The 2000 NPT Review
Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York
Statement
by H.E. Amb. Sha Zukang
Head
of Delegation of the Government of
the
People's Republic of China
at
the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties
to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
24
April 2000, New York
Mr.
President,
First
of all, I wish to extend, on behalf of the Chinese Delegation, our
sincere congratulations to you upon your election as the President of
this Conference. I am confident that with your wisdom, talent and rich
diplomatic experience, you will lead the conference to a success. I
would like to assure you of my delegation’s full support and
cooperation in your work. I
would also like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to
Amb. Pasi Patokallio of Finland, Amb. Tadeusz Strulak of Poland and
Amb. Camilo Reyes Rodriguez of Colombia, Chairmen of the past three
sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the valuable work they have
done.
Mr.
President,
At
the beginning of the new millennium, while hopeful for the future, we
are deeply aware of the heavy responsibilities on our shoulders. In
the course of the development of human history, the advancement of
science and technology and the spread of knowledge have led us out of
ignorance and backwardness and have brought about civilization and
progress. However, on its road towards the prosperity and happiness,
mankind has suffered repeated scourges of war. The two world wars in
the twentieth century left mankind with memories of blood and tears.
Later on, the confrontation between the eastern and western blocs
caused people to live under the shadow of danger of the war during the
Cold War period which lasted for more than forty years. With such
bitter experience, people all the more long for peace and stability.
The achievement of lasting peace and sustainable development have
become the common desire of the people of the world.
After
the end of Cold War, there was, for a period of time, some relaxation
of tension in the international situation. But peace has not been
achieved in the world. Recently, there has been an increase of
unstable and uncertain elements in the international security. The
world is undergoing the most profound and complicated changes since
the end of Cold War.
It
should be noted that even though the Cold War has come to an end, yet
the Cold War mentality still lingers on. Military alliances have been
strengthened, hegemonism and power politics manifest themselves from
time to time, and a small group of countries advocate the so-called
“humanitarian intervention'', by which, they violate state
sovereignty. They went so far as to use force against a sovereign
state, bypassing the United Nations. Such acts not only seriously
undermined the world peace and stability and grossly trampled upon the
international law and the norms governing international relations, but
also caused unprecedented challenge to the collective security system
with UN at its core, formed after the two world wars.
In
order to enhance its strategic superiority and establish its own
absolute security, a certain country has stepped up the development,
deployment and proliferation of its advanced ballistic missile defense
system, thus posing a severe threat to the global strategic balance
and stability.
In
some regions, forces of ethnic separatism and religious extremism are
on the rise, which not only jeopardizes the regional peace, but also
adds new elements of instability to the international security.
These
developments not only cause the increase of military factors in the
international relations and a decline in the sense of security among
countries, but also seriously undermine the trust and cooperation in
the field of international arms control. The positive momentum which
emerged in the field of arms control and non-proliferation after the
end of the Cold mar has been seriously setback, and the international
nonproliferation regime has suffered repeated and heavy blows. The
prospect of the disarmament process is a cause for great concern.
So,
it is against this background that the current Review Conference is
taking place. It is a very important conference, the outcome of which
will have a direct impact on the future and fate of the international
nonproliferation regime and the nuclear disarmament process. It is
therefore the responsibility of all State Parties gathered here to
ensure the success of this Conference. The aim of a review conference
should be to take stock of the past and plan for the future. Now, in
light of the current international situation in arms control and
disarmament, I would like to elaborate the positions of the Chinese
Delegation on the three objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), namely, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear
disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Mr.
President,
Just
as the Treaty's name suggests, the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons is naturally one of the major goals of the APT. In 1995, we
agreed on the indefinite extension of the Treaty, which represents a
significant milestone in the prevention of nuclear weapons
proliferation, promotion of nuclear disarmament process and
realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
However, it is regrettable that, only three years later, the
nuclear explosions, first in Rajasthan and then in Baluchistan cast a
dark shadow over the future of the international nuclear nonproliferation
regime. The international community responded strongly. UN Security
Council Resolution 1172 established the correct principle and
direction for the solution to the nuclear issue in South Asia. It is
regrettable, however, that little substantive progress has registered
and Resolution 1172 has yet to be implemented.
We
have taken note of the fact that the two countries in South Asia
declared that they would conduct “no more new nuclear tests" or
“would not be the first to conduct new nuclear tests" and
“would not impede the entry-into-force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)". We urge the two countries to
honor their commitments. At the same time, it should be stressed that
Resolution 1172 reflects the common will of the international
community on the South Asia nuclear issue, therefore the authority and
integrity of the Resolution must be safeguarded. The two countries
should foils implement the resolution at an early date.
