FRANCE

Intervention de S.E. Monsieur Hubert de la Fortelle,

Ambassadeur,

Représentant permanent de la France

auprés de la Conférence du Désarmement,

Chef de la delegation au Comité préparatoire de la Conférence d^'examen

de 2000 du TNP

USAGES PACIFIQUES DE L^'ENERGIE NUCLEAIRE

New York, le vendredi 14 mai 1999

vérifier au prononce

(unofficial english translation attached)

THIRD SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

FOR THE 2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation attaches very special importance to this discussion on the peaceflil uses of nuclear energy.

1) As you know, France has resolutely opted for nuclear power in its energy policy: more than 75 percent of its electricity is generated by it. Not only has this been a policy of energy independence: it is also a policy aimed at protecting our environment and promoting sustainable development. The facts speak for themselves:

our country is one of the least carbon dioxide-producing countries in Europe. Nuclear power is the only source of energy that allows us to produce the vast quantities of energy needed to meet humanity's growing demand for energy without producing large quantities of C0₂ emissions.

Even if short-term swings may affect the economic att:raction of different energy sources relative to each other, France is convinced that nuclear power will continue to be a major pillar of its electricity supply in the fliture.

2) Fortified by this observation that nuclear power has a central role to play in providing a clean, long-term response to the growing energy needs of humanity, France is actively involved in efforts to promote peaceful uses of the atom in the world, in keeping with article IV of the Treaty, and in compliance with articles I, II, and III of the Treaty.

It is doing so in the first place through an ever-growing number of nuclear cooperation agreements. Some thirty or so have been signed to date. Another three are currently under negotiation. These agreements give practical expression to our policy of cooperating with the countries concerned, providing a legal framework for that cooperation.

France also actively supports the IAEA. It is indeed essential that the Agency ha\'e at its disposal the human and financial resources it needs in order to discharge the missions entrusted to it in terms of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. France contributes 6.3 percent of the IAEA's technical cooperation fund. It is important that all States maintain their contributions to this flind at their current level or even increase them, in order to enable the development of peaceful uses of the atom.

3) Nuclear power is clearly going to play a key role in the ₂l£~ century. But this form of energy can only develop in a climate of trust. And that, we believe, depends on fdur imperatives:

the first imperative is non-proliferation, hence the need for effective and objective export controls, and active support for the IAEA ~afeguards system.

Rigorous export controls are an essential condition for the development of nuclear trade; but it is not an end in itself. In particular, it should not come to stand as an obstacle to this trade, nor should it jeopardize the imperative of safety. Strict and viL~ilant though they need to be, the rules governing export controls must not contravene the other Treaty obligations. This is a constant concern, and it guides us in our work within the Nuclear Suppliers Group. We conceive of these as an indispensable tool aimed at promoting a realistic, objective and balanced approach to export controls.

I won't return to the question of safeguards, since I have already expressed mvself on the subject in the previous debate. I would simply like to add that the adoption by a growing number of countries of additional 'protocols to their safeguard agreements implementing the IAEA strengthened safeguards programme will be conducive to even more trusting, and consequently flourishing, nuclear cooperation.

The second imperative is security, with effective physical protection mechanisms. On this point, France calls for the signature by all States of the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials. This instrument has proven its utility in an area on which States are highly sensitive. It is that same sensitivity which leads France to adopt a circumspect attitude over the idea of new binding norms that might apply to nuclear installations. If one wants these norms to be effective, then one will have to verify their application. Yet, to be lully effective, ph\~sical protection measures must remain confidential. On questions like this, the best is liable to be the enemy of the good. While we consider that extending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material could prove risky, on the other hand we do want all States to subscribe to the recommendations of the IAEA on this subject.

- The third imperative is surely the most important, namely safety. Safety must progress on all fronts, and that means reactors, downstream of the cycle, management of highly active, long-lived waste. We call on all States to sign and ratify the relevant cofl\~entions, starting with the convention on nuclear safety and the joint convention on the safety of management of spent fuel and on the safety of management of radioacti\e waste.

The first meeting of the contracting parties to the convention on nuclear safety met in Vienna in April 1999, and permitted a broad exchange of views on safety issues among participants. Let us hope that other States will adhere to this convention by time the next meeting comes to be held, in three years¹ time, and that all together they will aim at implementing it rigorously and in good faith.

The most stringent safety measures should also be applied to the transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials. We attach the utmost importance to ensuring that materials are transported in the optimum conditions of safety and security, in compliance with the strictest international standards. We will continue to emphasize transparency in our own actions and to inform the countries concerned about the conditions in which this transportation is carried out. However, there must be no impediment to the rights and freedoms of navigation and traffic stipulated in the relevant instruments of international law.

Lastly, I would remind you of the importance, in fostering confident nuclear cooperation, of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, together with the Paris and Brussels conventions on liability for nuclear damage.

The final imperative is transparency. France believes that the development of nuclear power must go hand in hand with greater transparency, so that governments and populations can be aware of the issues at stake and the means deployed. For our part, we pledge to continue our existing~efforts to foster transparency and information, particularly where safety is concerned.

To conclude, promoting peaceful uses of nuclear power is one of our missions under article IV of the Treaty, and France does not want it to be treated as the poor relative of the review process. It actually is one of the NPT three fundamental pillars. We want this to be the subject of detailed discussion on the occasion of the Review Conference in 2000. And we want the outcome of this Conference to give strong impetus to this crucial issue for the ₂I~~ century.