The 2000 NPT Review
Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York
STATEMENT
BY
H.E.
MR. AHMED ABOUL GHEIT
PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF EGYPT
TO
THE UNITED NATIONS
AT
THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)
25
April 2000
Mr.
President;
It
gives me great pleasure to convey to you and to your sisterly country
my sincere congratulations upon your assumption of the presidency of
the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. We are certain
that your wealth of experience in international affairs and in the
field of disarmament will guarantee the wise conduct of the business
of this conference.
I
would like to seize this opportunity to express our great appreciation
for the great efforts made by the chairmen of the three sessions of
the prep com of the conference which laid the basis for our work in
the following weeks.
My
delegation associates itself with the statement made by the delegation
of Indonesia, yesterday, while introducing the working paper of the
Non-aligned movement.
Mr.
President;
This
conference takes place at an important juncture in the process of
nuclear disarmament. It is the first conference to review the progress
made towards the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty since
its indefinite extension in 1995 and towards the implementation of the
comprehensive package of commitments undertaken by the states parties.
It is incumbent upon us to take stock of what has been achieved and
what remains unimplemented with a view to the realization of our lofty
goal; namely the complete elimination of nuclear weapons; and honoring
our common commitment to save succeeding generations from the scourge
of those weapons.
Mr.
President;
With
the end of the Cold War the peoples of the world had a renewed hope
that a new era would dawn in which peace, security and stability would
prevail. An era where the specter of nuclear war and the threat of
complete annihilation of mankind would disappear. The peoples of the
world had a renewed faith that the international community would
finally be able to renounce the military doctrines of nuclear
deterrence. Most regrettably, nuclear weapons continue to proliferate,
nuclear arsenals continue to be modernized, advanced nuclear programs
continue to be outside the safeguards regime and certain states
continue to resist the calls of the international community to adhere
to the NPT and to place their nuclear activities under international
supervision.
Mr.
President;
The
1995 conference adopted a majority decision on the indefinite
extension of the Treaty. Its adoption was within a comprehensive
package that contained three decisions and a resolution on the Middle
East. This package established goals and objectives that we seek to
achieve on the international and regional levels to lead us towards
the elimination of nuclear weapons globally. Undoubtedly the
international community expects this august gathering to conduct, in
the next few weeks, a comprehensive and objective evaluation in good
faith of the successes and failures in the achievement of these goals
and objectives and in the implementation of the provisions of the
Treaty. It will be our duty to review in full objectivity the degree
to which we have succeeded or failed in honoring the commitments we
made five years ago.
Today,
as we begin a new review conference, we must admit that the non-proliferation
regime is at a sensitive and delicate juncture. We are facing numerous
challenges, some of which limit the chances of the success of this
conference while some others affect the credibility of the non-proliferation
regime as a whole.
A
quick review of the objectives established in 1995 would reflect more
failure than success. The Decision on the Principles and Objectives of
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament has set a number of
objectives that the international community should have achieved
before the year 2000 Among which are the achievement of the
Universality of the Treaty as a matter of urgent priority, the
prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the
acceleration of the establishment of new nuclear weapon free zones In
addition, there was a number of objectives in the field of nuclear
disarmament, foremost among which are the conclusion of a CTBT and a
Treaty on Fissile Material as well as the acceleration of nuclear
disarmament. These were the objectives to which we committed ourselves
five years ago. Which ones have been achieved?
We
have failed to achieve the Universality of the Treaty There are still
states, which possess advanced nuclear capabilities and that have not
adhered, nor declared their intention to adhere to the Treaty We have
failed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia.
As for the CTBT, it has become an elusive objective after the refusal
of the US Senate to ratify it. The Conference on Disarmament has not
succeeded yet in initiating negotiations on a Fissile Material Treaty
nor even in agreeing on the bases of such Treaty.
As
for the Decision on Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty,
it had set an ambitious objective for review conferences and their
prep-coms. The later were supposed to contribute effectively in the
preparation for the conferences as Mini-review Conferences
themselves. There is no clearer testimony to the failure to achieve
this objective than the inability of the prep-coms of the 2000
Conference to adopt any substantive recommendations.