As
a State Party to the NPT, China has all along taken a serious and
responsible attitude towards nuclear non-proliferation. China is
firmly opposed to any form of proliferation of nuclear weapons to any
other country. China adheres to the policy of not advocating.
encouraging or engaging in nuclear weapons proliferation. We do not
help any other country develop nuclear weapons, nor provide assistance
to any nuclear facilities outside IAEA safeguards. China has abided by
the three principles of nuclear exports, i.e., the export is used
solely for peaceful purposes: it must be subjected to IAFA safeguards;
and the export should not be transferred to a third country without
China's permission. In order to strengthen and improve the control
mechanism for nuclear export, the Chinese government respectively
promulgated the Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Export on
September 10, 1997 and the Regulation on the Control of Nuclear
dual-use items and Related Technologies Export promulgated on June 1,
1998. Moreover, China joined the Zangger Committee, an international
nuclear export control system, in October 1997. China has also
participated in the negotiations of the “93+2" Protocol aimed
at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the
IAEA safeguards system. China
signed the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between China and the
IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in China on December 31, 1998.
Mr.
President,
With
the advancement of science and technology. the deepening of the
globalization process and the advert of the information age, there
will be more and more difficulties to prevent nuclear weapons
proliferation. Practice shows that it is impossible to realize the
goal of non-proliferation only by the traditional means of blocking or
suppression. How to effectively prevent the nuclear weapons
proliferation under the new circumstance? This must be answered by the
whole international community. China is of the view that further
efforts should be made in the following three areas in order to
address the non-proliferation issue. Firstly, establishing a global
security environment of stability, cooperation and mutual trust. which
will be the basic guarantee for the prevention of nuclear weapons
proliferation. It is known to all that an important reason to: some
countries to allocate huge financial resources to the development of
weapons of mass destruction is the lack of a sense of security- and
the need to seek an effective wav for self protection. The
establishment of a favorable international environment, the insistence
on tile peaceful solution of international disputes and security for
all the members of the international community will help remove the
motives of some countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
Secondly, to abolish double or multi-standards in the field of nuclear
non-proliferation is the prerequisite for the success of nuclear nonproliferation.
The purpose of nuclear non-proliferation should be the enhancement of
the security of all states. The implementation of the NPT should be
used as the sole criterion. Non-proliferation must not just serve the
security interest of a small number of countries. Much less should the
likes or dislikes of a country be taken as a criterion for judgment.
Otherwise, the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime
would be undermined and the extensive support lost. Thirdly, in the
framework of collective security-, the enhancement of international
unity, cooperation and common efforts is the only correct and
effective way to solve the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Without the cooperation with other countries, no country,
no matter how strong it is, can reach the goal of non-proliferation by
only relying on its own power and the power of its allies. Any trend
or action of unilateralism runs counter to the main tide of the
non-proliferation efforts.
Mr.
President,
The
Nuclear-Weapon States must faithfully implement their obligations for
nuclear disarmament. This is the necessary guarantee for the
maintenance of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The
indefinite extension of the NPT unconditionally agreed upon by the
non-nuclear-weapon states by no means endorses the indefinite right to
own nuclear weapons by the Nuclear-Weapon States.
The
emergence and development of nuclear weapons not only results from the
technological development, it owes even more to the international
security environment and the perception of security by each country.
Nuclear weapons came into being in the latter part of World War II and
were developed during the Cold War period marked by the eastern and
western blocs confrontation and mistrust. The late 1950s and early
1990s witnessed the end of the Cold War, the relaxation of tension of
the world and the improvement of relations among major countries along
with some significant progress made in the international nuclear
disarmament process. The US and Russia (the former Soviet Union)
concluded some treaties on nuclear arms reduction such as the INF
Treaty, START I and START II. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT) was finally reached after many years of painstaking
efforts by the international community. Due to the changes in the
international security situation since 1995, the international nuclear
disarmament process has once again bogged down to a standstill. The
bilateral nuclear disarmament treaties between the T JS and Russia are
sluggish in their ratification and implementation and the US Senate
even refused to ratify the CTBT.
It
is gratifying to see that the Duma of the Russian Federation has
formally ratified the START II treaty recently after several years of
twists and turns. We look forward to its early implementation of this
treaty and the initiation of the START III negotiations. China is of
the view that nuclear disarmament should be a comprehensive and
irreversible process. If only reducing obsolete nuclear weapons while
enhancing nuclear capability, or reducing the number of deployed
nuclear weapons while putting the reduced nuclear warheads into the so-called
"inactive reserve” that keeps to be maintained or even renewed,
ready for redeployment at any time, such practice are by no means
genuine nuclear disarmament.
It
should be particularly stressed that global nuclear disarmament can
not be reached without the global strategic balance. President Jiang
Zemin pointed out at the Conference on Disarmament in March last year
that the so-called missile defense program "will inevitably exert
an extensive negative impact on international security and stability
and trigger off a new round of arms race in new areas, thereby
seriously obstructing or neutralizing international efforts of nuclear
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. President Jiang also urged
the international community to take necessary measures to preempt such
dangerous developments.
