STATEMENT
BY
NORMAN A. WULF
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE THIRD SESSION OF THE
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE MEETING FOR THE
2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

 

May 12, 1999

 

"U.S. Commitment to Article VI"

 Mr. Chairman,

The United States' commitment to NPT Article VI is broad and deep. We continue to demonstrate it not only through our words but also through our actions. President Clinton has expressed the hope that during the next century "the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be even flirther reduced. -- and ultimately eliminated."

 There were those who thought that the U.S. commitment to disarmament would falter after the 1995 extension decision and that the U.S. would lose interest in pursuing this objective. For example, many suggested that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty negotiations would never result in a completed Treaty. They were proven wrong. The United States not only pushed for rapid conclusion of that treaty but also was the first to sign it. Obtaining ratification in 1999 is one of the Administration's highest priorities. In addition, the United States is committed to working toward the earliest possible entry into force of this fundamental treaty and will approach the "Article XIV Conference't, scheduled to be held this fall, with that objective firmly in mind. Moreover, the United States remains strongly committed to negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament -- another of the "key steps" called for in the 1995 NPT Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
 

L'ct me briefly cite just a few statistics to indicate how far we have come toward our shared objective of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons. Through unilateral actions and the INF Treaty, the United States has eliminated over 80 percent of its tactical nuclear warheads. We also have eliminated 47 percent of our deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The levels in the agreed U.S.-Russian framework for START III negotiations [2000-2500 deployed warheads], when achieved would represent a 30-45 percent reduction in the total number of deployed strategic warheads permitted under START II and an 80 percent reduction from Cold War levels in total deployed U.S. strategic warheads. In addition to deep reductions, President Clinton and Yeltsin also agreed at Helsinki in March 1997 to START III measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warheads. START III would be the first treaty to address not only the means of delivery, but also the actual dismantlement of strategic nuclear warheads. In addition, once START II enters into force the United States and Russia have agreed that they will deactivate strategic nuclear delivery vehicles by December 31, 2003, which would ensure that START II's security benefits are realized in roughly the same time frame as originally intended. The United States and Russia will begin START III negotiations immediately after Russia ratifies START II. In the meantime, we have achieved key START I limits on warheads and delivery vehicles well ahead of the deadlines.
 
There can be no question that the nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia has ended. Not only that, the reductions that have occurred in the overall inventory of U.S. nuclear forces have been, by any measure, dramatic.
 
For example:

we have canceled four major strategic programs, halted bomber production, and ceased production of both plutonium and high-enriched uranium for weapons purposes Although, the failure to achieve even further reductions rapidly through the START process has been a source of frustration and disappointment to all in this room. I can assure this meeting that the United States and the Russian Federation remain committed to ratification of START II and then moving on to START III.
 
On the multilateral front, the U.S. has advocated strongly the initiation of substantive negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Despite the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee at the 1998 session of the Conference on Disarmament and a consensus resolution during the 1998 UN First Committee, the Conference has not yet been able to reach agreement to engage in negotiation this year of this important nuclear disarmament measure. An FMCT remains not only a key priority for the USG, but is a nuclear disarmament measure that is achievable now. We owe it to future generations to make good on this opportunity-- a step all Parties agreed was important -- while it is still available. No one can predict the combination of circumstances that the future may hold that might make failure to grasp this opportunity look foolish, if not downright tragic.
 
U.S. Approach to Article VI
 
The United States remains committed to press ahead for still further progress toward fulfilling our Article VI obligations. While we do so, it is important to recognize that the pace of arms reduction is subject to a variety of external realities. Domestic and international policy
factors, the global security environment, and availability of financial resources are all directly related to this process. This is as true for the bilateral fora as it is for multilateral fora. History shows that neither process moves in a smooth, linear fashion, but in fits and starts. Great and unpredicted strides forward have occurred, as with the INF Treaty, where an entire category of U.S. and Soviet weapons was eliminated at once, and with the CTBT, where the vast majority of nations agreed to halt all nuclear explosive tests. We have also witnessed periods where there is little forward movement, such as with the current impasse over START II and over negotiations for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
 

U.S. "Non-Classic" Nuclear Disarmament Efforts
 
Beyond classical bilateral and multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts, there is an entirely new, but extremely relevant area of effort that we might call "non-classic arms control." Let me try to set out, in summary form first and then in greater detail, what the United States and Russia are doing in this area that directly contributes to achieving the goals of Article

VI. In the first instance, we are working together on arrangements to ensure the safety and security of existing Russian fissile material and to help Russia convert older reactors from a design that produces weapon-grade plutonium to a design that does not. Once fissile materials are secure, the United States and Russia are seeking to transform vast quantities of those materials into a form to convert them back into weapons usable form. To promote international confidence in those efforts, the United States and Russia are also working with the IAEA to allow the IAEA to verify that the large quantities of material that are dec]ared excess to defense needs are never again used for weapon purposes.
 