The
Resolution on the Middle East called upon all the states of the
region, which have not yet done so to adhere to the Treaty and to
place their nuclear facilities under the Full-Scope safeguards regime
of the IAEA It called upon those states to take practical steps for
the establishment of a Zone Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction and
their delivery systems in the Middle East. This was the commitment we
made five years ago. Which parts of it have been achieved?
In
welcoming the adherence of Djibouti to the Treaty, we seize this
opportunity to salute the accession to it by two states of the region,
namely UAE and Oman. They are in the process of finalizing the
comprehensive safeguard agreements with the IAEA as provided for in
Article III of the Treaty. At the same time we regret that this
progress continues to be met by Israel's intransigent refusal to
adhere to the Treaty or to place its nuclear activities under the Full-Scope
safeguards regime of the IAEA.
Mr.
President;
The
correct way to overcome the challenges faced by the
Non‑proliferation regime lies in conducting a frank and
objective evaluation of the extent to which the states parties, in
particular the Nuclear Weapon States, honor their commitments under
the provisions of the NPT and the undertakings they accepted in 1995
This evaluation should detect the weaknesses and the way to deal with
them in order to establish a sound approach to address those
challenges.
In
the field of Nuclear Disarmament, the 1995 review conference
reaffirmed the importance of the strict implementation of the
undertakings of nuclear disarmament in the Treaty as well as the
establishment of specific objectives to achieve that final goal. On
another level, the ICJ in its advisory opinion of 1996 reaffirmed that
there exists an obligation to conclude negotiations on Nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects under effective and strict
international control. These reaffirmations were responding to a
genuine wish by the non-nuclear weapon states to achieve tangible
progress in the efforts of nuclear disarmament. They were also an
expression of the profound belief of the peoples of the world in the
need for the speedy global elimination of those weapons. The
Sub‑Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities also stressed that nuclear weapons have no
place in international relations and reaffirmed the need to negotiate
their elimination.
We
can not fail to pay tribute to the steps taken by some nuclear weapons
states to reduce their nuclear arsenals over the last five years We express our appreciation
for the important step taken recently by the Russian Duma by ratifying
the START II Treaty. Nevertheless, these steps still fall short of
meeting the hopes and aspirations of the states of the world that
renounced the nuclear option and called for nuclear disarmament as a
noble goal whose achievement deserves our serious efforts.
In
an attempt to achieve this noble goal, President Hosny Mubarek called
in may 1998 for the convening of an international conference to
consider rendering the world free from all weapons of mass destruction
within a specified period of time. The Foreign Ministers of Egypt,
Ireland, Brazil, Sweden, South Africa, Mexico, New Zealand, and
Slovenia issued a joint declaration in June 1998 entitled
"Towards a World Free from Nuclear Weapons; the need for a New
Agenda" The declaration called upon the international community,
in particular the nuclear weapon states, to accelerate the nuclear
disarmament process. The states of the New Agenda Coalition tabled a
resolution to the General Assembly in its last two sessions, which
enjoyed an increasing support. The resolution expresses the vision of
the states of the coalition on the need for the nuclear weapon states
to reaffirm their unconditional and unequivocal commitment to
eliminate all nuclear weapons. It calls upon them to take practical
steps towards that objective It stresses the importance of the speedy
achievement of the Universality of the APT. Here, I would like to
reaffirm Egypt's full support for the statement made by Her Excellency
the Foreign Minister of Mexico on behalf of the states of the New
Agenda Coalition.
I
would also like to reaffirm Egypt's support for the call of the
Secretary General of the UN to convene an international conference to
consider the ways and means of the elimination of nuclear risks, as
contained in his report on the Millennium Summit. It is our hope that
this conference will be convened in the near future.
Mr.
President;
Egypt
has stressed repeatedly that the continued absence of effective
legally binding international security assurances to protect the non-nuclear
weapon states against the dangers of the weapons they voluntarily
renounced is a source of disappointment. It also frustrates the
objectives of non-proliferation. It can not lead to a sense of safety
or security.
To‑date,
the non-nuclear weapon states continue to seek security assurances
within a multilateral contractual instrument. They continue to seek
effective guarantees against the threat and consequences of a nuclear
attack. Security Council Resolution 984 of 1995 continues to fail to
respond to the legitimate demands of these states Egypt believes that
it is high time to initiate negotiations on an international legal
instrument that would provide the non-nuclear weapon states parties to
the Treaty with effective security assurances against the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons. This instrument should be legally
binding and should provide protection in case of nuclear attacks. It
should be both credible and effective.
