SWEDEN

Statement by
Ambassador Henrik Salander
at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference
of the Parties

to

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons New York

Cluster 2

Safeguards

13 May 1999

PERMANENT MISSION OF SWEDEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS 885 SECOND AVENUE. NEW YORK, NY 10017. TEL (212) 583-2500. FAX (212) 832-0389

Mr Chairman,

The position of the EU countries with respect to the issues falling under cluster 2 has already been clearly stated by Germany speaking for the European Union and associated countries. I shall therefore limit myself to one of the questions to which Sweden attached particular importance namely the IAFA Model Protocol.

Further progress towards a world free from nuclear weapons requires, inter alia, a strong global non-proliferation regime. The Model Protocol Additional to the Agreements between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safe-guards is a crucial instrument for the fttrther strengthening of this regime.

Sweden therefore calls upon all States having Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA to conclude without delay Additional Protocols to these agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol.

All the member States of the EU and the European Commission for Euratom have signed the Additional Protocols to their Safeguards Agreements on 22 September last year. The next step is now the ratification of these protocols. Work on Sweden's ratification of the Additional Protocol has begun with a view to presenting a Bill to the Swedish Parliament later this year.

The IAEA Model Protocol constitutes a milestone in the development of international safeguards and the strengthening of the NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation regime. It gives the IAEA an additional tool for providing credible assurance that national nuclear programmes are peace~l.

The issue of highest importance is now the implementation of the provisions contained in the Model Protocol, including the integration of traditional safeguards measures with the Model Protocol safeguards activities.

The step to go from having the IAEA verif~ring the peaceful use of fissile material in declared facilities, to also veri~ing the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and/or facilities, is significant in two regards. Firstly, it provides the IAEA with additional authority to gain insight into national nuclear programmes. This additional insight will enable the IAEA to better assess the correctness and the completeness of the overall information collected and provided regarding nuclear activities in a State, and thereby provide an extended basis on which to base its ensuing reassurance of the peaceful character of the programme. Secondly, it provides the opportunity for the States having concluded Additional Protocols with the IAEA to additionally demonstrate their commitment and dedication to the nuclear non-proliferation principles embodied in the NPT.

Sweden actively participated in the negotiations and other work within the framework of the IAEA to advance the so-called 93+2 programme. The Swedish Support Programme for IAEA Safeguards included projects to practically demonstrate how elements of information acquisition could feasibly be implemented. Currently, our Support Programme includes projects that are designed to assist the IAEA in practically collecting, collating and evaluating information available from open i.e. non-classified sources. Sweden will also, in the context of our Support Progralnme, be active in providing assistance to the IAEA for the purpose of implementing integrating safeguards in Member States. This illustrates our commitment to ~filling our obligations contained in the Additional Protocol.

Sweden, as a Member of the IAEA Board of Governors, is actively engaged in the work to ensure full implementation of the measures included in the Model Protocol. In this regard, the key issue for Sweden is the integration of traditional safeguards with Model Protocol safeguards. Cnly by such integration can the basic objective of the Strengthened Safeguards System, namely to increase the efficiency and the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards activities, be optimally achieved. Integration means, in our view, the streamlining of traditional safeguards in order to allow corresponding resources set free for attending to tasks identified in the Model Protocol. It thus does not mean the full replacement of the traditional system by the new system, or maintaining both systems in parallel.

Sweden, like many other IAEA ~oard Members, have expressed concern over the fact that the current IAEA Verification Programme, which is a mandatory activity according to the IAEA Statute, is financed to only about 80% over the regular budget. The remainder is financed through voluntary contributions. There is thus also for this reason a need to careflilly review details of the current verification programme with a view to identif~ng priorities. We are confident that the process of integrating the traditional and the recently emerged new safeguards systems will greatly assist in determining optimal priorities.

Thank you, Mr Chairman.