The 2000 NPT Review
Conference (RevCon)
14 April - 19 May 2000, New York
Statement
by H.E. Ambassador Celso L. N. Amorim
Head
of the Brazilian Delegation
to
the Sixth Review Conference of
the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
New
York, 25 April 2000
Mr.
President,
Let
me join previous speakers in congratulating you, Ambassador Baali, on
your election for the Presidency of this Conference. We are confident
that your experience and
personal skills will lead us through the difficult days ahead.
You may rest assured of my delegation's full support and cooperation.
Mr.
President,
Brazil
participates for the first time in a Review Conference of the NPT. The
increasing adherence to the NPT during the nineties reflected a
widespread desire to abide by what has gradually become the main
international basis to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
to promote nuclear disarmament.
Our
own accession to the NPT came after careful consideration of the
Treaty's role, especially in the years that followed the end of the
Cold War.
As
many others, Brazil had been critical of the asymmetrical obligations
deriving from the NPT, and all the more so as the essential bargain
contained in it was not being respected during the Cold War era.
Instead of reducing their arsenals, as they should, the nuclear-weapon
States were increasing their quantity and killing capacity. The
Treaty's nuclear disarmament obligations were thus systematically
eluded.
The
changes in the overall strategic situation in the early nineties,
however, brought about more promising prospects. Indeed, the nuclear
escalation began to be rolled-back, and deep reductions in nuclear
arsenals appeared as a real possibility. In less than two years, the
START and START-II agreements were concluded. Well-grounded hopes
could be nurtured that, within not so distant a future, mankind might
be rid of the nuclear threat.
The
adoption, by then, of the Chemical Weapons Convention revealed that,
whenever true political will and leadership exist, a whole category of
weapons of mass destruction could be proscribed in an effectively
verifiable manner.
Brazil
was encouraged by the package of decisions adopted at the 1995 Review
and Extension Conference, the main purpose of which was to ensure that
NPT Parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, would be more
accountable of their obligations to achieve the total elimination of
nuclear weapons.
Yardsticks
to measure progress were then set. One year later, the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature, thus paving the way
for other steps conducive to a nuclear-weapon-free world.
Important
developments had been taking place in Brazil and its neighbors:
In
1988, the Representatives who drafted our democratic Constitution
stipulated that nuclear energy would be used in our territory for
peaceful purposes only. Together with Argentina, we undertook a
successful confidence-building process, which resulted in a
Quadripartite full-scope safeguards agreement between the two
countries, the bilateral agency which was created for mutual nuclear
accountancy and control (ABACC)
and the IAEA.
In
a relatively short period, the necessary steps were taken to bring the
Treaty of Tlatelolco fully into force for Brazil and other countries
in the region. From the legal as well as political and practical
standpoints, Brazil was fully bound to the exclusively peaceful uses
of nuclear energy. In view of the auspicious evolution in
international trends, we decided to adhere to the NPT. In so doing, we
were hoping to contribute to the universal application and enhanced
credibility of the Treaty.
Commenting
on how Brazil intends to work for nuclear disarmament, President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso stated that "we will do it from within
the Treaty, acting to correct its imbalances (...)." He also
pointed out that "the international community can no longer live
with weapons of mass destruction", and added that "time has
come for us to set up together a phased programme for the total
elimination of nuclear weapons".
In
its turn, the Brazilian Congress expressed a stringent proviso in the
Legislative Decree that approved the NPT, namely that "Brazil's
accession to the NPT is made on the understanding that, in accordance
with Article VI of the Treaty, effective measures will be taken with a
view to the cessation of nuclear arms race at an early date and the
total elimination of nuclear weapons".
Mr.
President,
The
present international environment unfortunately does not give rise to
the same degree of optimism that seemed to prevail in the early and
mid-nineties.
The
recent decisions taken by the State Duma of the Russian Federation
regarding the ratification of the START II and the CTBT are
encouraging signals, which reinforce the expectations of the
international community on the continuation of the bilateral process
of nuclear reductions.
Yet there have been
disturbing tendencies that render the geopolitical situation today
less stable than it appeared to be in the years subsequent to the end
of the bipolar confrontation. Mutual suspicion seems now more
prevalent than mutual confidence. And it runs through a larger number
of actors. Regional tensions have added to the complexities global
balance. The deployment of new weapons systems and the modernization
of existing ones seem to indicate that the illusion of absolute
security is again being pursued.
Ten
years after the end of the Cold War, the dismaying reality before us -
as the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, pointed out in his Report to
the Millennium Assembly - is that some 35,000 nuclear weapons are
still there, either in operational, non-deployed, retired or strategic
reserve capacity.
We
were recently reminded that the principle of irreversibility in
nuclear arms control measures cannot be taken for granted. The
possibility of re-deploying nuclear weapons that are currently in non-operational
status has not been fully discarded. This, of course, renders
proclaimed nuclear weapons reduction figures and statistics all the
more relative. It is no wonder that many remain unimpressed by such
figures. From the point of view of a country that has renounced the
nuclear-weapons option - and indeed, we believe, from that of humanity
at large - a single nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon too many.
Mr.
President,
We
are disturbed by the fact that thousands of nuclear weapons continue
to be placed on hair-trigger alert, with the risk of their being
launched either by design or by accident, or yet by miscalculation.
Rationales for the possession and use of nuclear weapons have been
re-stated or reinforced. Deterrence doctrines now resemble catch-all
clauses to cope with all sorts of threats. Equally regrettable is the
lowering of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, dissociating
it from instances related to the very survival of the State.
