
universality.
In
1995 the States Parties agreed on principles and objectives for
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including a programme of
action. Developments over the past five years as well as future
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament tasks will therefore need to
be evaluated on the basis of those principles and objectives.
A
sober assessment of progress on nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament since 1995 yields a mixed picture - some light but a good
deal of shade as well. I will confine myself here to a few brief
comments Since 1995 a further 9 countries - Andorra, Angola, Brazil,
Chile, the Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and
Vanuatu have acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is a
notable success, since it means entire continents and regions now
adhere to the Treaty.
But
there are four countries that continue to stand aloof at a distance.
We must spare no effort to achieve step by step the adherence also of
these four countries to the Treaty. Universality remains one of the
foremost goals. The test explosions carried out ill South Asia in May
1998 seriously strain the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Despite
international criticism the countries concerned continue with their
nuclear weapon program. Nuclear build up and working towards the
ultimate goal of a nuclear weapon free world are incompatible. Can the
Treaty meet this challenge? We believe: there is no alternative to the
Treaty. For precisely that reason - but also and especially due to the
increasingly obvious danger, given the rapid development of military
medium and long-range missile technology, of proliferating nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction - there is an urgent
need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and the
Non-Proliferation Treaty as the corner-stone of that regime.
In
this context I would draw attention to the obligation of all States
Parties under the Treaty to adopt and ratify safeguards agreements. I
appeal moreover to all countries to adopt safeguards under the
Additional Protocol so as to enable the International Atomic Energy
Agency to identify any illegal nuclear activities more promptly and
efficiently.
The
way in which the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament agreed in 1995 have been implemented is anything but
satisfactory. While negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty were completed in 1996, its entry into force is still a long
way off. It is imperative it do so, however, there is no other choice.
My country believes this is of crucial importance. We therefore
strongly welcome the approval of the CTBT on 21 April by the Duma of
the Russian Federation. Equally important is the opening of long
overdue negotiations hi the Conference on Disarmament on banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear
explosive devices. The negotiating mandate drawn up in 1995 must not
be called into question nor must any country further delay the early
commencement of negotiations. Objective requirements must not be
subordinated to tactical considerations.
It
is essential to resolve the present deadlock at the Geneva Conference
on Disarmament if this important institution is not to be undermined.
We sincerely hope the Review Conference will be able to send a clear
signal that the paralysis currently gripping the Geneva Conference
will soon be a thing of the past.
Nuclear
non-proliferation is a difficult, step-by-step process requiring not
only reductions in existing arsenals but also ongoing changes in the
security structures built during the Cold War era around possession of
massive quantities of such weapons. The Adapted Treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) provides the basis for long-term stability in
Europe. That is crucial if further progress also on nuclear
disarmament is to be achieved. The bilateral process of nuclear
disarmament initiated by START I must now be vigorously pursued. I
therefore particularly welcome Russia's recent ratification of START
II and strongly hope this is a sign that formal negotiations on S'TART
III are to begin soon.
Individual
nuclear-weapon states have announced and in part already implemented
significant unilateral disarmament measures that also relate to two
aspects we believe are particularly important, namely, transparency
and irreversibility. I hope other nuclear-weapon states will follow
suit.
We
commend the progress towards consolidating existing and creating new
nuclear-weapon free zones Such zones play a valuable part in
maintaining regional stability and peace The treaties establishing
nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia help bolster
these efforts, as do efforts to establish a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Central Asia and a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction. The concerns expressed by the States
Parties in the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 have lost
none of their relevance.
In
1995 the forward-looking mandate of this sixth as well as subsequent
review conferences was strengthened and the dynamic nature of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty clearly underlined: the non-proliferation and
disarmament tasks of the future, to strengthen implementation of
Treaty obligations and make headway towards the goal of universal
adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
A
balanced and comprehensive discussion of all nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament issues is required. Constructive and focused
cooperation on the part of all participants is essential if the
Conference is to send a positive message that will strengthen nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament.
I
consider it highly significant that under the Portuguese Presidency
the member states of the European Union have agreed on a common
position for this Conference For the first time the EU member states
have succeeded, in reaching a consensus - and this I regard as
particularly important - on the nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament challenges that lie ahead. That consensus identifies major
challenges that none of the participants present today should ignore.
It is realistic yet meaningful in substance.
That
sends a powerful signal to the Conference. It shows that the EU member
states have risen to the task before us: to strengthen the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. To that end Germany has worked long and hard and will continue
to do so.
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