The 2000 NPT Review
Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York
Mr.
Wolfgang Hoffmann
Executive Secretary
of the
Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization
at the
2000 NPT Review Conference
New
York, 25 April 2000
Mr. Chairman,
The fact alone that
you afford the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization the opportunity
to address this Conference sheds rays of success on the Treaty of
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Review process. While
many positive factors can be attributed to the final success of the
lengthy and often arduous CTBT negotiations, references in the NPT as
well as mandates clearly expressed by Conferences of its states
parties can be considered pivotal for the successful conclusion of the
CTBT.
The 1995 Review and
Extension Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
gave the necessary strong impetus to the negotiations on the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Decision 2 of the Conference on
"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament" listed as the first measure towards the
implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty “the
completion by the Conference of Disarmament of the negotiations on a
universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive
nuclear-test-ban treaty no later than 1996."
With the endorsement
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the General Assembly
of the United Nations, in September 1996, the deadline set forth by
the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was met. The successful end
of one of the longest treaty negotiations in the history of arms
control and disarmament was widely acclaimed and "The New
Yorker" even commented at that time that "The
signing (of the CTBT) has a fair claim to be the most momentous event
ever to have taken place under the U.N.'s roof'.
After some 2000
nuclear test explosions conducted since the beginning of the nuclear
age, the CTBT inspired strong hopes that the deadly spiral of
developing ever more efficient and deadly nuclear devices had been
brought to an end, once and forever.
Article I of the CTBT
on Basic Obligations is unequivocal in its scope and foresees no
compromises. It reads as follows:
"Each
State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent
any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or
control.
Each
State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing,
encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. "
By putting an end to
testing, in any realistic way, the functioning of nuclear weapons, the
CTBT impedes the development of ever more sophisticated and
qualitatively new nuclear weapons. Thus the CTBT is expected to stop
the vertical and impede the horizontal nuclear proliferation. In
addition, the CTBT gives an impetus to further implementation of the
principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament, which were adopted at the NPT Review and Extension
Conference in 1995.
While complementing
the NPT, the CTBT is widely considered to go beyond the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty: the scope of the CTBT is not limited to the aspect of
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but it contains, at the same
time, specific arms control elements. While contributing essentially
to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it might
also strengthen and enhance the process of nuclear disarmament.
Background paper NPT/CONF.2000/2
prepared by the United Nations Secretariat for this Review Conference,
offers comprehensive information on the CTBT and its global
verification system. It also refers to the Preparatory Commission,
established on 19 November 1996 for the purpose of carrying out the
necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the CTBTO
and preparing for the first session of the Conference of States
Parties to the Treaty. This background paper was coordinated with our
Provision 1 Technical Secretariat, we were happy to contribute to its
preparation and we agree with its content. I will therefore not repeat
all the information contained therein.
Instead, I would like
to look at the question, what would make the CTBT a successful treaty
and how far the Preparatory Commission has come in achieving its
goals.
Regarding the
successful implementation of the CTBT, there are two aspects, which I
would consider of primary importance:
1. that the CTBT
becomes a global Treaty, i.e. that as many countries as possible sign
and ratify the CTBT;
2. that complete
implementation of the Treaty is guaranteed by a worldwide verification
system, i.e. that each State Signatory can be assured that the CTBT
will be adhered to, or, at least, that any violation will be detected.
Regarding membership
of the Treaty, I can inform you that, with presently 155 States
Signatories, it is approaching the status of a universal Treaty.
According to Article XIV of the CTBT, ratification by 44 States
Signatories, listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, is required for its
entry into force. 28 of these 44 States Signatories have ratified the
Treaty so far, including two nuclear weapons States, France and the
United Kingdom. They are among the total of 55 States that have
ratified. Two other States Signatories, who are among the 44, have
completed the parliamentary stage for ratification: Chile and the
Russian Federation. The speed of the overall ratification process has
been comparable to that of other Treaties, like that of the Chemical
Weapons Convention. But the CTBT's entry into force clause is very
specific and much remains to be achieved to secure success.