We
have noticed that when the Russian Federation ratified the START II,
it declared that it the United States undermines the 1972 ABM treaty,
that would prompt Moscow to withdraw from START II as well as all the
other arms control agreements. History shows that, as the cornerstone
of' the global strategic balance and stability, the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) treaty concluded in 1972 has provided the necessary
security framework for the USA and Russia cut down their nuclear
stockpiles and played an indispensable and crucial role in assuring
the continuous progress in their bilateral nuclear disarmament
process. Relying on its overwhelmingly superior strength in economy,
science and technology, a certain military power, notwithstanding its
large nuclear arsenals with overkill capability, is vigorously
pursuing the development of national missile defense (NMD) system in
an attempt to seek absolute security for itself. Regardless whether an
absolute security is achievable, such action is tantamount to nuclear
arms build-up, which will not only bring severe damage to the
integrity and vitality of the ABM treaty and the global strategic
balance and stability but also seriously disrupt the basis for the
US-Russia bilateral nuclear reductions, impede the international
nuclear disarmament process, thus shatter the prerequisite and basis
for international nuclear non-proliferation. Russia's ratification of
START II and CTBT has let in a light of hope for the nuclear
disarmament process and we hope that the countries concerned can seize
this opportunity and get back on the right track of arms control and
disarmament, a track has been proven feasible in the decade after the
end of the Cold War.
Mr.
President,
China’s
nuclear weapons arc solely for the purpose of self-defense. It has
therefore always practiced utmost restraint in its nuclear weapons
development. Stating from the first day it came into possession of
nuclear weapons, China has unconditionally undertaken not to be the
first to use nuclear weapons. Also without any condition, it has
committed itself not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China has
never evaded its responsibilities and obligations for nuclear
disarmament and has been advocating the complete prohibition and
thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In all seriousness and
responsibilities, it participated its the CTBT negotiations and was
among the first to sign that Treaty. The Chinese Government has
formally submitted the treaty to the National People's Congress for
examination and ratification. In the meantime. it must be emphasized
that there are two basic prerequisites for China to participate in any
arms control negotiations, nuclear arias control in particular.
navel), these negotiations and the treaties or agreements must not
compromise the global strategic balance and stability, nor undermine
China’s national security interests. In defiance of the strong
opposition from the international community, a certain country is bent
on developing the NMD disruptive to the global strategic stability.
This and other profound changes that have taken place recently in the
international security environment, will inevitably affect China's
arms control policy.
The
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) should be conducive to the
prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation and promotion of nuclear
disarmament. Based on this understanding, China supports the
conclusion of a FACT through negotiations. However, China is of the
view that, at a time when a certain country is determined to develop a
missile defense system using the outer space as its important base,
the prevention of the weaponization of outer space is a task even more
urgent than the FMCT negotiation. Therefore, the three major
disarmament issues of outer space, nuclear disarmament and FMCT should
at least dealt with by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva in
a reasonable and balanced manner. As a matter of fact, whether CD can
treat these three issues in a balanced wav has become a matter of
principle rather than only of procedure.
At stake is whether each country’s legitimate security
concerns can be equally addressed at the CD, the only forum for
multilateral disarmament negotiation.
Disarmament should be conducive to the enhancement of all
countries common security, never becoming a tool employed lay a few
States to strengthen their military superiority and weaken or restrict
other countries.
At
present, nuclear transparency is quite a topic in the field of arms
control. China holds that, as an integral part of the efforts for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear
weapons, certain transparency measures are necessary if warranted.
However, under the present circumstances, whether time and conditions
are ripe for taking these transparence measures and whether they can
enhance mutual trust as expected, are questions worth pondering.
Nuclear-Weapon States have differed a lot in their nuclear strategies
and different arsenals therefore it is unreasonable to ask these
countries to take the same transparency measures at the same time.
Furthermore, what degree of transparency in the military field can a
country accept is directly related to its strategic security
environment. Today. a superpower which rampantly intervenes in other
countries' internal affairs and willfully resorts to force,
continuously improving its overwhelming first-strike nuclear
capability. On the other
hand, it also spares no efforts in developing an advanced missile
defense system capable of neutralizing any counter-strike launched by
a small- or medium-sized Nuclear-Weapon State after sustaining
a nuclear first strike. Under such circumstances. it is neither
conducive to their own security nor in the interest of global
strategic balance and stability to ask the small or medium sized
nuclear countries to take transparency measures.