In this category of activities, the United States has already spent $1.6 billion. President Clinton in his State of the Union message earlier this year announced a plan to provide $4.5 billion over the next 5 years to assist Russia and the Newly Independent States on a variety of arms control and nonproliferation activities.

Let me provide additional details on each of these steps. We and several other countries are providing equipment and technical cooperation to allow not only Russia, but also other states of the former Soviet Union to meet international standards with respect to control, protection and accountancy of nuclear material. For example, the United States is working with Russia to build a secure facility at Mayak to store fissile material from dismantled weapons. Russia has said that it intends to place around 40% of its weapons grade plutonium stockpile in this facility.

We are also cooperating with Russia on the conversion of excess fissile material so that it is no longer usable for weapons purposes. Let me first say a word about high-enriched uranium. The United States agreed to purchase from Russia 500 metric tons of HEU extracted from Russian dismantled nuclear weapons. The U.S. purchases the material after it has been blended down to low enriched uranium for use as power reactor fuel. The first delivery of down-blended material arrived in the United States in 1995 and since then fuel from the down-blending of approximately 55 tons of HEU has been delivered. In addition, the U.S. is discussing with the IAEA an approach for the IAEA to verif~ the down-blending of 50 metric tons of U.S. HEU to LEU. Down-blending and verification activities are targeted to begin by the end of this year and will continue for six years.

 
Converting plutonium presents a much more difficult challenge and involves a number of countries in addition to the United States and Russia. One approach that is being examined is conversion of the separated plutonium into a mixed oxide fuel that can be burned in nuclear reactors. The other option is to add radioactive waste products to the plutonium and immobilize the mixture in such a way that it would be as difficult re-separate plutonium from the waste products as it is to reprocess spent fuel. However, both options are extremely expensive and will take lengthy periods of time to accomplish.

Because of the lengthy time periods involved, the United States and Russia are working with the IAEA to develop an approach to permit the IAEA to verify that this excess plutonium is never again used for nuclear weapons purposes. In the United States, the IAEA is currently applying safeguards to 12 tons of material. This is a down payment on the 226 tons the U.S. has declared excess and has pledged to submit to IAEA verification.

Our 'Fact Sheet" attached to the written version of my statement goes into these programs in much more detail than I have time for in this statement and I would encourage you to examine it closely. The Fact Sheet demonstrates that nuclear disarmament is being accomplished. In addition, it demonstrates one reality that simply cannot be ignored in any serious discussion of the issues dealt with by Article VI-- including dismantling of nuclear weapons -- namely, that the process is complicated, expensive, and often time-consuming work.

The point I wish to make is clear. Through these "non-classical" arms control measures, major steps have been taken and even more are in progress that lead inevitably toward fulfilling the objectives set forth in Article VI.

Ultimately, however, effective nuclear disarmament does not take place in isolation from developments in the broader international security environment, as the Treaty recognizes in both the preamble and Article VI. The conclusion of the CTBT, entry into force of the Chemical Weapon Convention, emergence of additional nuclear weapon free zones, conclusion of the IAEA strengthened safeguards system, and continuing work on a compliance regime for the Biological Weapons Convention -- all help to create an environment that is favorable to further progress toward reductions of nuclear weapons. India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests, questions regarding other countries' compliance with global nonproliferation norms, and the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to do serious work on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty do not contribute to this goal. While the nuclear weapon states bear primary responsibility for dealing with their nuclear arsenals, non-nuclear-weapon states have a critical role to play in helping create the right international security climate for achievement of disarmament. Here I am referring not only to the measure just cited, but also to efforts such as:

enhancing national export control systems;

efforts to identify, reduce, and eliminate destabilizing concentrations of conventional forces; and

implementation of measures to promote enhanced confidence and stability, particularly in regions of tension.

 
 Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, there has been a lot of focus this past year on trying to identify a new agenda for the disarmament process. I would suggest that we have an existing agenda that remains to be completed. Some of the steps still before us were first identified for multilateral action four decades ago. We need to redouble our efforts to accomplish the tasks before us, some of which I have outlined above.

However, we should also continue to look to the future and identify additional steps to be pursued. Certain initiatives await the right combination of political will and momentum to get underway. The United States accepts readily that there will be additional steps on the road to nuclear disarmament and we remain open to considering practical proposals, such as those that promote enhanced transparency, support our efforts to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, and reinforce the bilateral strategic nuclear arms reduction process.

The way forward, will necessarily build on the principal agreements and accomplishments of the past. While our path is still being defined, what is clear is that we are moving on a very broad front of mutually reinforcing measures not limited to nuclear efforts alone. What is equally clear is that the commitment of each of us to achieving these measures and to creating a stable international security environment is essential if we are to reach our shared goal of a world free from nuclear weapons.

Thank you.