Membership and
ratification was also in the focus of the first Conference on
Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, held last October in
Vienna. Its purpose was to consider and decide by consensus what
measures consistent with international law could be undertaken to
accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early
entry into force of the Treaty. The importance of the CTBT was
reaffirmed and one of the observations put forward was that unilateral
self-imposed moratoria on testing could not replace a legally binding
commitment through an international instrument such as the CTBT.
The key for the
viability of the Treaty is its global verification system. It
comprises an International Monitoring System; consultation and
clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence-building measures -
to ensure the reliable detection and identification of any ambiguous
event, and to provide a credible deterrent to clandestine nuclear
testing. The CTBT is thus not only the expression of an intention of
each State party not to carry out any nuclear explosion. It is, at the
same time, also a commitment by each State signatory to ensure the
Treaty's viability by establishing a regime to monitor adherence and
to detect violations.
The Treaty provides
that the global verification regime shall be capable of meeting its
verification requirements at entry into force. Therefore one of the
main tasks of the Preparatory Commission is to build up the worldwide
network of stations that comprise the International Monitoring System
(IMS). This cost-effective network of 170 seismological, 60
infrasound, 11 hydroacoustic and 80 radionuclide stations - supported
by 16 radionuclide laboratories - will be capable of registering
vibrations underground, in the sea and in the air as well as detecting
traces of radionuclides released into the atmosphere by a nuclear
explosion. The stations will transmit a steady stream of data
generated by these four complementary technologies, in near real time,
via a global satellite communications system to the International Data
Center, at the seat of the PrepCom in Vienna, where all the data will
be processed. All data, raw or processed, from the monitoring
facilities will be made available to the States Signatories. There are
provisions on consultation and clarification for dealing with
ambiguous events. As a final verification measure, an on-site
inspection may be requested.
We are building up
the International Monitoring System according to a schedule determined
by our annual program and budget. From the start of our operations in
1997 up to and including the 20f J budget year, the amount of money
budgeted for capital investment in establishing or upgrading
monitoring stations is US$ 92.1 million. This sum represents about 43
per cent of the total capital investment required to complete the
entire monitoring network.
In parallel, we have
also readied the International Data Centre, the nerve centre of the
verification regime, for the first analysis of data, transmitted from
the IMS stations via the Global Communications Infrastructure. With
the installation of the second of four releases of application
software, in 1999, the IDC is capable to distribute IMS data and IDC
bulletins and additional information to States Signatories seven days
a week, assisting them in verifying Treaty compliance.
The work of the PTS
has been guided by decisions of the Preparatory Commissions, upon
preparation by the two Working Groups. Without burdening you with
excessive details, I would like to offer you a brief overview on where
we are standing after three years of work:
ten facility
agreements or arrangements have been signed, out of which five have
entered into force. In addition, 57 States have completed interim
exchanges of letters.
204 IMS site surveys
have been completed, where required. Site surveys for 53 additional
stations are either under way or pending contract.
77 site surveys for
the Global Communications Infrastructure have been completed. In many
cases, these site surveys and subsequent civil work were performed by
or in cooperation with IMS staff.
88 IMS stations have
been installed or substantially meet specifications. The installation
of 65 additional stations is either under way or pending contract.
Global Communications
Infrastructure (GCI) Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs) have been
installed at 26 of the IMS, National Data Centres and developmental
sites, with 41 more under way.
Global satellite
coverage was established with the commissioning of four GCI hubs and
the frame relay infrastructure to link these hubs to the IDC in
Vienna.
GCI links to four
independent sub networks were commissioned, and a VSAT link to the
independent sub networks is now undergoing acceptance testing.
25 IMS stations are
sending data through the GCI and into the IDC on a test basis, with
many more stations planned in 2000.
The IDC established
the capacity to receive and test data over the GCI.
