The 2000 NPT Review
Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York
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AGAINST DELIVERY
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FOR AN ADDRESS BY
THE
HONOURABLE LLOYD AXWORTHY
MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TO THE SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE
OF
THE PARTIES TO
THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
New
York, 25 April 2000
In 1979, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre
Elliot Trudeau wrote of "the terrible dangers that threaten
humanity as long as nuclear weapons continue to be produced, and of
our obligations as citizens and governments to face the consequences
of this situation."
A generation later, the dangers have lost
none of the potency, the obligations none of the urgency that they had
when Prime Minister Trudeau first made these observations.
Without question, the risk of nuclear
annihilation remains the greatest potential threat to human security.
Since our country gave up its own nuclear
weapons capacity 50 years ago, Canadians have spent time, invested
resources and given priority to working with others to build a strong
international nuclear non-proliferation regime to lessen the threat.
With the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT]
at its centre, the regime we have ail painstakingly constructed over
the past decades has served us well. It has proved its value and has
produced results.
But while we can take satisfaction in past
achievement, it is no guarantee of future security. In the realm of
nuclear weapons threats and non-proliferation efforts, Cold War
certainties of the 20th century are giving way to the shifting
uncertainties of the 21st.
As a result, this Conference is an
opportunity not only to review the NPT but to rewire its machinery in
response to the new realities. What is at stake is nothing less than
the future course of nuclear weapons attitudes and arsenals -- indeed,
the very well-being of humanity.
The challenges are varied.
One real worry is the tendency of some to
justify retaining nuclear arsenals as a defence against other weapons
of mass destruction or as political status symbols.
No less disturbing are the ambitions of
others to acquire nuclear capacity. Nuclear testing by India and
Pakistan has added a frightening dimension to insecurity in the region
of South Asia, and it has flagrantly violated international norms
against nuclear proliferation.
Other issues have to do with the security,
storage and disposal of fissile materials from dismantled warheads.
Concern has grown about the possibility of illicit transfers of
nuclear weapons-grade material and technology, as well as the
irresponsible use by certain states, groups and individuals of their
nuclear knowledge.
In still other quarters, there is a drift
toward unilateral options -- a source of anxiety. In the United
States, the rejection by the Senate of the CTBT [Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty] is a significant step backward, while the proposed
unilateral National Missile Defence would have serious implications
for the NPT regime.
In the meantime, the inexcusable impasse at
the Conference on Disarmament has precluded any multilateral movement
relating to nuclear disarmament, security assurances and prevention of
an arms race in outer space, while over 50 States Parties to the NPT
have still not concluded nuclear safeguards agreements with the IAEA
[International Atomic Energy Agency].
To be sure, there have also been successes
since we agreed five years ago to extend the NPT indefinitely.
The number of states remaining outside the
Treaty has been reduced from 10 to only 4. The Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty has been negotiated and signed by the vast majority of states.
Nuclear weapons-free zones have been
established in Central and South America, Africa, and the Pacific.
international Atomic Energy Agency has adopted measures that
significantly strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the
nuclear safeguards regime.
There have been significant reductions in
nuclear weapons and the elimination of entire weapons systems by the
United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France, as well as deep
cuts in the nuclear forces assigned to NATO. This downsizing has
contributed to a more stable security environment.
In addition, Russia recently ratified both
START II and the CTBT a step we strongly commend. This provides a
hopeful window of opportunity for disarmament efforts.
Developments over the past five years have
been both positive and negative. But while the record may be mixed,
one thing is sure: those who think the end of the Cold War somehow
removed the threat of nuclear weapons need to think again. We all need
to.
Yet the risks associated with nuclear weapons
appear to have faded from the radar screen of international attention.
Somehow, we seem to have lost our way -- or our will -- to defend the
NPT regime resolutely, to keep its promises and honour its
obligations.
The global nuclear non-proliferation regime
cannot be allowed to wither by active design or malign neglect. On the
contrary, there is a need for heightened awareness among our peoples
and in our legislatures about the challenges. That need lay behind my
government's consultation with our Parliament two years ago on nuclear
issues.
Now is the time to re-affirm international
commitment and to refocus global energy on strengthening the regime.
This -- not the misguided appeal of unilateral action, whatever its
source -- offers the best guarantee of our common security.
The NPT Review Conference is therefore an
opportunity to identify shortcomings, to renew determination to build
an effective, international regime, and to come to grips with the
emerging threats to be addressed by that regime.
The tasks are clear. We must give new meaning
to the basic deal underpinning the NPT: a promise by those without
nuclear weapons not to acquire them, in exchange for a commitment by
those possessing such weapons to eventually give them up. Along with
that, we must give real meaning to the pledge of "permanence with
accountability, made when the NPT was extended indefinitely.
These are certainly Canada's goals. Our
approach is threefold.
First, we are committed to promoting and
protecting the Treaty's universality. We must never slacken in our
efforts to engage the four remaining NPT holdouts of India Pakistan,
Cuba and Israel, and to seek ways of obtaining their full adherence to
the provisions of the Treaty. At the same time, we need to ensure that
all States Parties keep their commitment to fulfilling their Treaty
obligations.