Continued
reliance on nuclear deterrence and the assumption that nuclear weapons
are here to stay for the indefinite future represent an unacceptable
state of affairs. They go against the unanimous conclusion of the
International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion that there
exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament.
As
the Canberra Commission - in which I had the honour to participate -
stated in its 1996 Report: "Nuclear weapons are held by a handful
of States which insist that these weapons provide security benefits,
and yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This
situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable; it cannot be
sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by any State is a
constant stimulus to other States to acquire them."
The
nuclear tests in South Asia should have been a wake-up call for the
risks posed by nuclear proliferation and protracted action on nuclear
disarmament. It is with great sadness and preoccupation that we
witness South Asia becoming yet another dangerous nuclear flash point,
whereas it could have followed the example of other regions which have
established the nuclear-weapon-free-zones now covering almost the
entire Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas. While recognizing that
there are historical differences that cannot be neglected, we believe
that valuable lessons might be drawn from the successful confidence-building
and non-proliferation experiences in South America and Southern
Africa.
At
the same time, there are visible, worrisome signs of a gradual
accommodation of the de facto nuclear
status of those States who are not yet Parties to the NPT and have
failed to renounce the nuclear-weapons option. Such an attitude would
contradict the letter and the spirit of the NPT as well as of the UN
Security Council Resolution 1172. This Conference has, in that regard,
a twofold task: to urge non-States Parties to accede to the NPT
without conditions and without delay, and to call on States Parties to
refrain from any action that may contravene or undermine the
fulfillment of the objectives of the Treaty as well as of relevant UN
Resolutions.
Mr.
President,
This
Conference faces daunting challenges. Its deliberations will be
followed with great attention by authorities and decision-makers
around the world, and its outcome will have a strong bearing on the
future of the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament norm and
other security related matters.
While
the picture of where we stand now and what was actually achieved or
not achieved over the last five years must be duly reflected, Brazil
considers that such an effort should not discourage States Parties to
the NPT from agreeing on measures aimed at enhancing the credibility
and effectiveness of the Treaty, as envisaged in the decisions of
1995.
In
looking forward to the next five years, this Conference must build
upon numerous contributions that have been advanced over the last
years, particularly on interim measures and next steps to be taken in
the nuclear disarmament field.
Such
contributions were presented by several governments, groups of
experts, including the Canberra Commission and the Tokyo Forum, the
NGO community as well as eminent civilian and ex-military authorities
of high rank and political standing in the nuclear-weapon States
themselves, including, more recently, former United States President
Jimmy Carter.
The
New Agenda coalition, of which my country is a founding member and
which started with a Ministerial Declaration in 1998, has been a
catalyst for the promotion of those ideas. Its motivations and
objectives were eloquently expressed in the statement made by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico.
The
New Agenda proposes a programme of action that does not exempt any
country from its responsibilities towards others. The listed measures
would be respectively incumbent on the five nuclear-weapon States, the
three States not yet Parties to the NPT which operate unsafeguarded
facilities and have not renounced the nuclear weapons option, and the
international community as a whole. Those multilateral, unilateral or
bilateral measures would not have to wait for one another. They would
be mutually reinforcing and may thus be pursued in parallel.
It
has been recalled that the New Agenda's ideas are not in themselves
novel. Some of them have been on the table for decades. So what is new
about the New Agenda? First, its composition: its proponents and
supporters come from different groupings and regions of the world and
have been actively working to promote the nuclear disarmament cause.
Second, its timing: as the post Cold War window of opportunity was
being clearly wasted, decisive action was required to preserve the
integrity and relevance of the NPT. And third, the comprehensive,
balanced and achievable nature of the programme of action put forward
by the coalition, which would be underpinned by an unequivocal
undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total
elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to engage in an accelerated
process of negotiations to that end. This perhaps explains the
increasingly broad support that it has been receiving from
governments, parliaments, NGOs and the civil society.
Mr.
President,
Whereas
the substantive outcome of this Conference is what really matters,
Brazil approaches the working modalities and format of the review
process with an open mind. Preserving and building upon what was
agreed in 1995 should be, naturally, our main guiding principle. The
failure, however, of the Preparatory Committee to reach any
substantive recommendations on principles, objectives and ways in
order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its
universality - as mandated by Decision 1 - is certainly deplorable and
may induce us to revisit some of the procedures followed thus far.
Mr.
President,
In conclusion, Brazil
is hopeful that the critical circumstances and enormous challenges
confronting this Review Conference will lead States here represented
to demonstrate greater flexibility and a deeper sense of
responsibility towards the need to uphold the integrity of the NPT and
demonstrate its [UNCLEAR] by agreeing to concrete measures in the
nuclear disarmament field.
We are here because
we firmly believe that that the NPT framework is the only existing,
viable setting for the international community to pursue a world free
from the possibility of nuclear war.
As
far back as 1923, the great Italian novelist, born in Trieste, Italo
Svevo, presented an ominous prophecy: “When all the poison gases are
exhausted, a man, made like all other men of flesh and blood, will in
the quiet of his room invent an explosive of such potency that all the
explosives in existence will seem like harmless toys beside it. And
another man, made in his image and in the image of all the rest, but a
little weaker than them, will steal that explosive and crawl to the
centre of the earth with it, and place it just where he calculates it
would have the maximum effect. There will be a tremendous explosion,
but no one will hear it, and the earth will return to its nebulous
state and go wandering through the sky, free at last from parasites
and disease."
It
is incumbent upon all of us to prevent that somber prophecy from being
realized.
I
thank you.
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