Preparatory work was
initiated this year to provide, for the first time, test IMS data and
IDC products to States Signatories.
The Commission is
also preparing the groundwork for on-site inspections, provided for by
the Treaty. The OSI Operational Manual is being developed as a
priority task and the PTS has been supporting the Group of Friends of
the OSI Programme Coordinator. Initial specifications for equipment
related to the four IMS technologies have been adopted and a passive
seismic system for aftershock detection will be received shortly for
testing and training, plans for which are being developed. Upon
invitation of the Kazakhstan Government, a field experiment simulating
aspects of an on-site inspection was conducted in Kazakhstan in
October 1999, on the basis of a 100-tonne chemical explosion for
calibration purposes.
Our Legal and
External Relations Division has been providing the necessary
assistance, complementing the efforts of the technical divisions. The
Administrative Division has provided support for the policy-making
organs as well as the necessary infrastructure for the work of the
Commission. While the work carried out by the technical divisions has
absorbed most of our budget, we have succeeded in keeping the
administrative share of the budget below 20%, thus giving States
Signatories real value for money.
Training of nationals
from States Signatories has been our ongoing effort. We have conducted
five Introductory Training Programmes in the IMS verification
technologies, two in-depth technical training Programmes, four IDC
Training Courses for prospective staff (a fifth is currently under
way), a workshop on aspects related to the transmission of data
through the GCI, five workshops to develop OSI techniques and
procedures for inclusion in the Operational Manual, two introductory
OSI training courses and one tabletop exercise simulating an on-site
Inspection.
In establishing the
global verification regime, CTBTO PrepCom is equipping 89 countries
with cost-free, cutting-edge technology, supporting the operation of
their stations, and training their staff in processing, using and
evaluating the data from the four verification technologies. All the
monitoring facilities will be owned and operated by the countries
hosting or taking responsibility for them. However, the potential
spin-off benefits arising from the CTBT verification technologies may
be no less significant. For instance, the knowledge of the earth and
atmosphere gained through IMS data, and processed by the IDC, may
enable States signatories to better plan major infrastructure projects
and more efficiently exploit their natural resources. IMS data could
also help foreseeing the movements of weather fronts and volcanic
eruptions, which could be vital for the early warning of populations
and civil aviation.
To help States
signatories to benefit from the CTBT and from the work of the
Commission, two International Cooperation Workshops were held in
Vienna and Cairo and two more are scheduled for this year in Beijing
and Lima. They explore the possible uses of verification technologies
and IMS data for other peaceful applications, examine the potential
for regional or international cooperation in collecting, analysing and
using data, and they also highlight the fundamental importance of the
CTBT for global peace and security. Last, but not least, they promote
signature and ratification of the Treaty.
The work of the
Preparatory Commission has been enjoying sustained support by our
States signatories. This support has been manifold. Active
participation in the work of the Commission, political support in
enhancing signature and ratification, and preparedness to accept the
necessary budget increases. Year after year, the support of our States
signatories has also been reflected in the collection rate of the
assessed contributions, which is 100 per cent for the 1996 budget,
over 97 per for 1997, over 96 per cent for 1998, over 95 per cent for
1999 and already close to 80 percent for 2000.
At a recent panel
discussion held in Vienna to commemorate the third anniversary of the
Preparatory Commission, it was stated that "the CTBT keeps alive
confidence in nonproliferation measures as an important element to
avoid the danger of a nuclear arms race and, eventually, a nuclear
war".
At the same event,
reference was also made to the importance of strong support for the
CTBT and its implementation process among states attending this OPT
Review Conference. As in 1995, when endorsement for the CTBT by the
NPT Review and Expansion [sic] Conference facilitated the negotiation
process, the 2000 APT Review Conference could definitely enhance the
preparation for entry into force of the Treaty. Mr. Chairman, let me
therefore call, through you, upon all states participating in the NPT
Review Conference to support a strong endorsement for the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and for the work of the
Preparatory Commission by this Conference.
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