Second, we will work to secure agreement on
an updated Five‑Year Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Action
Plan containing concrete objectives and goals.
We are flexible on the format but unwavering
on the principle. This program goes to the heart of the promise of
real accountability made by both nuclear and non‑nuclear weapons
states. The promise was the basis on which many countries—my own
included—agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely.
In our view, this means an action program
designed to:
complete
work on the CTBT by finding a way to bring it into force sooner rather
than later;
end
deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament and begin negotiations on a
ban on fissile material production;
continue
START reductions in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons arsenals;
stress
the need for Russia and the United States to maintain the integrity of
the Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty;
call
on other nuclear weapons states to enter into disarmament negotiations
once the number of U.S. and Russian strategic warheads is reduced to
the 1000-2000 range;
extend
the application of existing nuclear weapons-free zones and encourage
new zones—particularly in areas of tension, such as the Middle East
and South Asia;
promote
the universalization of comprehensive IAEA safeguards in order to
restrict the flow of materials and know-how needed for the development
of nuclear weapons; and
further
improve verification and inspection capacity and effectiveness.
Canada is pressing for progress in all these
areas. We are also calling for closer attention to another issue:
restricting access to the means of delivering nuclear and other
weapons—notably, missiles.
A growing number of countries now possess,
are developing or are acquiring missiles capable of delivering
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Yet there exists no treaty,
no code of conduct, no set of guidelines defining responsible
behaviour in these areas. This is a matter that must be addressed.
One possibility advocated by some is to
strengthen missile defences. However, there are serious concerns about
whether strengthened defences would work, whether they would
ultimately enhance or diminish security, and indeed whether they would
reinforce or damage the NPT regime.
Another option is to work at curtailing
missile proliferation in the first place, and to make doing so a key
part of a strengthened, global non-proliferation regime.
For example, the Missile Technology Control
Regime [MTCR] could be made more effective by adopting stricter export
controls on relevant technology and widening participation.
The Regime could also make an important
contribution toward developing workable confidence-building measures,
establishing universal norms to distinguish between responsible and
irresponsible behaviour involving missiles, and backing this up with
an effective verification mechanism.
Another solution that merits further thought
is the creation of a joint early warning system. Efforts to deal with
the Year 2000 bug demonstrated the capacity for wider international co-operation
in monitoring - and experience which might have application in
defending against ballistic missile attack.
A joint warning system might also be combined
with a multilateral, rules-based method of reducing ballistic missile
threats from non-traditional sources.
A stronger non-proliferation regime depends
on effective global arrangements. It also depends on the willingness
of individual countries and groups of countries to assess the validity
of their own policies.
This is why Canada has been active in efforts
now under way at NATO to review fully the Alliance's non-proliferation,
arms control and disarmament options. NATO nuclear forces have already
been reduced by over 80 percent. But more must be done.
The review will be presented to NATO foreign
ministers in December and could also be used to engage Russia in the
Permanent Joint Council. This willingness to explore further measures
underlines NATO's commitment to advancing global arms control and
disarmament. We trust that the review will be pursued with diligence
and serious intent, as a signal that the NPT Article 6 bargain will be
kept.
Finally, as the third strand of our approach,
Canada will work toward a more robust NPT review and assessment
process.
Agreeing on future goals is one thing; making
sure they are implemented is quite another. With that goal in mind, we
believe the NPT review process could be enhanced with a requirement to
more frequently track, discuss and document movement toward
translating our commitments into action.
Further, if we are to have real
accountability, we need to have real transparency. Welcome moves in
this direction are the naming of NGO [non-governmental organization]
representatives to a number of delegations to this Conference
(including my own), and the opportunity given to the NGO community to
make its views known.
As we learned from the Ottawa Process, which
culminated in a convention banning anti-personnel mines, the active
contribution of NGO representatives can do a great deal to enhance the
openness of our work, to involve people in the issues, and to mobilize
public support and participation in our efforts.
The first resolution ever adopted by the UN
General Assembly was one recommending that atomic weapons be
eliminated from national arsenals. Ever since then, we have grappled
with how best to contain the nuclear genie.
Imperfect as it may be, the global nuclear
non-proliferation regime provides the answer. A strong and effective
NPT remains indispensable.
There are evident feelings of impatience with
the nuclear deal, temptations to violate the NPT provisions, and a new
set of non-proliferation threats and challenges, combined with a
worrying drift away from international approaches.
Yet the NPT remains the most widely adhered-to
security accord in history. And the reason is that despite the
frustrations, the NPT and with it a global non-proliferation regime
offer the best hope for minimizing the threat of nuclear annihilation,
and the best vehicle for advancing our common security now and into
the future.
We need to re-affirm the importance of the
NPT here, and make the merits of multilateral solutions a part of the
debate back home in our respective Assemblies, Parliaments, and
Congresses.
It is therefore vital that the Review
Conference succeed in advancing this agenda and not stand still. This
is a responsibility we all carry as we turn our minds to the
challenging work ahead. A safe and secure future depends on it.
Thank you.
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