Mr.
President;
The
Treaty has recognized the right of non-nuclear states to benefit Tom
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the unconditional transfer
of its technology and know-how. The Decision on the Principles and
Objectives reaffirmed that right and the right of non-nuclear weapon
states parties to the Treaty to a preferential treatment in this
regard. The decision also called for increased transparency in the
nuclear-related export-controls. This has not been achieved yet.
Rather, the limitations imposed on the states parties to the Treaty
are increasing in a flagrant contravention of the letter and the
spirit of both the Treaty and the Decision on Principles and
Objectives.
Egypt
calls for the elimination of all the constraints which prevent the
full utilization by the states parties of the rights recognized under
Article IV of the Treaty. Egypt also calls for serious action to
achieve full-transparency in nuclear-related-export-controls regimes
and for their internationalization to encompass all states parties who
wish to join them. We also call for the establishment of an effective
legal obligation to apply the safeguards regime of the IAEA to all
nuclear activities in states parties and nonparties alike, as a
precondition for the transfer of nuclear technology or material to
them. Decisive and effective measures must be taken to protect
peaceful peoples from the threat of nuclear leakage from reactors not
subject to international supervision. An end must be put to the threat
they pose to the health, environment and the inhabitants of the areas
adjacent to such reactors.
Mr.
President;
Allow
me to return with a measure of detail to the Middle East. The states
parties have paid a special attention to that region The 1995 Review
Conference adopted a separate resolution on it within the package of
the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The resolution was co-sponsored
by the three depository states of the Treaty Regrettably, Israel
remains the only state in the region that has not responded to the
calls of the resolution to accede to the Treaty and to place its
nuclear facilities under the safeguards regime of the IAEA.
Over
the last few years Egypt has put forward many proposals on steps to be
taken by Israel and the states of the region with a view to achieving
practical progress toward riding the Middle East of nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction Among those steps are the
initiation of regional negotiations on the tenets of the establishment
of an NWFZ in the Middle East, the declaration by the states of the
region of their commitment to adhere to the international instruments
on the nonproliferation or prohibition of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons within a specified timeframe and the adoption by
Israel and the States of the region of confidence building measures in
the nuclear field. Thus, progress will be made towards the application
of the safeguards of the IAEA on all nuclear facilities in the region
and towards the establishment of an inventory of the Fissile Material
produced by the states of the region and their control.
We
have put forward these and other ideas in the hope of initiating a
positive dialogue that would contribute to breaking the current
impasse and reaffirming the obligation of the Israeli side to take
practical steps for the negotiation on rendering the region free from
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. It has been our
hope to pave the way for a new understanding among the states of the
region on dealing with the questions of regional security in the
Middle East and on the future of the region. An understanding that
would strengthen the security of the region and its states and would
dispel the doubts about the Israeli nuclear activity. Thus, we would
avoid a regional arms race with all its attendant dangers
Unfortunately, Israel did not respond to any of these endeavors.
Neither did it accept to engage in a calm dialogue about the nuclear
file and other armament fields in the region, a dialogue that should
be based on logic, understanding and the right of all states of the
region to live in peace and security.
Mr.
President;
This
imbalance can not be accepted neither can it last. The NPT can not
have any credibility with the states of the region as long as one
state is exempt from its provisions. The states parties to the Treaty
are called upon to evaluate what has transpired in the last five years
and to adopt precise recommendations for progress to be made towards
the achievement of the objectives of the Resolution on the Middle East
in full and without exceptions. This can only be achieved by Israel
accepting the commitments which its neighbors in the region have
already accepted in the field of Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons
Any discrimination that favors one party at the expense of the others
is untenable in this regard. It is a question that brooks no double
standards.
Therefore,
Egypt urges this conference, in its assessment of the implementation
of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, to consider the following:
First:
The uniqueness of the situation in the Middle East region as
acknowledged by the 1995 review conference This acknowledgment led it
to adopt a resolution on that region alone in recognition of the
dangers inherent in the continuation of the status quo in it.
