STATEMENT BY
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
AT
THE TlIIRD NPT PREPCOM 13 MAY 1999, NEW YORK
ON

CLUSTER II ISSUES

Check Against Delivery

NPT PrepCom May 1999

UK intervention in Cluster Debate on Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

Introductory remarks

Mr Chairman,

The United Kingdom fully supports the earlier statement made by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of the European Union. I should now like to add one or two points from a national perspective.

Strengthened Safeguards System

In his statement on behalf of the European Union, my German colleague referred to the progress which has been made within the IAEA towards the achievement of a strengthened system of international safeguards. He mentioned, in particular, the signature on 22 September 1998 of Additional Protocols covering the fifteen member States of the European Union.

The United Kingdom has been a strong supporter of the strengthened safeguards process, bearing in mind our special responsibilities as a nuclear weapons State. The Additional Protocol for the United Kingdom, signed in September of last year, takes full account of the commitment we gave in the May 1997 Special Meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors to implement those measures that would strengthen the capability of the IAEA to detect clandestine activities in non-nuclear weapons States or improve the efficiency of IAEA safeguards in the United Kingdom.

Having signed the Additional Protocol, national legislation is now before our Parliament to enable the United Kingdom to fulfil its international obligations and bring the Additional Protocol into force. The Nuclear Safeguards Bill was introduced in Parliament on 13 January of this year and is scheduled to have its second reading in the House of Commons on 11 June. Subject to the successful completion of its remaining Parliamentary stages, the Bill should be on the statute books by the autumn, ready to be brought into operation at any time after that.

The Nuclear Safeguards Bill contains measures to give Her Majesty's Government powers to compel the production of information and ensure access for IAEA inspectors, in fulfilment of our obligations under the Additional Protocol. In fact, our expectation is that we shall rarely, if ever, need to use these powers, and that industry will co-operate and work together with us on a voluntary basis. Indeed, we are near to completing with our industry a voluntary declaration exercise which will provide the IAEA with a picture of UK nuclear-related activities carried out in connection with non-nuclear weapon States as of 31 December 1998. The aim of this exercise is to ensure that we have in place the appropriate mechanisms to provide complete and timely information to the IAEA as soon as our Additional Protocol enters into force. We are working, in line with other Member States of the European Union, to have our Additional Protocol in force by the time of the 2000 Review Conference.

The United Kingdom welcomes the fact that forty States have now concluded Additional Protocols. We call upon all other States to show the same commitment by entering into negotiations with the IAEA with a view to concluding Additional Protocols as soon as possible. The full potential of the strengthened safeguards regime will only be achieved when Additional Protocols have been adopted and are being implemented by all States.

The Additional Protocol measures are, of course, intended to supplement and complement the more traditional safeguards measures provided for in existing safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The United Kingdom considers that, over time, the combination of the two will become the norm for safeguards application in non-nuclear weapons States party to the NPT. We also support the efforts that are being made within the IA£A to develop a system of integrated safeguards, in which the new measures will be combined with the old to create an efficient and effective system.

As our own example shows, the scope for action is not limited to non-nuclear weapons States party to the NPT. There are Additional Protocol measures that all States can implement in support of the aim of increasing the IAEA' 5 capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. The ultimate aim must be for all States not party to the NPT to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA - in accordance with paragraph 11 of the Principles and Objectives - and to commit themselves to the negotiation of Additional Protocols.

Compliance issues

Mr Chairman,

In concentrating so far on the new safeguards measures to be implemented by States once their Additional Protocols are in force, I do not mean to imply that we have lost sight of the need for States to comply fully with their existing commitments under safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

The past and continuing experience in two States in particular underlines the importance of continued vigilance on the part of the international community and the IAEA in particular.

DPRK

The UK has supported all efforts to ensure that the DPRK honours its safeguards obligations. We greatly welcomed the 1994 agreement between the DPRK and the United States, and note that IAEA inspectors have been able to verify that the nuclear freeze remains in place. But we regret that the DPRK is still not providing IAEA inspectors with the information and access they need to draw up a comprehensive picture of its nuclear programme. The lack of progress since the last PrepCom on the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK is a matter of grave concern to the United Kingdom. We urge the DPRK to come into full compliance with its Safeguards Agreement at the earliest possible time.

Iraq

The example of Iraq shows the immense danger of nuclear proliferation. Iraq, despite being an NPT signatory, was just a few years away from possessing a nuclear weapon. Thanks to the excellent work of the IAEA and the UN Special Commission, the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme has been dismantled. But the potential threat has not gone away. Iraq still has the capability to embark on such a programme again if we relax our vigilance. And it showed throughout 1998 that it would rather seek confrontation with the weapons inspectors than give up its remaining weapons of mass destruction.

The United Kingdom has been in the forefront of efforts to re-establish an effective disarmament and monitoring regime in Iraq. We shall continue to seek a way forward that provides for this.

Extending coverage of safeguards

The Principles and Objectives document underlines in clear and unambiguous terms the need for States to comply with existing commitments in the form of safeguards agreements with the IAEA. But it is also a forward-looking document.

Paragraph 13 calls for fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful use to be placed under IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable. This is an aim we support and in this connection the United Kingdom welcomes the US/Russian/IAEA Trilateral Initiative, the progress that the parties have made, and their continuing efforts towards making arms reduction an irreversible and verifiable process. We look forward to receiving further information in the IAEA Board of Governors.

The next logical step, and one that would do more than any other to date to move towards the goal of extending safeguards coverage expressed in paragraph 13, is of course the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. In our statement on disarmament, we have already made clear our frustration at the lack of progress towards this. I will not repeat the UK position, but would simply emphasise again the great importance that the UK attaches to the early start of negotiations.

In both of these initiatives we believe that the IAEA has a key role to play. The IAEA has the expertise to carry out effectively the necessary verification activities, and we look forward to collaborating with the Agency in the development of verification approaches to meet the challenges of the new regimes.

I have two final points concerning developments in the United Kingdom. In our statement on disarmament, we have already described the steps taken in the UK in the nuclear field as a result of the Strategic Defence Review. One result of this has been the placing under international safeguards of significant additional quantities of nuclear material previously held outside of safeguards for defence-related purposes. We have also given a commitment that all planned reprocessing and enrichment activities in the UK will be subject to safeguards.

Following our adoption, in December 1997, along with eight other participating States, of the guidelines for the management of plutonium in all peaceful nuclear activities, we have published our national strategy for the management of civil plutonium. We have also published figures for our national holdings of plutonium as at 31 December 1997, and are preparing the figures for 1998 for publication in advance of the June meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. The United Kingdom has also published figures on its holdings of high enriched uranium and natural and depleted uranium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle. Taken together with the information on stocks of nuclear materials held outside safeguards, which has been made available as a result of the Strategic Defence Review, this represents a real and substantial commitment to increased transparency in relation to all of our holdings of nuclear materials.

Concluding remarks

Mr Chairman,

The past year has been an important one in the field of safeguards and non-proliferation. The United Kingdom is playing its part in helping to strengthen and further improve the safeguards regime, and will continue to do so. Our hope is that by the time of the Review Conference next year we will have witnessed significant further progress towards the universal application of safeguards, both through the conclusion of Additional Protocols, and through the agreement of comprehensive safeguards agreements between the IAEA and States which have yet to put these in place.