STATEMENT BY CANADA

Thursday, May 13, 1999

Implementation of the Provisions of the Treaty

Relating to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Safeguards and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Mr. Chairman,

In Canada's statement during the General Exchange of Views on May 10th, we stressed the need to focus increasingly on the object of the Strengthened Review Process in its current context as well as on the specific objectives for the 2000 Review Conference. The object of the Strengthened Review Process is the preservation and enhancement of the authority and integrity of the NPT, which is of vital importance to us all. We are working this year in an even more critical context than earlier, but success rests on positive work on both procedures and substance of the Strengthened Review as well as on respect for the 1995 framework of decisions on which this Review is based. As part of the specific objectives for the 2000 Review Conference, we propose in this intervention to turn our attention to a central element of the integrity of the NPT, the measures designed to provide assurance that nuclear energy is used only for peaceful, non-explosive purposes. These measures include export controls, physical protection and IAEA safeguards.

Nuclear export controls are an essential action by governments to promote an effective nuclear non-proliferation regime, and are a means for States Party to fulfill their obligations under the NPT by seeking to ensure that their nuclear exports contribute exclusively to peaceful, non-explosive uses of nuclear energy. Properly structured and applied, export controls foster a climate of confidence in nuclear trade that encourages and facilitates international cooperation in pursuit of economic and technological development. Transparency is an essential dimension to nuclear export controls, a reality that is captured in the 1995 Principles and Objectives. We applaud the efforts made in 1997 and this year to convene International Seminars on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-proliferation held respectively in Vienna and New York. Canada joins with many other States in the belief that these seminars are positive steps in this regard. Canada supports further efforts at promoting and enhancing transparency. The 2000 Review Conference should endorse transparency in nuclear related export controls that should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States Party to theNPT.

Mr. Chairrnan,

Physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities is an integral part of effective nuclear non-proliferation. Canada considers that it is critical that all States adopt the recommendations of the IAEA on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, currently set forth in INFCIRC/2251Rev.3. Rigorous national measures in this regard ensure effective protection of nuclear material, both while under national jurisdiction and during international transit, and of nuclear facilities. Furthermore, Canada believes it is appropriate that States Party to the NPT review regularly the physical protection regime, which includes the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, an important framework for international cooperation in this area, with the goal of determining the adequacy of the current regime and reinforcing it if required. The 2000 Review Conference should note the importance of physical protection for effective nuclear non-proliferation and welcome proposals for the review through the IAEA of international recommendations and standards.

IAEA safeguards are a perennial item on the agenda of the review conferences, and properly so given their centrality to the effectiveness of the NPT. The Agency's safeguards system must obviously continue to adapt in the face of emerging political realities, of evolving technologies, and of operational efficiencies and improvements.

Canada has proposed in its working paper NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/2 that the 2000 Review Conference should note that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verif~ing and assuring, in accordance with its Statute and its safeguards system, that States' compliance with their safeguards agreements is preserved and enhanced. The 2000 Review Conference should call upon every non-nuclear-weapon State Partyto the NPT, which has not already done so to bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA pursuant to Article III of the Treaty. Moreover, it should also urge that States not party to the NPT enter into Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA.

In the past few years significant developments occurred in the area of IAEA safeguards which need to be pursued. The achievement of the IAEA in connection with Programme 93+2 for a strengthened and more cost-effective safeguards system has been estimable. The product of the work to implement Part II of the Programme, the Model Additional Protocol, was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997. A number of States, including Canada, have concluded a Protocol Additional to their Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA, and it is hoped that all States will conclude such an additional protocol by the time of the 2000 Review Conference. In this context, all States should conclude and implement Protocols Additional to their safeguards agreements based on the Model Protocol (INFCIRC/540 Corr.). To further these positive developments, much work needs to be done, in particular, with respect to the integration of the IAEA safeguards measures in order to realise the promises of the strengthened safeguards regime. This is why efforts to further strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be endorsed by the 2000 Review Conference.

The 1 990s have witnessed significant multilateral developments with respect to conditions of supply to non-nuclear-weapon States of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. Progress still needs to be made and the 2000 Review Conference should note that supply arrangements for these items should include, as a supply condition, an internationally legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, commitment verified by acceptance of IAEA fullscope safeguards.

Moreover, the current impetus for strengthened, effective and efficient verification measures by the IAEA in support of nuclear non-proliferation and, it goes without saying, of nuclear cooperation, paves the way for consideration at an appropriate point in time by States Party to the Treaty of the conclusion and entry-into-force of additional protocols as an element of fuliscope safeguards

Mr. Chairman,

The objectives of the Treaty are promoted by effective measures of nuclear nonproliferation, which include export controls, physical protection and IAEA safeguards. These measures buttress and enhance the integrity of the NPT by providing assurance that nuclear energy is used only for peaceful, non-explosive purposes. These measures facilitate nuclear cooperation. Canada recognizes that significant progress has been made over the recent years in support of nuclear non-proliferation and commend all States that have contributed to these significant achievements. However, there are still major improvements required to ensure nuclear non-proliferation. This is the reason why Canada has proposed in its first working paper, new Principles and Objectives for the 2000 Review Conference to guide and enhance further positive development in the areas of safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the next session of this third Preparatory Committee, Canada will further develop its views in the area of peacelul uses of nuclear energy.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, we would like to use this opportunity to reaffirm Canada's abiding support for the establishment of internationally-recognized nud ear-weapon-free-zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and their contribution to global and regional peace and security. We welcome the efforts of the States of Central Asia towards this end. Canada urges further efforts, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, to establish such nuclear-weapon-free-zones. Canada is hopeful that the 2000 Review Conference will include this issue in its new Principles and Objectives.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.