Mr. President,
At the outset, let me congratulate you on your election as
President of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and pledge our full
support for a successful outcome of this important conference. On
behalf of the European Union, the Representative of the Presidency has
already outlined in his statement in detail the position of the
European Union with regard to the many key questions which need to be
addressed by this Conference. I shall thus limit myself to a number of
issues which are of particular concern and interest to my country.
Mr. President,
In his Millennium Report the Secretary General of the UN reminds us
"that some 35,000 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the
nuclear powers, with thousands still deployed on hair-trigger
alert". He notes that "above all we need a reaffirmation of
political commitment at the highest level to reduce the dangers that
arise both from existing nuclear weapons and from further
proliferation".
This is our task in the weeks to come. First and foremost, we need
to reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.
Only a couple of weeks ago, on 5 March 2000, we celebrated the 30th
Anniversary of its entry-into-force. Already in 1968 Austria was among
the first countries to sign and ratify the NPT. Ever since, Austria
has demonstrated her firm support to this landmark treaty and
advocated the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. We
thus note with satisfaction that 187 countries are today parties to
the NPT and we deplore that four countries remain outside its scope.
We call on these countries to adhere to the Treaty and make it truly
universal.
With regard to vertical non-proliferation, we acknowledge that
important nuclear disarmament measures have been undertaken in the
last years, and that real cuts were achieved since 1995. We especially
welcome the ratification of the START II Treaty and its Protocol by
the Duma on 14 April 2000, which paves the way for its early entry
into force and timely implementation. We hope that this long-awaited
decision will soon lead to the commencement of negotiations on a START
III agreement and to a further significant reduction in the number of
strategic nuclear weapons.
In the field of nuclear weapons tests, Austria applauds the
adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the
set-up of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory
Commission of the CTBTO in Vienna.
The adoption a few days ago of the legislation required for the
ratification of the CTBT by the Russian Federation is an important
measure to bring the treaty into force. 155 States have signed and 56
States have deposited their instruments of ratification. Austria for
her part has ratified the CTBT in March 1998 testifying full support
to its objectives. The Art. XIV Conference in October 1999 in Vienna
has given a boost to the ratification process. The States Signatories
need to provide the CTBTO PrepCom with the necessary budgetary means
to continue the build-up of the comprehensive verification system to
make it fully operational upon the treaty's entry into force.
The challenge of banning the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices as foreseen in the
"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament" of the 1995 Review has not been met. During the
Austrian Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament early this year
all efforts were made to translate the existing consensus into
concrete negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. We are
disappointed not to have succeeded but we will continue our common
efforts to achieve this result.
Mr. President,
Austria, as host country of the IAEA, attaches particular
importance to the implementation of NPT-related safeguards agreements.
We welcome the elaboration of a Model Protocol additional to existing
safeguards agreements adopted by the Board of Governors of the IAEA in
15 May 1997. The measures contained in the Model Protocol will, once
implemented, strengthen substantially the IAEA's safeguards system and
the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. The
Additional Protocol constitutes an integral part of the IAEA
safeguards agreements and has, therefore, to be treated in accordance
with the safeguard provisions of the NPT. All States should conclude
Additional Protocols with the view of an early universal
implementation of IAEA's strengthened system.
Mr. President,
Let me now focus on the way ahead.
In our view, it is imperative that the "Principles and
Objectives" remain intact. We need not only to build upon the
results of 1995, but need also to devise mechanisms for translating
the "Principles and Objectives" into concrete actions and
tangible results.
We are favorable to the idea of a plan or program of action to
achieve a more systematic review of implementation. It would contain
both issues which have not been realized in the past and new measures
and initiatives. Substance and procedure need to be considered in a
delicate balance.
As others, my delegation would see a number of elements in such a
program:
Transparency and information sharing need careful consideration
as public consciousness and the global citizenry are giving
increasing attention to nuclear disarmament and non proliferation.
My delegation looks forward to contributing along these lines to
the work of the Conference. We shall strive in our common efforts
for a nuclear weapons free world in which the term "weapons of
mass destruction" may eventually be eliminated from the
vocabulary of humankind.
Thank you, Mr. President.