We
believe that the most rational and feasible confidence-building
measures now are that Nuclear Weapon States unconditionally undertake
not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weaponfree
zones. Although the ban on the first use of nuclear weapons can not
substitute the concrete nuclear disarmament measures, it will increase
the mutual trust among Nuclear Weapon States as well as between the
Nuclear Weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, reduce the risk
of nuclear war and help decrease discriminatory nature inherent in the
international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
As a result, the universality and effectiveness of the regime
will be enhanced, leading toward the necessary conditions for the
complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.
Mr.
President,
Promoting
the peaceful use of nuclear energy is one at the three objectives of
the NPT. Nuclear power is a clean and highly efficient energy with
tremendous potentials. Nuclear technology has been widely applied in
all aspects of human life.
As
a developing country with certain capabilities in nuclear industry,
China adheres to the relevant provisions of the NPT and actively
carries out mutually beneficial international cooperation in tile
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. China has signed agreements of
cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy with governments of
sixteen countries including the Russian Federation, France, and
others. China has also helped developing countries in the fields of
nuclear power, nuclear medical science and the application of nuclear
technologies.
In
the multilateral field, China has carried out fruitful cooperation and
exchanges with the IAEA in areas of nuclear power plant construction,
nuclear safety, management of nuclear wastes and the application of
nuclear technologies. In addition to making timely and full payments
to the Technical Assistance Fund (TCF) of the Agency, China has also
provided extra-budgetary resources. Froth thee to time. the scientific
and technical personnel from developing countries come to China for
survey and training. Upon request by the IAEA, China also dispatches
experts to provide technical services and give lectures to
transregional projects or international symposium. China has actively
participated in the cooperation of nuclear science and technologies in
Asia and the Pacific, making great contributions to promoting the
peaceful use of nuclear technology in this region.
In
order to fully implement the obligations of promoting the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy and international cooperation set forth. in the
NPT, China advocates the further strengthening of the technical
assistance to the developing countries, lift various unreasonable
limits regards nuclear technology transfer to developing countries,
and actively support developing countries to develop and use nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, with a view to making nuclear energy
beneficial to whole mankind.
Every
country has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear non-proliferation
and the peaceful use of nuclear energy are complementary to each
other. To strengthen the international cooperation in the peaceful use
of nuclear energy and expanding the application of nuclear technology
will not only promote a country's economic development, improve its
people's living standard, but also help prevent nuclear weapon
proliferation. But if the desire and demand for peaceful uses of'
nuclear energy from developing countries are ignored, while the
nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear export control are over
emphasized and normal peaceful uses of nuclear energy among various
countries are impeded under the pretext of nuclear nonproliferation,
that it will not only deviating from the original aims of the N'PT but
also bring harm to the interests of the countries concerned. If this
happens, the nuclear non-proliferation regime will not last for lack
of support.
Certain
States have categorized the world according to their preferences. They
call some countries they dislike by a host of weird names, such as
“rogue states" and have grossly deprived the latter of the
right for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These double-standard
or multi-standard conducts are extremely unfair and irresponsible.
They will not help solve the concerns for the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, but only deepen the mistrust among countries, causing
disappointment and doubt about the present nuclear non-proliferation
regime on the part of various countries, especially the developing
countries.
Mr.
President,
NPT
is the most important international treaty on arms control and has the
widest representation. Now the international situation is undergoing
great changes and disarmament efforts are at critical crossroad. Under
such circumstances, it is of great importance to ensure the success of
this Conference for the benefit of reinforcing the international
nuclear nonproliferation regime, promoting the international nuclear
disarmament and enhancing world peace and stability. It is China's
sincere hope that a final document can be produced by consensus at the
end of the conference, which will mark the success of the Conference.
As for the final document, it is not important whether it is
one paper divided into two parts of reviewing and forward-looking or
two separate papers. What is important is that the document should give an
accurate evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty in the past
five years and make practical arrangements on what goals should be
reached in the next five years. It is the first review conference
since the indefinite extension in 1995 and we should cherish such a
historic opportunity, overcome various kinds of negative elements and
strive for a consensus on all major issues. With a prudent,
responsible and flexible attitude, so as to establish a good
foundation for the future review and implementation of the Treaty.
Mr.
President,
I
would like to wrap up my speech by quoting a paragraph from the
statement of Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen at the United Nations
General Assembly in 1994: 'Since mankind has been able to make nuclear
weapons and tap nuclear energy for peaceful purpose in the 20th
century, we are confident that in the '21st century they will
certainly be able to completely ban and destroy nuclear weapons and
fully harness nuclear energy to enhance their own welfare". it is
not an inaccessible goal. The key lies in whether there is enough
political will for each and every country to realize this goal. We
have entered the twenty-first century and it is up to us to choose
whether to live under shadow of nuclear weapon threat or to the
sunlight of peace and happiness. May all the peace and freedom-loving
people in the world join hands to strife for a nuclear-weapon-free
world!
Thank
you, Mr. President.
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