Second:
The message of the 2000 Review Conference must be unequivocal in its
demand that Israel accede to the Treaty without further delay and that
it place all its nuclear facilities under the safeguards regime of the
IAEA. The message must be crystal clear in expressing the danger to
the security of the Middle East inherent in the continuation of the
status quo.
Third:
The need to achieve the universality of the NPT at the regional and
international levels alike is of essence. Egypt and other states in
the Middle East believe that the requirements of security and
stability in the region make it necessary for the assessment of the
progress achieved towards the universality of the Treaty, including at
the regional level by Israel's adherence thereto, to run parallel to,
if not precede, the verification of states parties compliance with the
provisions of the Treaty.
Fourth:
The responsibility of the Nuclear States and in particular the Sates
depositories of the Treaty that have co-sponsored the Resolution on
the Middle East in 1995 for its implementation and the realization of
all of its objectives in full.
Fifth:
The need for a mechanism to monitor and follow-up the progress made in
the implementation of the 1995 Middle-East Resolution.
Mr.
President;
In
this context it is important for me to stress that using the pretext
of not burdening the Conference or any other pretext so as not to deal
with the issue of the Middle East with the necessary seriousness would
undoubtedly detract from the credibility of the Treaty and the
Conference and that of the whole Non-Proliferation Regime. It would
also render the questions before the Review Conference even more
complex. The question of the Middle East was an integral part of the
comprehensive package adopted by the last review conference in 1995.
Without this resolution, that comprehensive package which enabled the
indefinite extension of the Treaty could not have been adopted without
a vote Egypt reaffirms that this comprehensive package is indivisible
It also reaffirms that the credibility of the review processes based
on the review of all of the provisions of the Treaty and all of the
decisions of 1995 as well as the resolution on the Middle-East, not
one part of it could be exempted.
Mr.
President;
Egypt
believes that the outcome of the review process of the NPT after its indefinite
extension must take into account the following:
First:
The outcome of the 1995 Conference must be preserved and must not be
reopened to negotiation. Undermining one part of the 1995 package
would lead to a similar treatment to other parts of it.
Second:
The review process needs to be built upon on what was achieved in
1995. We must continue our endeavors to achieve all the objectives we
agreed upon then and to ensure the full implementation of the
provisions of the Treaty.
Third:
The review of the Treaty must take place in accordance with the
provisions of the Decision on the Strengthening of the Review Process.
Thus, the Review Conference must consider what has been and what has
not been achieved over the last five years. Thereafter, it would
decide upon the necessary measures for the period until the 2005
Review Conference and should adopt the recommendations necessary to
achieve them.
Fourth:
Placing the questions which lend themselves to easy agreement in a
separate document from those on which consensus is harder to attain
would undoubtedly lead to detracting from the credibility of the final
outcome and of that of the Treaty itself This will be unacceptable.
Fifth:
The enactment of the Decision on the Strengthening of the Review
Process requires an objective outlook to improve the method of work of
the preparatory process of the Review Conferences, as well as to make
use of the subsidiary bodies whose establishment validity we all
agreed upon in 1995.
Sixth:
All parties to the Treaty, and in particular the nuclear weapon
states, are called upon to seek to achieve the universality of the
Treaty and to ensure the strict implementation of its provisions.
Mr.
President;
The
current international climate affords genuine opportunities to arrive
at long-term measures to achieve nuclear disarmament The current
changes must not be viewed as an end of a process but rather as a
profound transformation in the world order. It is incumbent upon us to
make use of the prevailing international climate to build upon the
achievements made thus far, to make further efforts to settle the
questions before us through the reformulation of new ideas and the
application of innovative approaches in order to build an
international order that would be more stable and more secure for this
and the succeeding generations.
The
dangers of nuclear armaments and other weapons of mass destruction
threaten the whole of mankind Therefore, it is only logical for all
members of the international community to participate on an equal
footing in the creation of mechanisms and frameworks to fully
eliminate that danger within an agreed global framework that would
ensure a balance of rights and duties among all states without any
double standards.
Mr.
President;
The
challenges before this Review Conference are not small ones neither
are they confined to the Middle East. Nevertheless, Egypt fully
intends to contribute actively in the works of this Conference I would
like to assure that the delegation of Egypt would not spare an effort
in cooperating with you in order to arrive at a consensus outcome that
takes into account the concerns and pitfalls expressed by many
delegations
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